

CHAPTER 4

DYNASTIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE IL-KHĀNS

THE MONGOL INVASION

The chronology of Sulṭān Muḥammad's first contacts with the Mongols is extremely confusing, and it is difficult and sometimes impossible to reconcile the accounts of the various authorities. According to Jūzjānī¹ relations had been established as early as 1215. Himself attracted by the riches of China and therefore disturbed by reports of Chingiz-Khān's operations in that region Muḥammad decided to send an embassy to this new rival with instructions to ascertain his military strength and the extent of his successes. The embassy was headed by one Bahā' al-Dīn Rāzi, and Jūzjānī professes to give his somewhat lurid account of the mission in the envoy's actual words. As the party journeyed through the North China plain they descried in the far distance a great white mound, which they took to be a snow-covered mountain but which, as they were informed by their guides, was in fact a huge pyramid of human bones. As they proceeded farther the very ground beneath their feet became dark and greasy from the fat of rotting corpses; and for three full stages they had to make their way through this grisly morass. When they finally arrived before Peking they perceived, beneath a bastion of the citadel, the bones of 60,000 young women who, when the city was captured, had flung themselves from the walls rather than fall into the hands of the Mongols. During the envoys' first interview with Chingiz-Khān the Chin Emperor's son and prime minister were brought in bound in chains, no doubt with an eye to the effect of this spectacle upon the ambassadors. The latter were, however, favourably received, and in a second interview Chingiz-Khān charged them to inform the sultan that he regarded him as the ruler of the West, as he himself was ruler of the East. There should be a treaty of peace and friendship between them, and merchants should be free to travel to and fro between their territories. Among the gifts which he sent with them for presentation to their master was a nugget of gold from the mountains of China

¹ Transl. Raverty, vol. II, pp. 963 ff.

so large that it had to be transported in a waggon. He dispatched with them also a group of his own merchants with a caravan of five hundred camels laden with gold, silver, silks and furs. And here Jūzjānī casts some doubt upon the story by stating, still apparently in the words of Bahā' al-Dīn, that these were the same merchants whose detention and execution at Uṭrār gave rise to the outbreak of hostilities between Chingiz-Khān and the sultan.

The mission to Peking is mentioned by none of the other sources. However, Nasawī's¹ account of an embassy in the opposite direction may well be the description of the same event, viz. the first diplomatic encounter between the Mongols and the Khwārazm-Shāh, wherever and whenever this may have actually taken place. The embassy described by Nasawī reached the sultan somewhere in Transoxiana (probably Bukhārā) early in 1218 bearing presents similar to those enumerated by Jūzjānī, including a precious silk fabric called *torqu*. The message they brought was likewise similar to that recorded by Jūzjānī. Chingiz-Khān had heard of the sultan's victories and wished to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with him; he wished also for the free and unhampered movement of merchants between their territories. In expressing these wishes, however, he referred to Muḥammad as being "on a level with the dearest of my sons", a phrase which gave deep offence to the sultan. Sending for one of the envoys, a Khwārazmī called Maḥmūd, probably the same Maḥmūd Yalavach who afterwards held high office in the Mongol empire, he questioned him in private about Chingiz-Khān, asking whether it was true that he had conquered the Chinese and captured their capital. Maḥmūd replied that it was indeed so. Even such conquests, the sultan went on, did not give an infidel the right to address him, the ruler of a great empire, as his son, i.e. as a vassal. Perceiving the sultan's anger Maḥmūd added that the Mongols' army could bear no comparison with the Khwārazm-Shāh's forces, and Muḥammad was mollified and agreed to the conclusion of a treaty.

Whatever the truth about the initial embassy to or from Chingiz-Khān, the sources are all in broad agreement about the massacre at Uṭrār. In that town, on Muḥammad's eastern frontier, there arrived at some time in 1218 a caravan of merchants, four hundred and fifty in number according to Juvainī,² a figure which tallies with the five hundred camels which, in Jūzjānī's account, were required for the transport of

¹ Transl. Houdas, pp. 57-9.

² Transl. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 79.

their wares. The sight of all these riches excited the cupidity of the governor, a relation of the sultan called Īnalchuq, who had been accorded the title of Qayir-Khān. He placed the whole party under arrest and dispatched a messenger to Muḥammad, who according to Juvainī was still in Western Persia, to seek his instructions, alleging that the merchants were really spies in the service of the Mongols. Whether the sultan believed this allegation or whether, like Īnalchuq, he was activated solely by motives of greed, he authorized or at any rate connived at the execution of several hundred fellow-Muslims, many of whom must have been his own subjects. News of this bloodbath was brought to Chingiz-Khān by a member of the party who had contrived to make his escape. Controlling his anger the Mongol conqueror made a last attempt to obtain satisfaction by diplomatic means. A Muslim, formerly in the service of Sultān Tekish, was dispatched with two Mongols as companions to protest against Īnalchuq's action and demand the surrender of his person. Far from acceding to this request the sultan ordered all three envoys to be put to death, a wanton breach of international law which rendered the Mongols' invasion of his territories inevitable.

However, before Chingiz-Khān could attack the sultan it was necessary to deal with two enemies nearer home. Of these the more formidable was the Naiman Küchlüg, who as the sultan's ally had seized the lion's share of the Qara-Khitai empire. An army under the command of the famous Jebe chased him from Kāshghar over the Pamirs into Badakhshān, where, with the co-operation of the local population, he was captured and put to death. In the meantime the remnants of the Merkit had been defeated and annihilated by an army jointly commanded by the great general Sübedei and by Chingiz-Khān's eldest son Jochi. Defeated with Küchlüg on the Irtish in 1206 the Merkit had at first made common cause with the Naiman prince but had then quarrelled with him and withdrawn into the region of the Upper Yenisei. Pursued from thence by the Mongols, they had fled to the territory of the Qipchaq to the north-east of the Aral Sea; and here, in what is today the Kustanai region of Northern Kazakhstan, they were now overtaken and destroyed.

Sultān Muḥammad was in Samarqand when he learnt of the Merkit's approach to the Qipchaq country. He at once set out to attack them, but upon reaching Jand received the news that the Mongols were close at their heels. Returning to Samarqand for reinforcements he advanced

northwards for the second time, hoping, in the words of Juvainī,¹ "to kill two birds with one stone". Between two rivers, apparently the Irgiz and the Turgai, he came upon the scene of the battle. From a wounded man, discovered amongst the piles of dead, it was learnt that it had been fought that very day. Hurrying after the retiring Mongols the sultan caught up with them the next morning. They sought to avoid a conflict insisting that their quarrel was only with the Merkit and that they had no authority to attack the sultan. The latter, however, forced them into a stubborn but indecisive engagement, which continued till nightfall. The Mongols then withdrew under cover of darkness after first kindling fires to conceal their intention; and the sultan entered their camp the next morning only to find it deserted. He returned to Samarqand in a state of panic, the effect of this first encounter with the Mongols being such that he never again ventured to meet them in the open field.

It was probably at Samarqand that Muḥammad first learnt of the approach of Chingiz-Khān's main army. He held the first of several councils of war, in which his son Jalāl al-Dīn,² according to Juvainī, or Shihāb al-Dīn Khīvaqī, according to Ibn al-Athīr,³ advocated the more courageous, if less practical, course of advancing with united forces to meet the enemy at the frontier. The majority were in favour of abandoning Transoxiana to its fate, some advising the sultan to withdraw into Khurāsān and defend the crossings of the Oxus, while others suggested that he should make a stand in the Ghazna region of Afghanistan and, if necessary, fall back on India. He decided to follow this latter advice and having placed considerable garrisons in the various towns of Transoxiana made his way to Balkh en route for Ghazna. At Balkh, however, he was met by an emissary of his son Rukn al-Dīn, the governor of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, who persuaded him to change his plans and proceed instead to Central Persia. Upon leaving Balkh he sent a patrol to Panjāb or Mēla, the well-known crossing of the Oxus near the mouth of the Vakhsh, to ascertain the course of events. At Tirmidh the patrol came up with the news that Bukhārā had already fallen, soon followed by a report of the capture of Samarqand. Continuing his westward flight the sultan passed by the great natural fortress known later as Kalāt-i Nādirī, and it was suggested to him that he should concentrate troops and supplies in this well-nigh impregnable stronghold. He was

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, p. 370.

² *Ibid.* pp. 376-7.

³ Vol. XII, p. 237.

unable to reach a decision and pressed onwards towards Nishāpūr, where he arrived on 18 April 1220. Still in a state of panic he urged the inhabitants to disperse throughout the countryside rather than attempt to withstand the irresistible Mongols. Finding them unwilling to quit their homes he bade them repair the fortifications for whose destruction he had himself been responsible. Then gradually recovering his peace of mind and thinking that the Oxus might prove at least a temporary barrier to the Mongols' advance, he gave himself up to pleasure and for a time refused to listen to any serious business. His fears were now so much allayed that he decided to send Jalāl al-Dīn back to Balkh. He had travelled only a single stage of the journey when he learnt that Sübedei and Jebe had already crossed the Oxus and were close at hand. He returned to Nishāpūr with the news, and the sultan left the town on 15 May just in time to escape the vanguard of the Mongol army, which arrived before the gates on the very next day and at once continued in his pursuit.

The conquest of Transoxiana had been accomplished with incredible speed. After passing the summer of 1219 on the banks of the Irtysh Chingiz-Khān had advanced westwards in the autumn through what is now the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan. At Qayaliq in the present-day Taldy Kurgan region he was joined by the local Qarluq tribesmen as also by the Qarluq of Almaliq and a contingent of Uighur led by their ruler, the *idhuq-qut*. The Mongol army, which in Barthold's¹ estimation numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 men, arrived at some time in the late autumn before the frontier town of Uṭrār. Here Chingiz-Khān divided his forces, advancing himself on Bukhārā with the main body, whilst sending his eldest son Jochi on an expedition down the Syr Darya and leaving his younger sons Chaghatai and Ögedei to lay siege to Uṭrār. Having crossed the Syr Darya the Mongols approached the small fortified town of Zurnūq, which was persuaded to surrender without a fight. Instead, however, of following the normal route towards Samarqand the Mongols were led by Türkmen guides across the Qizil Qum desert to Nūr (now Nurata); and from Nūr, which likewise offered no resistance, Chingiz-Khān arrived before Bukhārā early in February 1220. The garrison, after a siege of only three days, decided to abandon the town and endeavoured to cut their way through the besiegers; but only a few of their number made good their escape. The townspeople were left with no choice but capitu-

¹ *Turkestan*, p. 404.

lation, and the next day they opened their gates to the Mongols. The citadel, however, was still held by a small body of the sultan's troops who continued to offer resistance. This act of defiance was countered by the Mongols' destroying the town by fire and then launching an assault on the fortifications driving the inhabitants in front of them as a kind of cannon fodder. After some twelve days' fighting the citadel was stormed and its defenders massacred to a man. The walls of the town were then razed to the ground, and the Mongols, accompanied by a levy of the able-bodied men of Bukhārā forced into their service to fight in the front ranks against their fellow Muslims, set out for Samarqand. The fortifications of Samarqand had been greatly strengthened and very considerable forces concentrated there, circumstances of which Chingiz-Khān had been informed at Uṭrār and which account for his having first attacked the more westerly Bukhārā. Arriving before the town he passed the first two days in inspecting the walls and outworks, his forces now augmented by the troops of Chaghatai and Ögedei, the victors of Uṭrār. It was at this juncture that, having learnt of Muḥammad's flight, he dispatched Sübedei and Jebe in his pursuit. On the third and fourth days of the siege the defenders made sorties from the town but with such disastrous effect that on the fifth day they decided to surrender. Having first demolished the walls the Mongols drove the inhabitants out into the open country the better to subject the town to pillage. Here too, as in Bukhārā, the citadel garrison fought on after the surrender, but they were soon overpowered and destroyed. As for the civil population they were now divided up, the craftsmen for ultimate transportation to Mongolia as slaves of the Mongol princes and the young men for service in the levy; and the conquest of Transoxiana virtually completed, Chingiz-Khān withdrew into the mountains to the south of the town to remain inactive, resting his men and animals, until the autumn.

In the meanwhile Jebe and Sübedei were sweeping across Persia in pursuit of the sultan. So well, however, had he concealed his tracks that only on one occasion did the Mongols come to close quarters with him and even then he was quickly able to shake them off. It will be convenient, therefore, to consider Muḥammad's movements separately from those of his pursuers. Upon leaving Nišāpūr he had made off in a north-westerly direction to Isfarā'in and then followed the great trunk road to Ray. At Ray a patrol came up with the news that the enemy was close at hand and he hurried south-westwards to the castle

of Farrazīn¹ near the modern Arāk (Sultānābād) on the Hamadān-Iṣfahān road, where his son Rukn al-Dīn was encamped with an army of 30,000 men. Upon the very day of his arrival he sent his mother along with his son Ghiyāth al-Dīn to the castle of Qārūn, apparently a mountain stronghold in the neighbourhood of Hamadān, and at the same time dispatched a messenger to summon the atabeg of Great Lur, Nuṣrat al-Dīn Hazār-Asp. In the meantime the sultan consulted the amīrs of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam as to the best means of repelling the invaders. They advised that a stand should be made in the bastion provided by the Kūh-i Ushṭurān, a lofty mountain chain in the High Zagros. He went to inspect these mountains at close range and then damped his troops' spirits by rejecting out of hand the possibility of their defending themselves in such a terrain. No sooner had he descended from the mountains than the atabeg Nuṣrat al-Dīn appeared in answer to his summons. He too offered a natural stronghold as a base of operations: a mountain valley on the border of Luristān and Fārs, probably the Shi'b-i Bavvān, famed as one of the four Earthly Paradises. Here, the atabeg said, 100,000 foot could be gathered together from Luristān and Fārs to repel the enemy upon his arrival. But the sultan opposed himself to this plan also, suspecting or affecting to suspect that Nuṣrat al-Dīn wished to involve him in his own quarrel with the atabeg of Fārs. He decided to remain in Farrazīn but had no sooner reached this decision than he received news of the Mongols' attack upon Ray; and at the heels of the patrol which brought this news came the Mongols themselves.

They overtook the sultan *en route* to Qārūn and discharged arrows at him without realizing his identity. Escaping on his wounded horse he made his way to the castle, where he remained for only one day before taking guides and stealing off in the direction of Baghdad. The Mongols arrived immediately and launched an assault on the castle thinking the sultan to be still inside it; then realizing their mistake they set off in his pursuit. He shook them off by turning back from the Baghdad road and striking northwards towards the strong castle of Sarchahān in the mountains between Ṣā'in-Qal'a and Sultāniyeh. He remained here for seven days before crossing the Alburz into Gīlān; he then turned eastwards along the coast of the Caspian, the Mongols being now once again in close pursuit. Arriving at Dabū in the Āmul area he was advised by the local amīrs to seek refuge in one of the offshore islands, apparently the present-day Āshūrādeh at the entrance to Astarābād bay.

¹ Not Qazvīn as in Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 422. See Juvainī transl. Boyle, vol. II, p. 382 n. 63.

It was here that he died in December 1220, or January 1221, either, as Juvainī¹ would have us believe, from grief at the fate of his womenfolk, who had been captured by the Mongols in a castle on the neighbouring mainland, or, according to Nasawī's² more prosaic account, from an acute inflammation of the lungs. Such was the wretched end of a monarch who for a brief interval had ruled over the whole eastern half of the Saljuq empire but whose very conquests had facilitated the Mongol invasion, just as his conduct at Uṭrār had provoked it.

As for the sultan's pursuers, they had followed the normal practice of Mongol advance parties, avoiding combat as much as possible and attacking only when provoked. Thus at Balkh, where the notables of the town had sent a deputation to them with offerings of food (*tuxghu*), they had contented themselves with setting a *shahna* or resident over the people and had done them no harm. Even at Zāveh (the modern Turbat-i-Haidari), where the townspeople had closed their gates and refused their demand for provisions, it was at first their intention to ride on; but angered by jeers shouted at them from the walls they had turned back to storm the town and massacre the population. At Nishāpūr itself the authorities saw fit to go through the forms of submission and to supply the Mongols' needs. A deputation was received by Jebe, who urged them to destroy their walls and to give provisions to any bodies of troops that passed by. The two generals then parted company, evidently quite uncertain as to the direction of the sultan's flight. Sübedei turned back south-eastwards to Jām and then circled round to the north-west through Tūs, Rādkān and Qūchān to Isfarā'in. Here he may have picked up the sultan's trail, for he followed in his tracks along the great *Khurāsān* trunk road as far as Ray. Meanwhile Jebe, who had made for the district of Juvain to the north-west of Nishāpūr, had proceeded from thence into Māzandarān, where he carried out great massacres, especially in the Āmul region, before crossing the mountains to link up with Jebe at Ray. What happened at Ray is by no means clear. According to Juvainī,³ the *qādī* and other dignitaries tendered submission to the Mongols, but Ibn al-Aṭhīr speaks of their sacking the town, perhaps as the consequence of a later rebellion.⁴ At Ray the Mongols learnt of the sultan's recent departure in the direction of Hamadān, and Jebe set out in his pursuit. Entering Hamadān he received the submission of the governor and set a *shahna* over the town,

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 385-6.

² Transl. Boyle, vol. I, p. 147.

³ Transl. Houdas, p. 79.

⁴ Vol. XII, p. 244.

to which he returned again after the clash with the sultan at Qārūn. From Hamadān he made his way to Sujās to defeat and destroy a large concentration of the sultan's troops under two of his generals. The greater part of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam was then subjected to slaughter and rapine until, with the approach of winter, the Mongols withdrew northwards to the Mūghān Steppe. That troops were sent from these winter quarters in search of the sultan is possible but unlikely; the forces which chased him along the Caspian littoral and which captured the castles in which his harem had sought refuge were probably those left behind by Jebe in the previous summer. In any case, the generals' main attention must have been attracted in another direction, for it was from this base that they launched their first attack on the Georgians, on whom they inflicted a crushing defeat in February 1221. In the spring they returned to Hamadān to put down a revolt and then left 'Irāq for Āzarbāijān, where they pillaged and slaughtered until the atabeg made his submission. It was about this time, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ that they dispatched a message to Chingiz-Khān to the effect that the sultan being now dead they would, in accordance with the khan's *yarliḡh*, continue their conquests for a year or two before returning to Mongolia by way of the Caucasus. It would seem, indeed, that the pursuit of the sultan had been only the first part of their mission. From Āzarbāijān the generals now invaded Georgia for the second time, then passing into Shīrvān forced their way through Darband to descend into the plains of what is now southern Russia. Here they dispersed a coalition of Caucasians and Qīpchaq before advancing westwards into the Crimea to sack the Genoese *entrepôt* of Soldaia and defeat a Russian army on the Kalka. Then they turned back, crossing the Volga near the present-day Volgograd and finally joining their master somewhere along the route of his homeward journey after carrying out a reconnaissance raid without parallel in history, "an expedition", in the words of Gibbon,² "which had never been attempted and has never been repeated".

In the summer of 1220, whilst Jebe and Sübedei were chasing Sulṭān Muḥammad to and fro across Persia, Chingiz-Khān was resting his men and animals in the mountains to the south of Samarqand. It was not until the autumn that he moved southwards against Tirmidh on the northern bank of the Oxus, where today it forms the frontier between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The people of Tirmidh, emboldened by the strength of their fortifications, rejected his call to surrender, and

¹ Transl. Smirnova, p. 226.

² VII, 10.

paid for their defiance the terrible price that was soon to be exacted from the great cities of Khurāsān. When after eleven days' fighting the town was taken by storm, the whole population, men and women, were driven out on to the plain, and divided amongst the soldiers, by whom they were then put to death, each soldier being responsible for the execution of a fixed number of persons. The story is told that when the Mongols had finished this butchery they caught a woman who had escaped their attention. In exchange for her life she offered them a large pearl but, when they asked to see it, said that she had swallowed it. They at once disembowelled her and found several pearls in her stomach, whereupon Chingiz-Khān ordered all the bodies to be eviscerated. From Tirmidh he now withdrew into the upper reaches of the Vakhsh, i.e. the region of the present-day Tajikistan, where he passed the winter of 1220-1 in operations against the local population. Then, with the approach of spring, he prepared to cross the Oxus and attack Balkh.

On what happened at Balkh the authorities disagree. Ibn al-Athīr¹ says that the town surrendered voluntarily and that in consequence the lives of the inhabitants were spared. On the other hand, according to Juvainī,² the population, despite their professions of submission, was subjected to the same wholesale slaughter as the people of Tirmidh. It is probable that, as appears to have been the case at Ray and as we know to have been the case at Herāt, the massacre followed, not upon the original surrender of the town, but upon a subsequent revolt. Whatever the details, the capitulation of Balkh was speedily achieved, and Chingiz-Khān turned westwards to lay siege to Ṭāliqān, a town in the mountains of Jūzjān, probably to be identified with the present-day Chachaktu. The town with its castle (which is given various names, all meaning something like "Hill of Victory") occupied a strategic position in the path of bodies of Mongol troops on their way to Khurāsān, Ghūr and southern Afghanistan; and whenever such parties passed beneath the castle the garrison would make a sortie and attack them, carrying off their prisoners and cattle. So seriously did this harassment affect the Mongols' movements that, some months before Chingiz-Khān's arrival a large force from the main army had been beleaguering the town. Their failure to capture Ṭāliqān accounts for Chingiz-Khān's decision to intervene in person. The subjugation of Khurāsān he deputed to his youngest son Tolui, who carried out the task with a thoroughness from which that region has never recovered.

¹ Vol. xii, p. 255.

² Transl. Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 130-1.

THE MONGOL INVASION

From Balkh, Tolui proceeded in a westerly direction as far as Marūchaq in what is now the north-western corner of Afghanistan. Then crossing the Murghāb and its left-bank affluent the Kūshk he turned northwards along the river bank, following what, six centuries later, were to be the tracks of the Transcaspian Railway. Marv, at the time of his approach, was in a state of great confusion, the governor being at loggerheads with a great host of Türkmen who had sought refuge in that neighbourhood and whom he had only recently succeeded in dislodging from the town, which they still continued to attack. Having spied out the position of the Türkmen's encampment on the river bank, the Mongols launched a night attack. Surprised in the darkness the Türkmen, despite their numbers, were utterly routed, and such as were not drowned in the river fled in panic. The way now lay open and on the next day, 25 February 1221, the Mongols arrived before the gates of Marv. Tolui in person, with an escort of five hundred horsemen, rode the whole distance around the walls, and for six days the Mongols continued to inspect the defences, reaching the conclusion that they were in good repair and would withstand a lengthy siege. On the seventh day the Mongols launched a general assault. The townspeople made two sallies from different gates, being in both cases at once driven back by the Mongol forces. They seem then to have lost all will to resist. The next day the governor surrendered the town, having been reassured by promises that were not in fact to be kept. The whole population was now driven out into the open country, and for four days and nights the people continued to pour out of the town. Four hundred artisans and a number of children were selected to be carried off as slaves, and it was commanded that the whole of the remaining population, men, women, children, should be put to the sword. They were distributed, for this purpose, amongst the troops, and to each individual soldier was allotted the execution of three to four hundred persons. These troops included levies from the captured towns, and Juvaini records that the people of Sarakhs, who had a feud with the people of Marv, exceeded the ferocity of the heathen Mongols in the slaughter of their fellow-Muslims.

Even now the ordeal of Marv was not yet over. When the Mongols withdrew those who had escaped death by concealing themselves in holes and cavities emerged from their hiding places. They amounted in all to some five thousand people. A detachment of Mongols, part of the rearguard, now arrived before the town. Wishing to have their share

of the slaughter they called upon these unfortunate wretches to come out into the open country, each carrying a skirtful of grain. And having them thus at their mercy they massacred these last feeble remnants of one of the greatest cities of Islam.

The sober and careful Ibn al-Athīr,¹ a contemporary of these events, puts the number of the slain at the enormous figure of 700,000. Juvainī² gives an even higher figure. He tells how the *sayyid* ‘Izz al-Dīn Nassāba “together with some other persons passed thirteen days and nights in counting the people slain within the town. Taking into account only those that were plain to see and leaving aside those that had been killed in holes and cavities and in the villages and deserts, they arrived at a figure of more than one million, three hundred thousand.”

From this great shambles Tolui now proceeded south-westwards to Nishāpūr. After their desertion by Sulṭān Muḥammad the people of Nishāpūr had at first adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mongols, but with the passage of time and the rumours of victories gained by the sultan in Central Persia they had become openly hostile to the invaders. In November 1220 an army of 10,000 men under one Toghachar, a son-in-law of Chingiz-Khān, had appeared before the town. The fierce resistance of the townsfolk caused the Mongols to withdraw but not before Toghachar had been killed in battle. The people of Nishāpūr were elated with the news of his death, which was, however, soon to prove their own death-warrant. Tolui now approached the town with such vast forces and such abundance of siege instruments that the people at once lost heart and sought to negotiate terms of surrender. Their overtures were rejected, and the assault began on Wednesday, 7 April 1221: the walls were breached on the Friday, and on the Saturday the town was taken by storm. As in Marv, the people were driven out into the open country, and in order to avenge the death of Toghachar it was ordered “that the town should be laid waste that the site could be ploughed upon; and that in the exaction of vengeance not even cats and dogs should be left alive”.³ Toghachar’s widow, the daughter of Chingiz-Khān, rode into the town with her escort and took her share in the killing of the survivors. Four hundred craftsmen were spared for transportation to Mongolia; otherwise the

¹ Vol. XII, p. 256.

² Transl. Boyle, vol. I, pp. 163-4. On these figures see below p. 484, n. 4.

³ Transl. Boyle, vol. I, p. 177.

whole population was put to death. The heads of the slain were severed from their bodies and piled in heaps, those of the men being separate from those of the women and children.

"The last of all to suffer", says Juvainī,¹ "was Herāt, and when he [i.e. Tolui] had joined her to her sisters, he returned to wait upon his father." The Persian historian has unfortunately left no detailed account of the capture of the town. Barthold,² on the authority of d'Ohsson, whose authority in turn was a fifteenth-century local history of Herāt, says that none of the inhabitants were killed, with the exception of the sultan's troops and that Herāt, in consequence, "suffered least of all". On the other hand, Jūzjānī, a contemporary of the event who had himself taken part in the defence of a mountain fortress at no great distance from Herāt, speaks of its capture after siege of eight months' duration and the subsequent massacre of the entire population. There were in fact two sieges of Herāt, both of which are recorded in detail in a work which was re-discovered only during the present century and was published, on the basis of a unique manuscript, as recently as 1944. This is the *Ta'riḫ-Nāma-yi-Harāt* or "History of Herāt" of Saif b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb known as Ṣaifī. A native of Herāt, Ṣaifī was born in that city in 1282 and wrote his history at some time between 1318 and 1322. It contains a great deal of information, not recorded elsewhere, about conditions not only in Herāt itself but in the whole of *Khurāsān* in the period during and immediately following the Mongol invasion.

According to Ṣaifī's³ account Tolui, upon his arrival before Herāt, encamped in the meadows near the town and sent an envoy to invite the people to surrender. The envoy was at once put to death on the orders of the malik or governor representing Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn. Tolui, in anger, ordered a general assault, which continued for eight days, at the end of which the malik was killed in the fighting. Tolui now intervened in person, riding up to the edge of the moat and making a proclamation, in which he promised to spare the lives of the inhabitants if they surrendered immediately. To this the townspeople agreed and the Mongols kept their word except with regard to the troops of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn numbering 12,000 men. Tolui set a malik over the town, a Muslim called Abū Bakr of Marūḥaḡ, and also a Mongol *shahna*, a man called Mengetei, a member of Tolui's immediate entourage. Eight days later Tolui left the region to join his father.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 152.

² *Turkestan*, p. 447.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 66 ff.

But this was by no means the end of the story. For a time all went well, the people living peaceably under the protection of the Muslim malik and the Mongol *shahna*. And then, all of a sudden, they rose in rebellion and killed both of these officials. *Ṣaifī* gives two versions of this rising. It was either a spontaneous movement on the part of the Herātīs or else it was engineered by the people of the mountain stronghold of Kālyūn to the north-east of Herāt, who were still holding out against the Mongols, and hoped in this way to enlist the Herātīs as their allies. According to this latter version, the assassinations were carried out by men from Kālyūn who entered the town disguised as merchants with weapons concealed about their persons. Whatever the truth of the matter, the damage was now done. When the news reached *Chingiz-Khān* he was filled with anger and dispatched the general *Eljigidei* at the head of 80,000 men to mete out retribution. *Ṣaifī*¹ records his instructions: "The dead have come to life again. This time you must cut the people's heads off: you must execute the whole population of Herāt."

Eljigidei set out in November 1221. In due course he arrived on the *Harī Rūd*, and busied himself for the next month with warlike preparations: from the surrounding regions he gathered reinforcements to the strength of 50,000 men. With this great army *Eljigidei* now laid siege to Herāt. This time the resistance was long and heroic. It was not until June of the following year that the Mongols finally captured the town. *Eljigidei* carried out his instructions to the letter: the entire population was put to death, "and no head was left on a body, nor body with a head".² *Ṣaifī* assesses the number of those thus massacred at a figure of 1,600,000. (The contemporary *Jūzjānī*³ records that in a single quarter there were counted 600,000 dead and on this basis estimates the total number in the whole town at 2,400,000!) For seven days the Mongols were busy with this slaughter and with demolishing the houses, filling in the moats and destroying the fortifications. On the eighth day they set off in the direction of Kālyūn. When they had reached Auba (Obek) on the *Harī Rūd*, *Eljigidei* sent back 2,000 horsemen with instructions to kill any persons they might find who had escaped the massacre by going into hiding. They stayed two days in the town, where they discovered nearly their own number of such wretches; they put them all to death and then returned to the main body.

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 76.

² *Op. cit.* p. 80.

³ Transl. Raverty, vol. II, p. 1038.

The siege of Ṭāliqān, to which we now return, lasted, according to Ibn al-Athīr,¹ ten months (six months before, and four months after the personal intervention of Chingiz-Khān), according to Rashīd al-Dīn,² seven months; the town was taken only after the arrival of Tolui's forces fresh from the conquest of Khurāsān, i.e. at some time in the early summer of 1221. On Chingiz-Khān's movements following on the capture of Ṭāliqān the sources are vague and contradictory. He probably remained in the mountains of Jūzjān in the immediate vicinity of Ṭāliqān until he received the news of Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn's victory at Parvān.

Jalāl al-Dīn had accompanied his father in his flight across Persia and had been present at his deathbed on the island in the Caspian. Together with his brothers Uzlaq-Sulṭān, the heir-presumptive of Sulṭān Muḥammad (though, according to Nasawī, the sultan, shortly before his death, had altered his will in favour of Jalāl al-Dīn) and Aq-Sulṭān he then left the island and landing on the Manqīshlaq Peninsula made for Gurgānj, his father's capital, which he reached some little time before its investment by the Mongols. The discovery of a plot against his life (in which his brother Uzlaq-Sulṭān seems to have been involved) prompted him to quit the capital almost immediately and make for the territories formerly allotted to him by his father and corresponding more or less to the modern Afghanistan. Crossing the Qara Qum desert accompanied by only three hundred horse he broke through the cordon established by the Mongols along the northern frontiers of Khurāsān and succeeded in reaching Nishāpūr. His brothers, Uzlaq-Sulṭān and Aq-Sulṭān, who followed the same route shortly afterwards, were less fortunate. They were killed in battle or captured in flight and their severed heads were paraded on the end of lances to strike terror into the population—an indignity afterwards inflicted upon Duke Henry of Silesia.³ As for Jalāl al-Dīn, he remained in Nishāpūr only for a day or two before departing, on 10 February 1221, *en route* for Ghazna. His departure nearly coincided with the arrival of the Mongols in his pursuit. They at once took up the chase, but he shook them off and travelling, according to Juvainī,⁴ 150 miles in a single day arrived before the walls of Zūzan in Kūhistān. Refused asylum by the people of Zūzan he found shelter in a neighbouring town, which he left at

¹ Vol. xii, p. 255.

² Transl. Smirnova, p. 219.

³ See Carpini, *The Tartar Relation*, transl. George D. Painter, pp. 80 and 82 n. 4.

⁴ Transl. Boyle, p. 404.

midnight, only a few hours before the arrival of the Mongols: he had reached the region of Herāt before they finally abandoned their pursuit. The sultan continued on his way to Ghazna, which, at the time of his arrival, was in the hands either of his cousin Amīn Malik, a Qanqlī Turk, who had been malik of Herāt, or of the Ghūrī A‘zam Malik, the son of ‘Imād al-Dīn of Balkh, more probably the latter. Amīn Malik, if not already present, hastened to join the sultan and with his Qanqlī forces, the Ghūrī troops of A‘zam Malik and a great host of Khalaj and Türkmen tribesmen which had gathered together at Peshawar under Saif al-Dīn Īghraq, Jalāl al-Dīn now found himself at the head of a well-equipped, if ill-assorted, army of some 60,000 men.

The sultan passed the remainder of the winter in Ghazna and in the first days of spring led his forces northwards to Parvān, a town at the confluence of the Ghōrband and the Panjshīr in a position where many roads met and where he hoped to obtain some information about the course of events. Learning that a Mongol army under the two generals Tekechūk and Molghor was laying siege to a castle in the Wāliān Kōtal (to the north-west of Chārīkār) he led an attack against them and had killed a thousand men of the Mongol vanguard before they withdrew across the river (apparently the Ghōrband) and destroyed the bridge. The two armies then discharged arrows at each other across the water until nightfall, when the Mongols retreated and the sultan returned to his base at Parvān. News of this encounter being brought to Chingiz-Khān, presumably by the defeated commanders, he at once dispatched one of his most distinguished commanders, the Tatar Shigi-Qutuqu, at the head of an army of 30,000 men. The Mongols reached Parvān, according to Juvainī,¹ only a week after the sultan’s own arrival. Jalāl al-Dīn at once rode out to meet the enemy. Three miles from the town he drew up his forces in battle order, assigning the right wing to Amīn Malik and the left to Īghraq, while he himself commanded in the centre. He then instructed the whole army to dismount and fight on foot holding on to the reins of their horses. The Mongols concentrated their attack on the right wing under Amīn Malik, which they drove back until repeated reinforcements from the centre and the right turned the tide and they were forced back in turn.

The battle raged to and fro until nightfall when both sides withdrew to their bases. Under cover of darkness the Mongols had recourse to a ruse which, according to Carpini,² was part of their normal tactics. They

¹ Transl. Boyle, p. 406.

² Transl. Becquet and Hambis, p. 80.

set up dummy warriors on their spare horses, and the next morning the sultan's army were dismayed to descry what appeared to be a line of reinforcements drawn up at the rear of the enemy lines. In their alarm they considered the possibility of flight but, rallied by the sultan, joined battle with the Mongols for the second time. Again they fought on foot and this time the enemy launched their attack on the left wing under Īghraq. Īghraq's men stood firm and the Mongols turned and began to make for their base, whereupon, at the sultan's command, the whole army mounted horse and moved forward at the charge. The Mongols fled before them, then turned in a final desperate attack before, with the sultan's personal intervention, they were utterly routed, Shigi-Qutuqu escaping with the remnants of his army to carry the news to Chingiz-Khān.

Few victories have been more short-lived than this, the only serious defeat to be inflicted upon the Mongols during the whole campaign. Jalāl al-Dīn's forces were dispersed upon the very battle-field. In a quarrel over the booty Amīn Malik struck Īghraq over the head with a whip. Jalāl al-Dīn, fearing the reaction of Amīn Malik's undisciplined followers, saw fit to ignore the incident, and Īghraq, waiting only till nightfall, withdrew in dudgeon with all his forces as also those of A'zam Malik, who had taken his side in the dispute with the Qanqlī. Disheartened by their defection, Jalāl al-Dīn returned to Ghazna, there to make preparations for seeking safety beyond the Indus: the victor of Parvān was soon to become a fugitive before the main army of Chingiz-Khān.

At Ṭāliqān Chingiz-Khān had been joined not only by Tolui but also by his elder sons Chaghatai and Ögedei, who together with his eldest son Jochi had captured the Kh̲wārazmī capital Gurgānj after a siege of seven months. It was thus at the head of vastly augmented forces that he now advanced against Jalāl al-Dīn, apparently setting out from the Ṭāliqān area immediately upon receiving the news of the defeat inflicted upon Tekechūk and Molghor. His route lay through the present-day district of Durzāb and Gurziwān, where the resistance of a stronghold (probably the castle of Rang mentioned by Jūzjānī)¹ delayed the army, according to Juvainī,² for a full month. The advance was held up at Bāmiyān also, where one of Chaghatai's sons, the favourite grandchild of Chingiz-Khān, was killed and where, in vengeance for his death, it was ordered "that every living creature, from mankind down to the

¹ Transl. Raverty, p. 1003.

² Transl. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 132.

brute beasts, should be killed; that no prisoner should be taken; that not even the child in its mother's womb should be spared; and that henceforth no living creature should live therein".¹ The report of Shigi-Qutuqu's defeat at Parvān seems to have reached Chingiz-Khān after this butchery had been completed, for we are told by Juvainī that upon receiving the news he hurried forward by day and night without intermission so that no time was left for the cooking of food. At Parvān he halted long enough to inspect the battlefield and to criticize both his own commanders and the sultan for their choice of positions. In Ghazna, which he entered without opposition, he learnt that Jalāl al-Dīn had left for the Indus only a fortnight before and at once continued in his pursuit. He overtook the sultan on the very banks of the river, probably at Dinkot, near the modern Kālābāgh, whilst the boats were still being assembled for the crossing. Despite his desperate position, hemmed in by the oncoming Mongols in front and with the waters of the Indus in his rear, Jalāl al-Dīn drew up his forces and offered battle. The Mongols first attacked the right wing commanded by Amīn Malik; it was driven back and destroyed, Amīn Malik himself being killed whilst fleeing in the direction of Peshawar. The left wing was likewise driven back: only the centre, where the sultan in person commanded a body of 700 men, continued to stand firm. In charge after charge he attacked different sectors of the semi-circle of troops in front of him, but as more and more detachments arrived he was left with less and less space to manoeuvre until by mid-day it was clear that the situation was hopeless. He mounted a fresh horse, made a final charge to force back the men closing in on him, then turning in the space thus gained he threw off his cuirass and drove his horse over the bank into the water, thirty feet below. His pursuers were about to plunge in after him but were prevented by Chingiz-Khān, who had ridden down to the water's edge to watch the sultan's progress towardst he opposite bank. As he climbed ashore safe and sound, still grasping his sword, lance and shield, the Conqueror pointed him out to his sons with expressions of amazement and admiration. Jalāl al-Dīn's men were less fortunate than their leader: of those that followed him into the Indus the vast majority were killed by Mongol arrows, and Juvainī² tells us, on the authority of eye-witnesses, that the whole river, within the range of the bowmen, was red with the blood of the slain.

The Battle of the Indus marks the virtual end of the Campaign in the

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. I, p. 133.

² *Ibid.* vol. II, p. 411.

West. It took place, according to Juvainī,¹ in Rajab of the year 618, i.e. at some time between 21 August and 19 September 1221. Nasawī² gives a later and more precise date, viz. the 8th Shawwāl (25 November), which is, however, difficult to reconcile with Juvainī's more detailed account of events leading up to the battle. After gaining this victory Chingiz-Khān followed the Indus some distance upstream, apparently seeking a crossing-place and then turned off into the valley of the Upper Kurram. Here he learnt that Jalāl al-Dīn had recrossed the river to bury his dead. He dispatched Chaghatai in his pursuit whilst proceeding himself with the main army to winter-quarters in a region probably to be identified with the Swat valley. He now conceived the idea of returning to Mongolia by way of Bengal and Assam, but the difficulties of the route were such that he was forced to turn back after travelling only two or three stages and slowly retraced his steps through Afghanistan. The summer of 1222 he spent in pasture lands high in the Hindu Kush, apparently in the region of Parvān. Here he received the first visit of the Taoist monk Ch'ang-ch'un, whom he had summoned from China hoping to receive from him the "medicine of immortality". A second interview was postponed till the autumn because of news of an insurrection by the "native mountain bandits"³ with which Chingiz-Khān wished to deal in person. This is perhaps a reference to the continued resistance of Herāt or, conceivably, to the situation at Balkh, where, as Juvainī⁴ tells us, the Mongols on their return journey killed the survivors of the earlier massacre and demolished any walls that were still left standing. Ch'ang-ch'un passed close to Balkh on his way to the second interview with Chingiz-Khān, and we are told in the account of his travels that the population "had recently rebelled against the Khan and had been removed; but we could still hear dogs barking in the streets".⁵ Chingiz-Khān received this visit somewhere to the east of Balkh, perhaps in the Baghlāi area; he broke camp on 3 October and crossed the Oxus on a bridge of boats on the 6th. Chaghatai had by now returned from his fruitless search for Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn, and a general called Dorbei Doqshin was sent back on the same errand. He was equally unsuccessful although he penetrated as far as Multan and Lahore before the summer heat forced him to withdraw northwards to join his master. Meanwhile Chingiz-Khān had reached the Samarqand area

¹ *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 135.

² *The Travels of an Alchemist*, p. 102.

⁴ Transl. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 131.

² Transl. Houdas, p. 139.

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 111.

early in November and encamped some six or seven miles to the east of the town. Juvainī is wrong in stating that he passed the whole winter here, for Ch'ang-ch'un, who left Samarqand on 29 December, caught up with the Mongols a month later on the eastern banks of the Syr Darya. The spring and summer of 1223 were spent in the region of Qulan-Bashī, the pass between the Arīs and Talas basins on the way from Chimkent to Jambul. Here Ch'ang-ch'un took his leave of Chingiz-Khān and we have no precise details regarding the rest of his itinerary: he was on the Black Irtysh in the summer of 1224, and it was not till the spring of 1225 that he finally reached his headquarters in Mongolia. In the autumn of the following year he was at war with the Tangut, whose rebellion is said to have been one of the reasons for his return from the West. He died, while the campaign was still in progress, on 25 August 1227.¹

SULTĀN JALĀL AL-DĪN

Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn remained in India for nearly three years. He was joined, on the very banks of the Indus, by a number of stragglers from his defeated army and after several successful encounters with bodies of Indian troops in the Salt Range found himself at the head of some three to four thousand men. News of the approach of a Mongol army now caused him to withdraw in the direction of Delhi. Somewhere in the Rawalpindi area the Mongols gave up the chase and the sultan, having arrived within two or three days' journey from Delhi, dispatched an envoy to Sultān Shams al-Dīn El-Tutmīsh to seek an alliance and ask for temporary asylum. Alarmed at the possibility of involvement in the sultan's fortunes El-Tutmīsh replied with a polite refusal, and Jalāl al-Dīn turned back to the Lahore region, where more fugitives gathered around him and his forces were increased to a total of 10,000 men. Another expedition against the tribes of the Salt Range led to an alliance with the Khokars against Nāṣir al-Dīn Qubāḥa, the ruler of Sind, who was driven out of Uch and forced to flee upstream to Multān. The summer (apparently of 1222) Jalāl al-Dīn passed in the Salt Range or in the mountains near Lahore and then, with news of the Mongols again in his pursuit, he made his way into Lower Sind, clashing briefly with Qubāḥa as he passed by Multān, setting fire to Uch, which had risen in revolt, and capturing Sādūsān (the modern Sehwan) before arriving at the seaport of Debul at the mouth of the

¹ For the best account of his career see Grousset, *Le Conquérant du monde*.

Indus. At Debul he received the news that his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn had made himself master of 'Irāq, where, however, the greater part of the military favoured Jalāl al-Dīn and were demanding his presence there. This news and reports of the Mongols' continuing approach decided the sultan to re-enter Persia by way of Balūchistān and Makrān.

The sultan emerged from these waterless wastes with greatly depleted forces: his army, according to Nasawī,¹ had been reduced to 4,000 men mounted on donkeys and oxen. He was welcomed on the borders of Kirmān by a former official of his father. This was Baraq Ḥājib, a Qara-Khitayan by origin, who had risen to the rank of *hājib* or chamberlain in the service of Sultān Muḥammad and had then attached himself to Ghiyāth al-Dīn. Appointed governor of Iṣfahān he had quarrelled with Ghiyāth al-Dīn's vizier and was on his way to India to join Jalāl al-Dīn when his party was attacked by the governor of the castle of Guvāshīr (as the town, as distinct from the province, of Kirmān was then known). Baraq turned the tables on his attacker, whom he captured and put to death: the governor's son, driven from the castle, entrenched himself in the inner town, to which Baraq was laying siege when he received the news of the sultan's approach. In addition to other tokens of his loyalty he offered Jalāl al-Dīn the hand of his daughter in marriage. The sultan, as we shall see, was much addicted to such political and, for the most part, temporary alliances: in Ghazna he had married a daughter of the ill-fated Amīn Malik and in India a Khokar princess. The marriage with Baraq's daughter having been duly solemnized the sultan appeared before the gates of Guvāshīr, which at once surrendered to him and in which he now installed himself with his bride and his father-in-law. Some days later he set out on a hunting expedition, from which Baraq excused himself on the grounds of some bodily infirmity. Suspecting his motives Jalāl al-Dīn sent back an officer to summon him to his presence, making out that he was leaving immediately for 'Irāq and wished to consult Baraq on conditions in that province. Baraq's reply, though expressed in courtly language, made it quite plain that he intended to keep Kirmān for himself, an intention made even plainer by his ejecting such of the sultan's followers as still remained in Guvāshīr. Jalāl al-Dīn had no alternative but to swallow his discomfort and continue on his way, leaving Baraq to consolidate his position and found the local dynasty of the Qutlugh-Khāns (1224-1303). In Fārs the sultan fared better. Pleased with the advent of a rival

¹ Transl. Houdas, p. 157.

to Ghiyāth al-Dīn, who had twice invaded his territory, the Atabeg Sa'd showered presents upon Jalāl al-Dīn, gave him his daughter in marriage and even agreed to the sultan's request for the release from imprisonment of his rebellious son Abū Bakr, afterwards his successor and the patron of the poet Sa'di. Jalāl al-Dīn remained in Shirāz only for a month or two after the marriage (perhaps the most permanent of these alliances, for we know that the Salghurid princess accompanied Jalāl al-Dīn in the final flight before the Mongols that culminated in his death at the hands of a Kurdish assassin), and then made his way to Iṣfahān. Here he learnt of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's presence at Ray, whither he proceeded at such speed as to catch his brother and his followers completely unawares. Most of the officers and officials at once declared themselves for Jalāl al-Dīn, and those who, with Ghiyāth al-Dīn at their head, had fled in panic, were soon persuaded to return and tender their submission. Thus, after three years of wandering, the sultan found himself in undisputed possession of part at least of his father's empire.

With the military resources now at his command Jalāl al-Dīn, in the winter of 1224-5, moved southwards into Khūzistān with the object, apparently, of resuming his father's feud with the caliph. Nasawī¹ and Juvainī² are, as one would expect, somewhat reticent on this delicate subject and it is only Ibn al-Athīr³ who gives a detailed account of the campaign. In Muḥarram 622/January-February 1225 the sultan invested Shustar, which was defended with considerable vigour by the caliphal governor of Khūzistān, Muẓaffar al-Dīn Wajh al-Sabū'. As the siege dragged on detachments of the sultan's army infiltrated westwards plundering the country as they went; they reached the districts of Bādūrāyā and Bākūsāyā on the eastern borders of Arab 'Irāq, and one party turned southwards to clash with the governor (*shahna*) of Baṣra. Meanwhile the siege of Shustar, which had continued for two months, was suddenly abandoned, and the sultan set out in the direction of Baghdad. His advance was opposed by an army of 20,000 men under the command of the *mamlūk* Jamāl al-Dīn Qush-Temür. Defeated by a ruse, despite their superior numbers, the caliph's troops were driven back to the outskirts of Baghdad, which, however, the sultan did not closely approach, perhaps because of the formidable preparations that had been made for his reception, making instead for the small town of

¹ Transl. Houdas, pp. 180-1.

² Transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 421 ff.

³ Vol. XII, pp. 276-8.

Ba'qūbā some twenty-seven miles to the north of Baghdad. From here the Khwārazmīs proceeded to Daqūqā (the modern Tauk), still pillaging the countryside as they passed by and in particular seizing all the horses and mules on which they could lay their hands; for they had arrived in Khūzistān, according to Ibn al-Athīr, with a great shortage of mounts, such animals as they had being so weak as to be practically useless. Daqūqā was taken by storm and the sultan, angered by the inhabitants' resistance, ordered or countenanced a general massacre. Alarmed by the fate of Daqūqā the people of Baqāzīj on the Lower Zāb asked the sultan for a shahna to protect them from his soldiers; he sent them, so it was said, a son of Chingiz-Khān whom he had captured in one of his battles with the Mongols. The sultan himself remained in Daqūqā till the end of Rabī' I (the beginning of May 1225), exchanging messages with Muẓaffar al-Dīn Kōk-Bōri, the last (1190-1232) of the Begtiginids of Irbīl, with whom he finally concluded a treaty of peace. According to Juvainī,¹ these negotiations followed upon the capture of Muẓaffar al-Dīn in battle as he passed by Daqūqā at the head of reinforcements for the caliph's army. Satisfied with this diplomatic victory or perhaps realizing that his resources were still inadequate for a full-scale assault on Baghdad, the sultan now decided to turn his arms against a far less formidable opponent, Muẓaffar al-Dīn Ōz-Beg, the atabeg of Āzarbāijān.

At Marāgheh, which he found still in ruins as the result of the Mongol invasion, Jalāl al-Dīn received the news that Yaghān Taisī, the maternal uncle and atabeg of his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn, had set out from Āzarbāijān with the intention of seizing the town and region of Hamadān. After his nephew's discomfiture at Ray, Yaghān Taisī had entered Ōz-Beg's territory either as his ally against the sultan, as Nasawī² would have us believe, or more probably, as Ibn al-Athīr's³ more detailed account implies, as a freebooter pure and simple. After ravaging a great area of Āzarbāijān he passed the winter of 1224-5 on the seacoast of Arrān, presumably in the Mūghān Steppe, so favoured in later times by the Īl-Khāns. Recrossing Āzarbāijān *en route* for Hamadān he had pillaged the unhappy country for a second time. His advance on Hamadān was due to the instigation of the caliph, who had offered him the town and region as an *iqṭā'*, presumably as an act of reprisal for the sultan's invasion of his own territory. Travelling light and with the

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 423-4.

² Transl. Houdas p. 178

³ Vol. XII, pp. 280-1.

speed that was to become proverbial Jalāl al-Dīn came upon Yaghān Taisī by night, his encampment surrounded with the horses, mules, donkeys, oxen and sheep which he had carried off from Arrān and Āzarbāijān. The plunderer awoke in the morning to find his forces encircled by an army whose commander he recognized, by the parasol held over his head, as Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn. Completely taken aback by the sudden appearance of the sultan, whom he had believed to be still in Daqūqā, he sent his wife, who was Jalāl al-Dīn's sister, to intercede on his behalf. She obtained his pardon, and the sultan, his forces swollen by Yaghān Taisī's army to some 50,000 horse, returned to Marāgheh to prepare for the attack on Tabriz.

With the approach of the sultan the atabeg had at once deserted his capital for Ganja (the present-day Kirovabad) in Arrān; and, perhaps because of his enemy's departure, Jalāl al-Dīn's first moves were peaceful and conciliatory enough. He sought and obtained permission for his troops to visit the town and purchase provisions; then when complaints were made about their behaviour, he sent in a *shahna* to keep order and protect the populace; only when complaints were lodged against the *shahna* did he finally lay siege to the town. After five days of violent fighting the two sides came to terms, and Tabriz was surrendered to the sultan on the understanding that Öz-Beg's wife, who had remained in the town, should be granted safe-conduct to her possessions in *Khūy* and *Nakhchivān*. This lady, a daughter of Toghrīl II, the last of the Saljuqs of 'Irāq, had, according to Juvainī,¹ been in secret correspondence with Jalāl al-Dīn. Estranged from her cowardly and pleasure-loving husband, she had promised to secure the capitulation of the town if the sultan would agree to marry her. Such a marriage was possible because of an oath which Öz-Beg had taken that he would divorce her if he executed a slave, whom he now had in fact executed. Jalāl al-Dīn accepted her proposal; she for her part persuaded the notables of Tabriz to negotiate the terms of surrender, and the sultan made his triumphal entry on 17 Rajab 622/25 July 1225. Ibn al-Athīr² has recorded two episodes of his short stay in the town. When Friday came around he attended the service at the mosque, but when the preacher began to pray for the caliph he stood up and remained standing until the prayer was over. Öz-Beg had built at vast expense a beautiful pavilion looking down upon gardens. Having entered and inspected it the sultan declared that it was a place fit only

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol II, p. 424.

² Vol. XII, p. 282.

for the slothful and of no use to him. Sloth was certainly not one of Jalāl al-Dīn's failings. Within days, it would seem, of his occupation of Tabriz he had already embarked upon his first campaign against the Georgians.

For some years previous to the sultan's arrival the Georgians had been engaged in aggressive warfare against the Muslim states on the southern fringes of the Caucasus; and Āzarbāijān, whose ruler had neither the power nor the will to oppose them, had borne the brunt of their attack. Jalāl al-Dīn was accordingly seen in the light of a heaven-sent deliverer, a role which he was only too willing to assume. With such forces as he had at hand he at once advanced into enemy territory, encountering a Georgian army of some 70,000 men on the river Garni in Armenia. The battle, which took place at some time in *Shā'bān*, 622/August–September 1225, resulted in a crushing defeat for the Georgians; and advancing from the battlefield the sultan captured the old Armenian capital of Dvin, then in Georgian hands. From Dvin he returned to Tabriz, where the leading men were reported—falsely, according to Nasawī¹—to be plotting against him, leaving his brother *Ghiyāth* al-Dīn to carry the war into the borderlands of Eastern Georgia. The conspirators, if such they were, having been duly punished, the sultan left Tabriz for *Khūy*, where he fulfilled his promise of marrying Öz-Beg's wife. According to Nasawī² and Juvainī,³ the news was brought to her husband in the castle of Alinja near Julfā, at no great distance from *Khūy*, and his feelings of shame and mortification were so violent as to bring about his death. It is probable, however, and more in keeping with what is recorded of Öz-Beg's character, that he survived this blow to his personal honour. At any rate we are told by Ibn Al-Athīr⁴ that he was still in Ganja some time after the ceremony when the town was occupied by Jalāl al-Dīn's troops. He withdrew into the castle, from which he sent a message to the sultan protesting against, not the violation of his marriage, but the marauding activities of Jalāl al-Dīn's soldiers; and the sultan dispatched a body of troops to protect him from further annoyance.

The war against the Georgians was resumed, according to Nasawī,⁵ immediately after the *'id al-fiṭr*, i.e. at the beginning of October 1225, but it is difficult to believe that all that had happened since the capture

¹ Transl. Houdas, pp. 192 ff.

³ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 425–6.

⁵ Transl. Houdas, p. 202.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 197–8.

⁴ Vol. XII, pp. 284–5.

of Tabriz (at the end of July) could have been crowded into so brief a space of time; and it was probably well into winter (Dhu'l-Hijja, 622 = 4 December 1225–1 January 1226, according to Ibn al-Athīr)¹ before the sultan re-entered Georgian territory, his objective being now the capital, Tiflis. Advancing directly northwards from Dvin he crossed the Pambak mountains to encounter the enemy in the Lori steppe in what is now northern Soviet Armenia. The Georgian army, according to Ibn al-Athīr, had been augmented with contingents of Alans (Ossetes), Lezghians and Qipchaq Turks; but this is probably an anachronistic reference to the confederacy that was formed against the sultan in 1228. Whatever their composition, these forces were defeated, and the sultan advanced into Georgia proper. His progress was slow, whether because of Georgian resistance or because of the rigours of a Caucasian winter, and it was not until the beginning of March 1226 that he finally arrived before Tiflis. Having inspected the fortifications and convinced himself that an open assault would be fruitless Jalāl al-Dīn had recourse to a stratagem. Concealing the greater part of his forces in ambush he approached the town at the head of some 3,000 horse; and the defenders, deceived by appearances, were tempted to make a sortie. The sultan turned in simulated flight and led the Georgians on until they fell into the trap he had set, and the whole Khwārazmī army sprang up from their hiding places, drove the enemy back through the gates and, with the collaboration of the Muslim inhabitants, possessed themselves of the town. The citadel, which lay on the far side of the Kur, seemed secure from attack; but a single day sufficed for the sultan to transport his troops across the river and blockade it from every side. The garrison negotiated favourable terms of surrender and were allowed to withdraw unmolested into western Georgia. It was otherwise with the townspeople. The Christian population, except such as saved their lives by apostasy, were subjected to a general massacre; and all of their churches were razed to the ground.

Jalāl al-Dīn's prestige was now perhaps at its zenith. Tiflis had been in Georgian hands for more than a century and in recovering the city for Islam the sultan had succeeded with apparent ease where the Saljuqs, while still at the height of their power, had repeatedly failed. It was this success no doubt which induced his admirer Mu'azzam, the Ayyūbid ruler of Damascus, to suggest to Jalāl al-Dīn an attack on the Armenian town of Akhlat as a diversionary movement in a campaign against his

¹ Vol. XII, p. 293.

brother Ashraf, the ruler of Ḥarrān and Mayyāfāriqīn, who held the town as the most easterly of his various fiefs. Jalāl al-Dīn was already *en route* for Akhlāt when news reached him of suspicious behaviour on the part of Baraq Ḥājib, and he abandoned this new adventure in order to deal with his rebellious vassal. Accompanied by less than 300 horse he rode from the Tiflis region to the borders of Kirmān in the amazingly short space of seventeen days. As on a previous occasion Baraq adopted an attitude of courteous defiance; and, realizing the strength of his position, the sultan had no option but to turn back. He halted at Iṣfahān to rest his horses; and the Iṣfahānī poet Kamāl al-Dīn Ismā'il composed a fine *qaṣīda*¹ upon his spectacular dash from the Caucasus mountains to the Dasht-i-Lūt. Here he received a report from his vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, who during his absence had led a raid into the Erzerum region to replenish the garrison's dwindling provisions; whilst returning through the territories of Akhlāt he had been attacked by Ashraf's representative, the *ḥājib* Ḥusām al-Dīn 'Alī of Mosul, who was able to recover the whole of the booty. Despite this provocation Jalāl al-Dīn did not, upon his return to Tiflis in the early autumn, immediately resume his attack upon Akhlāt. Instead he laid siege to the Armenian towns of Ani and Kars, both held by the Georgians, which he continued to invest until the beginning of October, when he returned to Tiflis and from Tiflis made a ten-day foray into western Georgia. All of these movements were designed to mask his real intentions and to lull Ḥusām al-Dīn into false security. In this he was not entirely successful, for when he appeared before Akhlāt on 7 November the *ḥājib* had had two days' notice of his approach. In their second assault the sultan's men forced their way into the town, where, however, they committed such atrocities that the population, filled with the courage of despair, were not only able to eject them but also to beat off a further attack launched a few days later. Meanwhile, there had been a heavy snowfall in Armenia and reports had reached the sultan that the Ive Türkmen, thinking he was stuck fast before Akhlāt, had occupied Ushnuyeh and Urmīyeh and extended their marauding activities to the very walls of Tabriz. On 15 December he raised the siege of Akhlāt and hastened back to Āzarbāijān.

The Türkmen were soon dealt with, but other preoccupations prevented Jalāl al-Dīn from resuming the assault on Akhlāt. In February or March 1227 the Georgians attacked and burnt Tiflis and

¹ See Juvainī transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 434-5.

had dispersed before the sultan could overtake them. Then Orkhan, one of his oldest and most trusted commanders, was murdered in Ganja by Ismā'īlī assassins, and to avenge his death the sultan carried fire and sword into all the Ismā'īlī territories from Alamūt to Gird-Kūh. Next came news of a Mongol army advancing westwards and already at Dāmghān on the borders of his territory. The sultan attacked these invaders, put them to flight and followed them in close pursuit for a number of days; he then halted near Ray in case they might rally and return to the attack and receiving a report that large forces were in fact approaching he decided to stay and await their arrival.

Such, according to Ibn al-Athīr,¹ was the sequence of events in 1227. Neither Nasawī nor Juvainī mentions the campaign against the Ismā'īlīs or, what is stranger still, the defeat of the Mongols in the Dāmghān region. All authorities are at any rate agreed that the major encounter with the Mongols occurred in the following year. In 1228, so Ibn al-Athīr² tells us, Jalāl al-Dīn fought many battles with the Mongols: his informants differed as to the actual number, but most of them went against him, only in the last was he victorious. This was the Battle of Iṣfahān, fought according to Nasawī,³ on 22 Ramaḍān 625/25 August 1228, which seems in point of fact to have been a Pyrrhic victory for the Mongols. Nasawī's⁴ account of the battle is in broad agreement with Juvainī's⁵ less-detailed version. Proceeding direct from Tabriz to Iṣfahān (and not withdrawing in that direction from Ray as in Ibn al-Athīr's⁶ account) the sultan gathered together his forces and calmly awaited the enemy's approach. When the Mongols encamped a day's journey to the east of the town, he did not immediately give battle having been advised by his astrologers not to engage the enemy until the fourth day. The Mongols interpreted his inaction as unwillingness to fight and thinking it might be necessary to lay siege to the town, dispatched a foraging party of 2,000 horse into the Luristān mountains to procure provisions. Jalāl al-Dīn caused them to be followed by a detachment of 3,000 men who, having seized the passes and cut off their retreat, returned to Iṣfahān with 400 prisoners. Of these wretches some were handed over to the qāḍī and ra'īs to be massacred in the streets of the town for the delectation and encouragement of the populace; the rest he decapitated personally in the court-

¹ Vol. XII, pp. 306-7

² Transl. Houdas, p. 231.

³ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, 436-8.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 310.

⁵ *Op. cit.* pp. 223-32.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

yard of his palace, the bodies being dragged out into the open country to be devoured by dogs and vultures. On the day approved by the astrologers the sultan was drawing up his army in battle-order when Ghiyāth al-Dīn, who had been nursing a grudge against his brother, suddenly withdrew along with all the forces under his command. Undisturbed by this defection the sultan, perceiving the enemy's numbers to be inferior to his own, ordered the local infantry to return to the town, as a gesture at once of self-confidence and of contempt for his opponents. Towards evening the right wing of his army charged the Mongols' left, broke through and pursued the fleeing enemy as far as Kāshān. Satisfied with this success Jalāl al-Dīn was resting on the side of a ravine when he was approached by one of his chief officers, who urged him not to let the enemy escape under cover of darkness but to avail himself of the opportunity to destroy them utterly. The sultan at once mounted horse but had hardly reached the end of the ravine before a Mongol force, which had been lying in ambush, charged down upon the left wing driving them back against the centre. The sultan's commanders in the left wing were killed almost to a man, and the centre, where he himself was stationed, was in utter confusion, surrounded on every side by the enemy. His very standard-bearer turned in flight, and Jalāl al-Dīn struck him down with his own hand before cutting his way through the Mongol ranks and making good his escape. What was left of the centre and left wing fled in various directions: some to Fārs, some to Kirmān and some to Āzarbāijān, while those who had lost their horses made their way back to Iṣfahān. Two days later the right wing returned from Kāshān expecting to find the rest of the army equally victorious; learning of their defeat and dispersal they too disbanded, leaving Iṣfahān at the mercy of the invaders. The Mongols, however, who had suffered even greater losses than their opponents, were content to show themselves before the walls of the town; they then retreated northward with such speed that they reached Ray in three days; they continued eastwards to Nishāpūr and were soon beyond the Oxus. As for the sultan a whole week passed without news of his whereabouts; he was believed dead and there was talk of appointing Yaghan Taisī as his successor. The qāḍī persuaded the citizens to postpone any decision until the 'īd al-fiṭr; and Jalāl al-Dīn, who had been hiding in the Luristān mountains, appeared just in time to preside over the celebrations. Entering the town amidst universal rejoicings he honoured and promoted those of his commanders and

soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the battle whilst punishing others for their absence or inactivity. He remained only a day or two in Iṣfahān before proceeding northwards in the wake of the retreating Mongols; from Ray he dispatched bodies of horsemen even into the desolate wastes of Khurāsān.

Upon returning to Tabriz the sultan received disturbing news about his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn. After his defection at the Battle of Iṣfahān Ghiyāth al-Dīn had taken refuge in Khūzistān, where he stood under the direct protection of the caliph; he was now said to be heading northwards towards Iṣfahān. When this report reached the sultan he was playing polo in the great square. With typical impetuosity he flung down his mallet and at once took to the road only to learn *en route* that his brother had sought and obtained asylum with 'Alā' al-Dīn of Alamūt. The Ismā'īlī ruler refused to hand over the fugitive but guaranteed his good behaviour, and, apparently satisfied with his undertaking, the sultan returned to Āzarbāijān. As for Ghiyāth al-Dīn, his confinement in Alamūt soon became irksome and he was lured by Baraq Ḥājib to Kirmān, where both he and his mother (whom Baraq had compelled to marry him) were treacherously put to death.

Late in 1228 Jalāl al-Dīn approached Akhlāt for the second time. He now had another score to settle with the ḥājib Ḥusām al-Dīn. The Saljuq princess, Öz-Beg's former wife, was soon completely disenchanted with her new husband and, angered by the discourteous behaviour of his lieutenant the vizier Sharaf al-Dīn during the sultan's absence in Central Persia, had not only invited the ḥājib to invade Āzarbāijān but had accompanied him back to Akhlāt. The sultan's troops do not appear on this occasion to have closely invested the town. Instead they pillaged and massacred through the length and breadth of Armenia penetrating to the Plain of Mūsh on the border of Jazīreh or Upper Mesopotamia, and the people of Ḥarrān and Sarūj, thinking the Khwārazmīs intended to winter in that more temperate region, began a general exodus into Syria. Their fears, however, were groundless, for the sultan, when an unprecedented snowfall rendered further operations impossible, withdrew his forces into Āzarbāijān.

A renewal of the campaign in the spring of 1229, was prevented by a threat to the sultan's northern flank. The Georgians, now fully recovered from their earlier defeat, had formed a confederation of the various Caucasian peoples and were advancing southwards with a multinational army that included a contingent of 20,000 Qipchaq Turks. The

two sides came into view of each other at a place with the Georgian name of Mindor near the town of Lori, and it was at once evident that the enemy's forces vastly outnumbered the sultan's. Disdaining his vizier's advice to entrench himself and await reinforcements, the sultan drew up his men in preparation for battle. He then ascended a hill in order to observe the enemy more closely and, descriing the banners of the Qīpchaq on the right wing, dispatched a messenger to remind them of the favours he had rendered them during his father's lifetime. The appeal was successful and the Qīpchaq withdrew from the battlefield. Next, turning to the Georgians drawn up in front of him the sultan proposed a one-day truce, during which the young men of either side might engage in single combat. The proposal was readily accepted, and five champions rode forward in succession from the Georgian ranks, each to be felled by the sultan in person. Then, wearying of the sport and forgetful of the truce, he gave a sign with his whip, and his troops advanced at the charge to drive the enemy before them in headlong flight.

Fresh from this and other victories in the Caucasus area the sultan, at the end of August 1229, sat down before the walls of Akhlāt. This time he did not raise the siege with the advent of winter, although the bitter cold and heavy snowfalls obliged the besiegers for a while to forsake their posts and seek shelter in neighbouring villages. Meanwhile food supplies inside the town dwindled and deteriorated, and the besieged, who had begun by eating their sheep and oxen, were reduced to a diet of cats and dogs, and even rats and mice. Akhlāt was finally taken on 14 April 1230, and was subjected, apparently against the sultan's better judgment, to three days of looting. Ḥusām al-Dīn, his old adversary, was now dead, having been executed by the mamlūk who had succeeded him as governor, and the sources are silent about the Saljuq princess whom he had abducted. Jalāl al-Dīn indemnified himself for her loss and avenged the slight to his honour by laying hands on a Georgian lady, the wife of Malik al-Ashraf, who had been left behind in the town. It was probably this act which decided Ashraf to join with Kai-Qubād, the Saljuq sultan of Rūm, in taking up arms against Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn.

Kai-Qubād had been greatly alarmed, not to say panic-stricken, by the capture of Akhlāt, which he saw as an immediate threat to the eastern flank of his territories; and he had dispatched envoy after envoy to the Ayyūbids with frantic appeals for an alliance against the sultan. With

the approval of the senior Ayyūbid, Malik al-Kāmil of Egypt, Ashraf mustered his forces—5,000 seasoned troops—at Harrān and moved northwards to link up, at Kai-Qubād's headquarters in Sivās, with an army of 20,000 Rūmīs. The allies then proceeded eastwards along the highway to Persia and halted in Arzinjān in the valley of the western Euphrates. The sultan, meanwhile, was following the same route in a westerly direction. He had left Akhlāt to attack the town of Malāzgird, when the ruler of Erzerum, a cousin of Kai-Qubād, who had supplied him with provisions and forage during the siege, came to inform him of the alliance concluded between his cousin and the Ayyūbids; he advised the sultan to advance to the attack before their forces could combine. Jalāl al-Dīn accepted his advice and had pushed forward as far as Khartabirt, where he fell ill; by the time he had recovered sufficiently to continue the march the allies had already linked up. The first clash with the enemy occurred in the village of Yasī-Chaman, somewhat to the east of Arzinjān, on 7 August, when a detachment of Rūmī troops were surrounded and cut to pieces. Two days later the main armies were in contact and there was some skirmishing; but they did not join battle in earnest until the 10th. The Khwārazmīs were decisively defeated, whether because they lost their bearings in the mist, or because of a sand storm that blew in their faces, or simply because of the weight of the enemy's numbers; and Jalāl al-Dīn fled to Khūy, pausing *en route* at Akhlāt only long enough to collect such stores and valuables as could be readily transported.¹

From Akhlāt, which he now reoccupied, Ashraf entered into negotiations with the sultan; and peace was concluded on condition that Jalāl al-Dīn should henceforth respect the territories of both the Ayyūbids and the Saljuqs. With respect to Kai-Qubād the sultan gave this undertaking with great unwillingness and only upon receiving reports that large forces of Mongols had arrived in Central Persia. This was the army, 30,000 strong, under the command of the *noyan* Chormaghun, dispatched by Ögedei, the son and first successor (1229–41) of Chingiz-Khān, to complete the conquest of Persia and make an end of the sultan. It seemed at first as though the Mongols might winter in 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, thus affording Jalāl al-Dīn time to reassemble his forces; but then came news of an army at Sarāb, only sixty miles east of Tabriz. The sultan set out at great speed for Ahar, where he passed the night; the roof of the palace in which he lodged caved in and he took this for

¹ For a detailed account of this campaign see Gottschalk, *Al-Malik al-Kāmil*, pp. 188 ff.

an evil omen. He made his way to the Mūghān Steppe, where the Mongols all but caught up with him; he shook them off by abandoning his encampment under cover of darkness and hiding in the mountains of Kapan, in what is today the extreme south-east of Soviet Armenia. The winter of 1230-1 he passed in Urmīyeh and Ushnūyeh; later we find him in Arrān sentencing his vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, justly or unjustly, to death and suppressing a revolt in Ganja; then involved in fruitless negotiations with the Ayyūbid governor of Akh̄lāt; and finally *en route* for Diyārbakr, apparently to join the ruler of Āmid in an attack upon the sultan of Rūm. In the middle of August 1231 he encamped in the immediate vicinity of Āmid; he drank heavily that night and was sunk in intoxicated sleep when, at day break, the Mongols launched their attack. Roused by one of his generals he effected his escape whilst the enemy was pursuing the bulk of his army, which, led by the same general, made its way to Irbil and finally to Iṣfahān. The sultan, meanwhile, with only a small following, rode up to the walls of Āmid and, being refused admission, turned back in the direction of Mayyāfāriqīn and encamped outside a nearby village. Again overtaken by the Mongols he killed two of his pursuers and made off into the mountains. Here, he was captured by the Kurds, who murdered him for his clothes and horse, according to some authorities, or for motives of revenge, according to others. In due course the ruler of Āmid recovered his body and gave it burial; but many refused to believe that he was dead and years later, when the whole of his domains were subject to Mongol rule, pretenders would arise claiming to be Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn.

Such was the end of the last of the Kh̄wārazm-Shāhs. Nasawī¹ describes him as a short, dark man, Turkish in appearance and in speech, though he spoke Persian also. Grave and taciturn by nature he smiled rather than laughed and never lost his temper or used abusive language. His qualities, in d'Ohsson's judgment, were those of a Türkmen warrior rather than of a general or a sovereign. This is to do him less than justice. For all his faults, he alone of his contemporaries, as was recognized by friend and foe alike, was a match for the invaders. Jalāl al-Dīn and his army formed a wall between Islam and the Tartars. That wall had now been breached and neither Ayyūbid nor Saljuq was capable of stemming the flood.

¹ Transl. Houdas, pp. 411-12.

THE MONGOL VICEROYS

After the death of Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn the military operations of Chormaghun were conducted in the Caucasus, Upper Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, and henceforth he was to exercise only an indirect influence on the course of events in Persia. One consequence of his passage through Iran had been the Mongol re-occupation of Khurāsān and the gradual establishment of a civil administration in that unhappy region now slowly recovering from the state of utter desolation in which it had lain since the invasion. At the time of the conquest of Gurgānj, a certain Chīn-Temūr, a Qara-Khitayan by origin, had been appointed *basqaq* of that area. He now received orders to lead his forces westwards in support of Chormaghun and, arriving in Khurāsān, proceeded systematically to reduce the province to subjection, setting *basqaqs* over such places as had submitted. In this work he was hampered by the activities of two former generals of Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn, Qaracha and Yaghan-Sonqur, who were conducting guerrilla warfare against the Mongols in the Nishāpūr region. News of these operations having reached the Great Khan, he was greatly enraged and instructed the noyan Dayir to set out from his base at Bādghīs and, having first dealt with Qaracha, to put the whole population of Khurāsān to the sword. Dayir's troops were already on the move when he received the news that Qaracha had been driven out of Khurāsān by Kül-Bolat, a lieutenant of Chīn-Temūr, and had entrenched himself in Zarang in Sīstān. Dayir proceeded to lay siege to Zarang, which held out for nearly two years, and upon its surrender dispatched messengers to Chīn-Temūr asserting his claim to the governorship of Khurāsān. In this he was supported by Chormaghun, who called upon Chīn-Temūr to join him in the West, whilst leaving the administration of Khurāsān and Māzandarān in the hands of Dayir. Chīn-Temūr decided to appeal to the Great Khan, to whom accordingly he dispatched a mission headed by Kül-Bolat and including several local rulers who had made their submission to the Mongols. Ögedei was pleased with the mission, remarking that Chormaghun, despite the vastly greater territory under his control, had never sent tributary princes to wait upon him; and he issued a *yarligh* or rescript giving official status to Chīn-Temūr as the governor of Khurāsān and Māzandarān. A second mission, led by an Uighur Turk called Körgüz accompanied by Bahā' al-Dīn Juvainī, the father of the historian, whom Chīn-Temūr had made his *ṣāhib-dīvān* or

minister of finance, was equally successful but brought no benefit to Chīn-Temūr, who had died before the mission returned (633/1235-6).

He was succeeded in his office by Nosal, an aged Mongol said to have been more than 100 years old, who died in 637/1239-40, already in effect superseded by the Uighur Körgüz, a clever and ambitious man, who, as the result of a second visit to Mongolia, had been given special powers by the Great Khan. Körgüz proceeded upon his return to hold a census and to reassess the taxes, but was soon obliged to return to Mongolia to answer charges laid against him by the family and dependants of Chīn-Temūr. Not only did he triumph over these adversaries, but he was granted letters-patent conferring upon him the civil administration of all the territories held by Chormaghun in Western Asia. Returning to Khurāsān at the end of 1239 he at once sent agents to 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, Arrān and Āzarbāijān to take over from the military commanders, whilst he established his own headquarters in Ṭūs. The town was still in ruins, only some fifty houses remaining standing, but with Körgüz's encouragement and example was now speedily re-built. Public order was restored, and Juvainī tells us,¹ with the usual hyperbole, that an amīr who had previously cut off heads with impunity would not now venture to decapitate a chicken, whilst the morale of the peasantry was so high "that if a great army of Mongols encamped in a field they might not even ask a peasant to hold a horse's head, let alone demanding provisions. . ." Körgüz's career was, however, nearly at its end. A dispute with his vizier, one Sharaf al-Dīn, a man of the people from Khawārazm, whose character can hardly have been as black as it is painted by Juvainī,² caused him to set out upon a fourth journey to Mongolia. This was presumably in the winter of 1241-2, for he was met *en route* with the news of the Great Khan's death, which occurred on 11 December 1241. When passing through the territories of Chaghatai, then only recently dead, he had in the course of an altercation with an official made a remark which had given offence to Chaghatai's widow. Fearful of the consequences of his words in the new and unpredictable situation he hurried back to Khurāsān. His fears were not groundless, for no sooner had he returned to Ṭūs than the emissaries of Chaghatai's family—one of them his successor, Arghun Aqa—arrived in the town. He was arrested and taken first to Ulugh-Ef, the *ordu* of Chaghatai near the present-day Kulja and then to the court of Töregene, the widow of Ögedei and Regent of the Empire (1242-6)

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 501-2.

² *Op. cit.* vol. II, pp. 524-46.

in Qara-Qorum. Here it was ruled that the crime should be tried where it had been committed, in Chaghatai's territory. Kōrgüz was in consequence brought back to Ulugh-Ef, where, by the orders of Qara-Hülegü, the grandson and first successor (1242-6) of Chaghatai, he was put to a cruel death. Originally a Buddhist despite his name (the Turkish for George) Kōrgüz had towards the end of his life become a convert to Islam, an indication perhaps of some feeling of solidarity with his Muslim subjects.

Arghun Aqa had already been appointed to succeed Kōrgüz as the viceroy of the conquered territories in the West, i.e. of a region embracing Iran, the southern Caucasus area and part of Upper Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. He arrived in Khurāsān in 641/1243-4 and left almost immediately on a tour of inspection of 'Iraq-i 'Ajam and Āzarbāijān. From Tabriz, where he received embassies from the sultan of Rūm and the Ayyūbid rulers of Damascus and Aleppo, he was summoned to attend the *quriltai* or assembly of the Mongol princes at which Güyük, the son of Ögedei, was elected his successor as Great Khan (1246). Confirmed in his office and loaded with honours by the new khan, Arghun returned to Khurāsān in the spring of 1247. He spent some time in Marv before passing on to Tūs, where he ordered the rebuilding of the Saljuq palace called the Manšūriyya. He then relaxed for a while in the meadows of Rādkān, a region of copious springs and lush grass, which seems to have made a special appeal to the Mongols, and in the late autumn of 1247 set out for Tabriz by way of Māzandarān. At Āmul he was magnificently entertained by Juvaini's father, the *ṣāhib-dīvān*, and was about to resume his journey when he received news of intrigues against him in the Mongol capital; and he determined to return thither without delay. On this journey he was accompanied not only by the *ṣāhib-dīvān* but also by the latter's son, the future historian. The party had reached Talas, the present-day Jambul in Kazakhstan, when they were met with the tidings of Güyük's death (which had occurred in April 1248); at the same time there came news of the approach of the noyan Eljigidei at the head of a large army. The purpose of this expedition is not clear: it was perhaps intended that Eljigidei, as the khan's personal representative, was to supersede Baiju (who had succeeded Chormaghun in 1242) as commander of the Mongol forces in Western Asia. Arghun hurried forward to meet him and at his insistence returned to Khurāsān to supervise the equipment and provisioning of his army. It was not until the late summer of 1249

that he was able to resume his interrupted journey to Mongolia. His case was duly investigated in the ordu of Oghul-Qaimish, Güyük's widow, then Regent of the Empire; and a decision was reached in his favour. On the homeward journey the party (of which the historian Juvainī was one) halted for a month or two at the ordu of Yesü-Möngke, who now ruled over the apanage of Chaghatai. The party had arrived in Almaligh in the late summer or early autumn of 1250; they left in the winter, when the roads were blocked with snow, but nevertheless made rapid progress and had soon reached Marv in Khurāsān. Arghun did not remain long in Iran. In August or September 1251 he again set out for the East in order to attend the quriltai which had been summoned to enthrone the new khan, Möngke (1251-9), the eldest son of Tolui. The enthronement had in fact already taken place (on 1 July 1251), though the news did not reach Arghun until his arrival at Talas. It was now mid-winter and the deep snow made travelling almost impossible. Nevertheless the party struggled on and finally came to Besh-Baliq, the old Uighur capital, a little to the north-west of Guchen in Sinkiang. From here Arghun sent a message to inform the new khan of his approach, but the party did not reach the Mongol Court till 2 May 1252, nearly a year after Möngke's enthronement. Arghun reported on the chaotic condition of finances in the territories under his control, and it was decided that a more equitable form of taxation known as qubchur, already in force in Transoxiana, should be introduced in the Western countries also. The deliberations over these and other matters lasted so long that it was not until August or September 1253 that Arghun finally took his leave. It was during this lengthy stay in Mongolia that Juvainī, who had again accompanied Arghun, was persuaded to embark upon his history of the Mongol conquests.

Upon his return to Khurāsān Arghun dispatched officials to the various parts of Persia to carry out the fiscal reforms. He himself set out for the Court of Batu, the son of Jochi and founder of the Golden Horde, to deal with certain unspecified business, apparently on the instructions of the Great Khan. Returning by way of Darband he conducted a census and imposed the new qubchur tax in Georgia, Arrān and Āzarbāijān before proceeding to 'Irāq-i 'Ajam. In the meanwhile, availing themselves of his absence, certain of his enemies at the Mongol Court had secured a yarliḡ for the dispatch of an inspector to Khurāsān to examine his accounts. Reports of this official's arrival and activities must have reached Arghun more or less simultaneously with news that

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the Great Khan's younger brother, Prince Hūlegū, was advancing westward at the head of a great army. In November 1255 he waited on Hūlegū at Kish, the present-day *Shahr-i Sabz* in Uzbekistan and accompanied him as far as *Shuburqān* before continuing on his way to Mongolia once again to triumph over his accusers.

Arghun was to spend the remainder of his life in the service of the Īl-Khans. He returned to the West, according to Juvainī, in September 1258, although Rashīd al-Dīn represents him as being present, in Hūlegū's suite, at the siege of Baghdad (January–February 1258). In 1259 and 1260 he was in Georgia introducing the qubchur and conducting military operations against the rebel princes. He held, under both Hūlegū and Abaqa, the office of Tax-Farmer General (*muqāṭi'-i mamālik*). As deputy to the viceroy of *Khurāsān*, Abaqa's younger brother Tūbshin, he took part in the war with Baraq, the ruler of Transoxiana, in 1270. He died in the meadows of Rādkān in May or June 1275.

HÜLEGÜ

At the quriltai of 1251 the Great Khan Möngke had decided to complete and consolidate the Mongol conquests by dispatching his brothers Qubilai and Hūlegū to China and Western Asia respectively. The victories of Qubilai (Kubla Khan), the successor of Möngke as Great Khan (1260–94) and founder of the Yüan dynasty, fall outside the scope of this volume.¹ As for Hūlegū, his instructions were in the first place to destroy the Ismā'īlīs and demolish their castles and then, this task completed, to put down the Kurds and Lurs: the caliph was to be attacked only if he refused to tender his allegiance. Elaborate preparations were made for the passage of Hūlegū's army through Central Asia. The road was cleared of boulders and thorny shrubs; bridges were built over small, and ferries provided for the crossing of larger rivers; and all pasturage on either side of the route, from the Khangai mountains to the Oxus, was reserved for the exclusive use of Hūlegū's army. That army, probably larger than the forces which Chingiz-Khān led westward in 1219, included contingents from all the Mongol princes, the sons, brothers and nephews of the Great Khan; and special mention should be made, in view of later developments, of the contingent sent by Batu and led by two of Jochi's grandsons, Balaghai and Quli, and one great grandson, Tutar, as also of the contingent from

¹ See Grousset, *L'Empire des steppes*. pp. 349 ff.

Chaghatai's *ulus* led by one of his grandsons, Tegüder. The army likewise included a corps of Chinese mangonel-men and naphtha-throwers for employment in siege operations.

Hülegü advanced westward at a leisurely pace necessitated perhaps by the size and unwieldiness of his forces. Setting out from his own ordu in October 1253 he halted for a time at Ulugh-Ef, where he was entertained by Princess Orqina, the widow of Chaghatai and now (1252-61) the ruler of his ulus. The summer of 1254 Hülegü passed in mountain pastures somewhere on the eastern borders of Transoxiana. In late September 1255 he encamped in the famous meadows of Kān-i Gil to the east of Samarqand. Here he was visited by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, the founder (1245-78) of the Kart dynasty of Herāt, who had demonstrated his loyalty to the Mongols by taking part in their invasion of India in 1246. Early in November Hülegü pressed on to Kish, where, as we have seen, he was joined by the viceroy Arghun Aqa. From Kish he dispatched express couriers to the various Persian rulers informing them of his intention to extirpate the Ismā'ilīs and calling upon them to render assistance or suffer the consequences of their refusal or inactivity. Many of these rulers, including Sa'd, the heir and successor (1226-60) of the Atabeg Muẓaffar al-Dīn of Fārs, came to do homage in person, as did also the rival sultans of Rūm, 'Izz al-Dīn and Rukn al-Dīn. After a month's stay in Kish the army continued on its way to the Oxus, which it crossed on bridges of boats commandeered from the ferrymen. On the left bank of the river Hülegü amused himself with a tiger hunt, in which the hunters rode on Bactrian camels in place of their terrified horses. The next halting-place was in the meadows of Shuburqān (the present-day Shibarkhān in north-western Afghanistan), where only a short stay had been intended; but heavy snowfalls and bitter cold obliged Hülegü to pass the remainder of the winter in this area. In the early spring of 1256 Arghun Aqa took leave of the Mongol prince having first entertained him in "a large tent of fine linen embroidered with delicate embroideries, with gold and silver plate in keeping with it";¹ and Hülegü entered Kūhistān to come for the first time in contact with the Ismā'ilīs.

As the army was passing through the districts of Zāveh and Khawāf, there occurred a number of "incidents", a vague term used by both Juvainī² and Rashīd al-Dīn³ presumably with reference to surprise

¹ Juvainī, transl. Boyle, vol. II, p. 164.

² *Op. cit.* p. 615.

³ Transl. Arends, p. 26.

attacks by Ismā'īlī *fidā'īs*; and Hülegü dispatched the generals Köke-Ilge and Ket-Buqa to attack the Ismā'īlī stronghold of Tūn. Ket-Buqa, a Nestorian Christian, famous afterwards as the Mongol commander at 'Ain Jālūt, had had considerable experience in fighting this enemy. At the head of Hülegü's advanced guard, a body of 12,000 men, he had crossed the Oxus in March 1253, captured several places in Kūhistān and then laid unsuccessful siege to the celebrated fortress of Gird-Kūh in May of the same year. In August he had attacked the castle of Shāhdiz near Ray and sent a raiding party still farther west into the Alamūt region. Returning to Kūhistān he had harried the country a second time and captured several strongholds, including Tūn. The town, says Juvainī,¹ "had apparently not yet been humbled and still persisted in its former benightedness..." Köke-Ilge and Ket-Buqa arrived before the gates on 4 April 1256; they took the town on the 16th and slaughtered all the inhabitants, except the younger women, according to Juvainī,² or the artisans, according to Rashīd al-Dīn.³ Their mission accomplished the two generals rejoined the main army, then on its way to Tūs.

At Tūs as at Shuburqān Hülegü was lodged in a beautiful tent which Arghun Aqa had had especially constructed for his accommodation on the instructions of the Great Khan. After a few days of feasting and revelry he moved on to the gardens of Manṣūriyya, the Saljuq palace restored by Arghun Aqa, where he was entertained with a banquet by Arghun's wives. Leaving Tūs the army encamped for a day or two in the meadows of Rādkān before proceeding to Khabūshān (the modern Qūchān), "a town" to quote Juvainī,⁴ "which had been derelict and in ruins from the first incursion of the Mongol army until that year, its buildings desolate and the *qanāts* without water and no walls still standing save those of the Friday mosque". The historian, whose motives were not altogether disinterested, for he had purchased a quarter of the town for himself, approached Hülegü on the subject of Khabūshān and obtained his authority for the complete restoration of the town at the expense of the treasury.

Hülegü remained in this region for a month and then resumed the advance westward. On 24 July he was rejoined by the ambassadors he had sent to the Ismā'īlī Grand Master, Rukn al-Dīn Khur-Shāh, to convey the terms of surrender. From Khurqān near Biṣṭām, where he

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, p. 615.

² *Op. cit.* p. 616.

³ Transl. Arends, p. 26.

⁴ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, p. 617.

had arrived on 2 September, he dispatched a second embassy to Rukn al-Dīn. The Grand Master, acting on the advice of the famous philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and other learned men detained against their will amongst the Ismāʿīlis, decided to send his brother Shahanshāh to make professions of submission. Hülegü received Shahanshāh with every honour and dispatched a third embassy with the message that Rukn al-Dīn should now demonstrate his submission by demolishing his castles. Dissatisfied with the Grand Master's response Hülegü prepared for battle. In the middle of September he advanced from Khurqān at the head of 10,000 men, whilst the various armies converged on Rukn al-Dīn's residence, the well-nigh impregnable castle of Maimūn-Diz,¹ Buqa-Temür and Köke-Ilge approaching by way of Māzandarān, Tegüder and Ket-Buqa by way of Simnān and Khuvār and Tutar and Balaghāi from the direction of Alamūt. And again he sent ambassadors, to notify Rukn al-Dīn of his intention and to promise an amnesty if he presented himself in person. As Hülegü passed by Fīrūzkūh the ambassadors returned accompanied by Rukn al-Dīn's vizier, who undertook to destroy the castles but asked that Rukn al-Dīn might be allowed a year's respite before vacating Maimūn-Diz and that the castles of Alamūt and Lanbasar might be spared from destruction. Meanwhile Hülegü continued to advance through Lār and Damāvand, and the castle of Shāhdiz, to which Ket-Buqa had laid siege two years previously, was captured within two days. Yet once again he sent ambassadors to Rukn al-Dīn calling upon him to present himself before him. The Grand Master now agreed to send his son and to demolish all of the castles; and Hülegü halted at 'Abbāsābād near Ray to await the son's arrival. On 8 October Rukn al-Dīn sent a child of seven or eight, his own or his father's by some irregular union. Hülegü sent the boy back on the ground that he was too young and asked instead for one of Rukn al-Dīn's brothers to relieve Shahanshāh. On 27 October the Grand Master sent his brother Shīran-Shāh, who was received by Hülegü near Ray; and he, or more probably Shahanshāh, returned on the 31st bearing a yarliḡh to the effect that provided Rukn al-Dīn dismantled his castles he had nothing to fear.

This message was apparently intended to lull Rukn al-Dīn into false security, just as the latter's embassies had been designed to delay the Mongol's assault until the winter snows rendered it impracticable. The

¹ The site has only recently been identified and investigated. See Willey, *The Castles of the Assassins*, pp. 158 ff.

weather, however, remained unseasonably mild and, his victim being now completely encircled, Hülegü ordered the various armies to close in whilst he himself advanced from the direction of Pishkil-Dara through Ṭāliqān. On 8 November he was encamped on a hilltop facing Maimūn-Diz from the north and the next day surveyed the castle from every side in search of some vulnerable point. The great strength of the fortifications, the approach of winter and the consequent difficulty of procuring supplies were advanced as reasons for postponing siege operations until the spring; but a minority of the princes and generals favoured immediate investment of the castle and Hülegü supported their view. In the event the siege was to last less than a fortnight. Great pine trees, planted in former times by the Ismā'īlīs themselves, were felled by the Mongols to serve as poles for their mangonels; and in addition to these normal siege instruments a Chinese ballista, with a range of 2,500 paces, discharged its missiles against the garrison. In the face of this bombardment the Ismā'īlīs ceased fighting and asked for a truce, which was granted. Then Rukn al-Dīn asked for a *yarlīgh* granting him safe-conduct if he descended from the castle. This too was granted, the *yarlīgh* being drawn up by the historian Juvainī who functioned as Hülegü's secretary. Still the Grand Master failed to appear, and the bombardment was resumed on a much larger scale. Now at last Rukn al-Dīn decided to surrender and sent down his brother Shīran-Shāh and one of his sons with a group of notables including Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī; on the following day, 29 Shawwāl/19 November, according to Juvainī,¹ or on the day after, according to Raṣhīd al-Dīn,² who quotes a chronogram by Naṣīr al-Dīn, he came down himself.

The next day Rukn al-Dīn brought all of his family and following down out of the castle; and the Mongols climbed up to begin the work of demolition. They were attacked by some of the more fanatical *fidā'īs*, whose desperate resistance was broken only after four days of fighting. Meanwhile, Rukn al-Dīn had been kindly received by Hülegü, though kept as a prisoner at large under the surveillance of a Mongol commander. At Hülegü's behest he dispatched bodies of men to destroy the Ismā'īlī castles in the whole of the region. Forty such castles were demolished, only Alamūt and Lanbasar refusing to admit these emissaries. Alamūt was invested by Balaghāi until surrender terms were negotiated through the good offices of Rukn al-Dīn. The work of demolition then began, but the historian Juvainī, with Hülegü's

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, p. 634.

² Transl. Arends, p. 29.

permission, was able to salvage part of the celebrated library, as also a quantity of astronomical instruments. Lanbasar was approached by Hülegü in person. Finding the garrison disinclined to surrender he left Dayir-Buqa to lay siege to the castle (which, in the event, was to hold out for a full year) and, on 4 January 1257, set out for his chief ordu, then situated some twenty miles from Qazvin, where he celebrated the Mongol New Year festival with a week of revelry. Rukn al-Dīn seems to have accompanied Hülegü to his ordu, though his family and possessions had been transferred to Qazvin. Because he was still of use to him Hülegü continued to treat him with honour and consideration, bestowing upon him a Mongol girl of whom he became enamoured and even humouring him in his curious pastime of watching camel-fights. With the Grand Master's co-operation it had been possible for Hülegü to secure the speedy surrender of scores of Ismā'īlī castles, many of which (as was in fact the case with Gird-Kūh) could have withstood a siege of many years. Once his usefulness was exhausted, however, his presence was a source of embarrassment to Hülegü, who acceded with alacrity to his request that he might be sent to the Great Khan. Rukn al-Dīn did not return from this journey. According to Juvainī,¹ he actually reached the Mongol Court, was reproached by Möngke with the continued resistance of Lanbasar and Gird-Kūh and was murdered by his escort in the Khangai mountains on the way back. Rashīd al-Dīn,² on the other hand, tells us that he was put to death on the outward journey, at the express orders of the Great Khan, who protested at the wasting of relay animals upon such a visitor. His departure was the signal for a general massacre of his followers, and all the Ismā'īlīs in Mongol custody, including Rukn al-Dīn's own family at Qazvin, were put to the sword, not even infants in the cradle being spared. Their wholesale slaughter was carried out, according to Juvainī,³ not only by order of the Great Khan Möngke but in fulfilment of a *yasa* of Chingiz-Khān himself.

By the virtual extinction of the Ismā'īlī sect Hülegü had rendered a great, if unintentional, service to orthodox Islam. His next blow was to be directed against the founthead of orthodoxy, the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. The Īl-Khān,⁴ as we may now call him, proceeded with the same

¹ Transl. Boyle, vol. II, pp. 724-5.

² Transl. Arends, p. 30.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ The term means "subject khan" and was applied to the Mongol rulers of Persia (and sometimes to the rulers of the Golden Horde) as subordinates to the Great Khan in Mongolia and afterwards China.

deliberation as in his advance through Central Asia. In March or April 1257 he left the Qazvīn area *en route* for Hamadān and was joined, apparently before reaching his destination, by Baiju, the successor of Chormaghun in the West, whom he presumably instructed on the role of his army in the forthcoming campaign. Hülegü himself, with the Jochid princes Quli, Balaghāi and Tutar, encamped on the Hamadān plain, from whence, after a brief stay, he set off in the direction of Baghdad, arriving in Dīnavar on 26 April; he then, for some unknown reason, returned to Hamadān; on 26 July he was in Tabriz and on 21 September back in Hamadān. Here began what Grousset¹ has called the "dialogue epistolaire" between Hülegü and the caliph, "un des plus grandioses de l'histoire". The gist of Hülegü's first message, shorn of Rashīd al-Dīn's rhetoric, was that the caliph should either present himself in person or send his three principal officers, the vizier, the commander-in-chief and the lesser *davāt-dār* or vice-chancellor; the caliph's reply was to the effect that this raw and inexperienced young man should return whence he had come. There followed a second exchange in similar tone, after which, wishing to secure his passage through the Zagros mountains, Hülegü established contact with the caliph's governor of Dartang and persuaded him to hand over the castles in his area: though the governor afterwards repented of his treason, the castles were retained through the intervention of Ket-Buqa at the head of 30,000 horse. The way being thus cleared, the ʿĪl-Khān consulted his leading men as to the advisability of an attack on Baghdad. The astronomer Ḥusām al-Dīn, who, despite his Muslim name, had been attached to Hülegü by the order of the Great Khan, spoke openly against such a move. Every ruler who had attacked Baghdad and the 'Abbāsids had forfeited his kingdom and his life; and he foretold six natural disasters that would occur if Hülegü made the attempt. Hülegü then turned to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, who had now joined his suite, and asked his opinion. With equal discretion and common sense the philosopher replied that none of these disasters would occur. "What then will happen?" asked the ʿĪl-Khān. "Hülegü will reign in place of Musta'ṣim", he replied; and in a disputation with Ḥusām al-Dīn he had no difficulty in citing a number of cases in which the caliphs had come to a violent end without any consequent calamity.

The decision being now taken, the Mongol armies converged on Baghdad. Baiju, coming from the direction of Irbil, crossed the Tigris

¹ *L'Empire des steppes*, p. 428.

at Mosul and encamped to the west of Baghdad to await the arrival of the forces from the East. Of these the right wing, commanded by Balaghāi, Tutar and Quli, was advancing through Shahrazūr and Daqūqā, the centre under Hülegü himself by way of Kirmānshāh and Ḥulwān, and the left wing under Ket-Buqa by way of Luristān and Khūzistān. Hülegü set out from the Hamadān area in November 1257. From Asadābād he again summoned the caliph to his presence, and at Dinavar he received the caliph's ambassador again advising him to turn back. He replied that having travelled so far he could not return without having met the caliph face to face. On 6 December he reached Kirmānshāh, which must have offered some resistance, for the town was sacked and the inhabitants massacred. From here he summoned Baiju and his officers to a council of war. They joined him at Ṭāq-i Girrā, the so-called "Zagrian Gates", and, their consultations completed, set off to recross the Tigris and take up their position to the west of Baghdad. Hülegü sent yet another warning to the caliph and, passing through the defile, encamped on the banks of the Ḥulwān river, where he remained from 18 to 31 December. In the meantime, Ket-Buqa had conquered the greater part of Luristān; and Baiju, by 16 January 1258, having crossed the Tigris, had reached the banks of the Nahr 'Īsā. Here Suqunchaq, the future governor of ʿIrāq-i ʿArab and Fārs, obtained his permission to lead the advanced forces and pushed forward as far as Ḥarbiyya. The davāt-dār, who commanded the caliph's army, was encamped between Ba'qūbā and Bājistrā. Hearing of a Mongol army approaching from the west he crossed the Tigris and joined battle with Suqunchaq near Anbār. The Mongols retreated to a place which Rashīd al-Dīn¹ calls Baḥīriyya, apparently on a branch of the Dujail called Naḥr Baḥīr. Here they were rallied by Baiju, who came up with the main army. The Mongols then opened a dyke and flooded the whole area behind their opponents, and, attacking at dawn on 17 January, inflicted a heavy defeat on the caliph's troops, of whom 12,000 were killed in battle in addition to those drowned in the flood. Of the survivors some few, with the davāt-dār at their head, made their way back to Baghdad, whilst others fled as far as Ḥilla and Kūfa.

Following up this victory Baiju's troops had by 22 January reached the western suburbs of Baghdad. In the meantime, Ket-Buqa, coming up from the south, had passed through Ṣarṣar and penetrated the market district of Karkh; and Hülegü himself, leaving his heavy baggage at

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 41.

Khānaqīn, had reached the eastern walls of Baghdad simultaneously with Baiju's approach to the western side. In accordance with their practice in siege operations the Mongols ringed the whole circumference of the town with a kind of palisade called *sibē*; inside this fence they sunk a moat and set up their mangonels. The assault began on 29 January. On 4 February a breach in the Burj al-'Ajamī ("Persian Tower"), the great bastion to the south-east of the Halba Gate, gave the Mongols access to the fortifications. Swarming in through this gap they drove the defenders to right and left along the wall tops and by evening were in control of the whole of the battlements. The situation was now desperate, and the *davāt-dār* made a vain attempt to escape by boat down the Tigris, while the caliph initiated a series of parleys which led to nothing and were finally broken off by Hülegü in annoyance at the wounding of one of his officers. The caliph's commander-in-chief, Sulaimān-Shāh, the Iwe Türkmen, and the *davāt-dār* had been handed over to the Mongols during the parleying: they were now both of them executed. Left with no adviser except his unsympathetic and probably disloyal vizier Musta'shim decided upon surrender. On 10 February he came out of the town accompanied by his three sons and presented himself before Hülegü. The Īl-Khān addressed him with apparent kindness and affability and then asked him to order the inhabitants to lay down their arms and come out of the town. The caliph had a proclamation made to this effect, and the people poured through the gates only to be slaughtered as they issued into the open. Musta'shim himself and his sons were lodged, in the custody of Mongol guards, at the Kalwādhā Gate, the present-day Southern Gate, near Ket-Buqa's encampment.

The sack of Baghdad began on 13 February, and the killing, looting and burning continued for seven days, only the houses of Christians being spared. On the 15th Hülegü went on a tour of the caliph's palace and caused the terrified Musta'shim to disclose the whereabouts of his treasures. This is the occasion which gave rise to the story, familiar from the pages of Marco Polo and Sir John Mandeville, of the caliph's being starved to death in a tower full of gold and silver. The nucleus of this story is the account of the interview between Hülegü and Musta'shim as given by Naṣir al-Dīn Tūsi,¹ who may well have been actually present. The Īl-Khān "set a golden tray before the Caliph and said: 'Eat!' 'It is not edible,' said the Caliph. 'Then why didst thou keep it,' asked

¹ Boyle, "The Death of the Last 'Abbāsīd Caliph", p. 159.

the King, 'and not give it to thy soldiers? And why didst thou not make these iron doors into arrow-heads and come to the bank of the river so that I might not have been able to cross it?' 'Such', replied the Caliph, 'was God's will.' 'What will befall thee,' said the King, 'is also God's will.'"

The caliph's death was in fact imminent. On 20 February, having called an end to the pillage and slaughter, Hülegü left Baghdad for the village of Waqaf, which has not been identified but must have lain somewhere along the road to Khānaqīn. It was in this village on that same day that Musta'sim met his end. Both Naṣīr al-Dīn and Rashīd al-Dīn in his much fuller account are silent as to the manner of the caliph's death, but the late Muslim authorities are almost certainly right in stating that he was rolled up in a carpet and trampled or kicked to death, to avoid the shedding of his blood, such being the Mongols' method of executing their own princes.

The vizier and the ṣāhib-divān were both confirmed in their offices, a circumstance which throws some doubt on the latter's loyalty also, and were ordered, in collaboration with other officials appointed by Hülegü, "to rebuild Baghdad, remove the slain and dead animals and reopen the bazaars".¹ And dispatching his cousin Buqa-Temür to complete the conquest of southern 'Irāq-i 'Arab and Khūzistān the Īl-Khān withdrew northwards, first to his ordu near Hamadān, and then into Āzarbāijān, where he was to remain for over a year before embarking upon a third campaign, against the Aiyūbid states in Syria. He seems to have passed the earlier part of the summer in Marāgheh, which he was to make his capital city. It was here that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī now began, under his patronage, to erect his famous observatory, and it was here, too, on 12 July 1258, that he received his vassal the non-agenarian Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' of Mosul, to whom he owed the capture of Irbīl, vainly besieged by the noyan Urqatu. He appears, however, soon to have moved on to Tabrīz, the capital of his son Abaqa and the later Īl-Khāns; here he was visited by both of the sultans of Rūm and also by the Atabeg Abū Bakr of Fārs, who came to offer his congratulations on a victory on which his *protégé* the poet Sa'di had composed a famous *marthiya* or *qaṣīda* of mourning. The spoils of this and Hülegü's earlier victory over the Ismā'īlīs had already been transported to Āzarbāijān, where they had been stored in a castle on the island of Shāhī in Lake Rezā'iyeh (Urmīyeh). From these treasures a selection had been made as

¹ Boyle. *op. cit.* p. 160.

presents to the Great Khan to whom Hülegü had dispatched a report on his conquests in Persia and Iraq and on his contemplated campaign against Syria.

The motives underlying the invasion of Syria are somewhat obscure. The hostility between Hülegü and the Ayyūbid Nāṣir Yūsuf, "personnage médiocre et sans courage", as Grousset¹ calls him, is too insubstantial of itself to account for so vast an operation. Christian influences may well have been in play, and it is perhaps only a simplification of the actual circumstances when the Armenian Haithon² represents his kinsman and namesake Het'um I of Little Armenia as holding counsel with Hülegü on the conquest of Palestine and as saying to the ʾĪl-Khān: "Sire, the Sultan of Aleppo holds the lordship of the kingdom of Syria; and since you wish to recover the Holy Land, it seems to me best that you first of all lay siege to the city of Aleppo. For if thou canst take that city the others will soon be occupied." Aleppo was certainly Hülegü's first and main objective. He set out from Āzarbāijān on 12 September 1259, having sent on Ket-Buqa ahead with the advanced forces. As before, he commanded the centre in person, entrusting the right wing to Shiktür and Baiju and the left to Suqun-chaq and his other commanders. The armies passed through the mountain pastures of Ala-Tagh to the east of Lake Vān: Hülegü was pleased with this region, afterwards a favourite summer resort of the ʾĪl-Khāns, and gave it a Mongol name. The route continued through Akh-lāṭ and the Hakkārī mountains, where there was great slaughter of the Kurdish inhabitants, into Diyārbakr. Here Hülegü set about the systematic subjugation of Upper Mesopotamia. Dispatching his son Yoshmut to Mayyāfāriqīn, which surrendered only after a long and desperate siege, and Malik Ṣāliḥ, the son of Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', to Āmid, he himself captured Edessa, Dunaisir, Nasībīn and Ḥarrān. Then crossing the Euphrates, the Mongols appeared suddenly and unexpectedly before Aleppo, where they were joined by allies unmentioned by the Muslim sources, King Het'um and his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch. The siege of the town lasted less than a week, from 18 to 24 January 1260; the citadel held out till 25 February. There was the usual methodical massacre lasting six full days; and King Het'um had the satisfaction of setting fire to the great mosque. The fate of Aleppo led to the bloodless surrender of Ḥamā; and when the news reached Damascus Nāṣir Yūsuf fled towards Egypt while a deputation of

¹ *L'Empire des steppes*, p. 434.

² P. 302.

notables offered Hülegü the keys of the town. Ket-Buqa made a triumphal entry on 1 March accompanied by King Het'um and Bohemond; and the administration of Damascus was entrusted to a Mongol *shahna* with three Persian deputies.

By the early summer of 1260 the *Il-Khān's* troops had penetrated as far as Gaza, and it seemed that the conquest of Syria would be followed by the invasion of Egypt. It was at this juncture that Hülegü received the news of the Great Khan's death (which had in fact occurred nearly a year ago, on 11 August 1259); and he at once returned to Persia, leaving Ket-Buqa in command of an army considerably reduced in numbers, only 20,000 men, according to Kirakos,¹ 10,000, according to Haithon² and Barhebraeus.³ The motive for Hülegü's withdrawal can hardly have been, as Rashīd al-Dīn⁴ implies, simply sorrow for the loss of his brother; he may have already felt some apprehension of a threat to his northern flank by Berke of the Golden Horde; but Haithon⁵ is possibly right in suggesting that he saw himself as a candidate for the vacant throne. Rashīd al-Dīn⁶ mentions only one point in his eastward journey: Akhlāt, which he reached on 7 June. According to Haithon,⁷ he left his son Abaqa in command at Tabriz and continued for several days in an easterly direction. Then, receiving news of the election of Qubilai as Great Khan, he returned to Tabriz. It was probably here that he learnt, not, as stated by Haithon,⁸ of encroachments by Berke in the Caucasus area, but of a disastrous defeat in Syria.

Before leaving Syria Hülegü had sent an embassy to Qutuz, the Mamlūk ruler of Egypt. His ambassadors, who offered the usual alternative of submission or war, had, on the advice of Baibars, Qutuz's commander-in-chief and successor (1260-77), been summarily executed, and the Egyptians had invaded Syria to gain a decisive victory over the Mongols. Crushing the forward post at Gaza they were able, thanks to the benevolent neutrality of the Franks of Acre, who had fallen foul of Ket-Buqa, to push forward along the coastline still held by the Crusaders. At Acre, revictualled by these temporary allies, they turned eastwards through Galilee towards the Jordan. The armies collided on 3 September at 'Ain Jālūt near Zarīn, and the Mongols were overwhelmed by the superior numbers of their opponents. The heroism of Ket-Buqa is described by Rashīd al-Dīn⁹ in language reminiscent of the

¹ P. 388.

⁴ Transl. Arends, p. 50.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*

² P. 303.

⁵ P. 303.

⁸ P. 304.

³ P. 436.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

⁹ Transl. Arends, pp. 52-3.

native saga, the *Secret History of the Mongols*. The greater part of his forces turned in flight; he refused to follow their example. In a last message to his master he declares: "Let not the Khan be distressed with the loss of a single Mongol army. Let him imagine that during one year the wives of his soldiers did not conceive and the mares in their herds did not foal." Deserted by his men he fights on until his horse stumbles and he is taken prisoner. The exchange of taunts with his captor is in true Homeric style; and in his last words, before his head is struck off, he contrasts his own faithful service of his khan with the Mamlūk's rise to power by treachery and regicide.

The news of Ket-Buqa's defeat and death reached Hülegü in all probability at Tabrīz; it must have been shortly followed by reports of the Mongols' expulsion from the whole of Syria and their withdrawal across the Euphrates. It so happened that on the previous day Hülegü had received Nāṣir Yūsuf of Aleppo, on whom, in recognition of his renewed homage, he had conferred the governorship of Damascus. Doubts being now cast upon the Ayyūbid's loyalty, a detachment of horsemen were dispatched to intercept him on the journey back to Syria: they overtook and massacred the whole of the party, only the astronomer Muḥyī al-Dīn Maghribī being spared because of his profession. The re-conquest of Syria was attempted by a large force commanded either by Ilge, the ancestor of the Jalayirids, or by Köke-Ilge of the Uriyangqat, a kinsman of the great Sübedei. The Mongols advanced as far as Ḥimṣ, where, on 10 December, they were defeated in battle by the Egyptians and, for the second time, driven back across the Euphrates. So ended the first phase in the struggle between the Mongols and Mamlūks for the possession of Syria, a struggle in which the ʾĪl-Khāns enjoyed the support of Armenian Cilicia and sought in vain the co-operation of Christian Europe: Öljeitü, the great grandson of Hülegü and the penultimate ruler (1304-16) of the dynasty, still hoped for some such united action against the common foe.

Hülegü's attention was now diverted to his northern frontier. The causes of the war with Berke, the ruler of the Golden Horde (1257-66), are variously given. Berke is represented by some authorities as the defender of Islam and as reproaching Hülegü for his devastation of so many Muslim countries and particularly for the execution of the caliph. It is more likely that the heirs of Jochi felt their rights endangered by the establishment of a Mongol kingdom in Persia. Arrān and Āzar-bāijān, which had been incorporated in that kingdom, had already been

trodden by "the hoof of Tartar horse"¹ in the reign of Chingiz-Khān and were therefore, according to the Conqueror's directions, part of the *yurt* or appanage of Jochi. The *casus belli* seems to have been the death, in apparently suspicious circumstances, of the three Jochid princes, Balaghai, Tutar and Quli, who had accompanied Hülegü to Persia.

Balaghai, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, in one place,² Tutar in another,³ had been accused and convicted of sorcery, a capital offence with the Mongols, and had been sent to Berke as the head of his *ulus*. The latter, satisfied as to his guilt, had sent him back to Hülegü, who had carried out the sentence. The crime, as attributed to Balaghai, had taken place as early as 1256 or 1257, the execution (of Tutar) on 2 February 1260. The other two princes, Tutar (or Balaghai) and Quli, were alleged to have been poisoned. After the death of the princes their troops fled, some by way of Darband to the territory of the Golden Horde, others by way of Khurāsān to the Ghazna region, led by a general called Nīgūdar (Nigüder), whence the name of Nīgūdarīs by which they were afterwards to be known. The flight of these troops was apparently consequent upon a battle fought at some time in Shawwal 660/August–September 1262. It was at about the same time, on 2 Shawwal/20 August, that Hülegü set out from Ala-Tagh to meet Berke's army, which, led by the famous general Noqai (a kinsman, as Rashīd al-Dīn⁴ is careful to point out, of the dead Tutar), had advanced southwards through Darband and encamped in the region of Shīrvān to the south of the south-eastern spur of the Caucasian range. Hülegü's advanced forces made contact with the army at Shamākhī in Dhu'l-Hijja/October–November and suffered some kind of defeat. Berke's men must nevertheless have retreated, for on 29 Dhu'l-Hijja/14 November they were in contact once again with these forward troops near Shābarān in the region of the present-day Kuba, well to the north of the mountains. This time victory went to the Persian Mongols, and Noqai himself was put to flight. On 20 November Hülegü advanced from Shamākhī at the head of the main army; Darband was taken by storm on 8 December and Noqai's forces routed for the second time on the 15th. Hülegü's triumph was, however, short-lived. A force under the nominal command of Hülegü's son and successor Abaqa was sent in pursuit of the fleeing army. Crossing the Terek they came upon their deserted but well-stocked encampment, where they feasted and caroused for three

¹ Juvainī, transl. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 42.

³ Transl. Arends, p. 54.

² Transl. Verkhovsky, p. 81.

⁴ *Ibid.*

days before being attacked by Berke in person at the head of a great army. The battle raged all day (13 January 1263), and when the Persian Mongols, overwhelmed by their opponents' superior numbers, were withdrawing across the frozen Terek the ice gave way under their weight and many were drowned. Abaqa got back in safety to Shābarān, and the victorious Berke, after chasing his defeated enemies to the south of Darband, returned into his own territory, leaving Hülegü to retire in discomfiture to Tabriz, where he arrived on 23 March. He began elaborate preparations for the renewal of the campaign against the Golden Horde, but in the event it was his son and successor Abaqa who liquidated the war with Berke.

Hülegü had also in these last years of his reign to cope with rebellious vassals. The faithful Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' of Mosul had died in 1261 at an age of 96 lunar years, and his son Šāliḥ had entered into relations with the Mamlūk ruler Baibars. The Īl-Khān was warned of these activities by Šāliḥ's own wife, a daughter of Sultān Jalāl al-Dīn brought up by the Mongols, and an army was dispatched against Mosul. During a siege which seems to have lasted a full year an attempt was made by Baibars to relieve the town with Syrian troops: it fell in July or August 1262, the inhabitants being massacred and Šāliḥ himself, at Hülegü's express orders, subjected to a lingering death by a particularly loathsome form of torture. With the execution of Šāliḥ's infant son every memory of the dynasty founded in 1127 by 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī, the great champion of Islam against the Crusaders, was finally extinguished. In Fārs, meanwhile, another old vassal, the Atabeg Abū Bakr (1226-60) had died, and the behaviour of his third successor, Saljuq-Shāh (1262-4), led to the intervention of a Mongol army. Saljuq-Shāh fled to Kāzarūn, where he was captured and killed, and Hülegü bestowed the throne upon Princess Abish, a grand-daughter of Abū Bakr, whom he gave in marriage to his eleventh son, Mengü-Temür (1256-82): she was the last of the Salghurids.

Hülegü died on 8 February 1265 in his winter quarters on the Jaghatu (the present-day Zarīneh Rūd), one of the four rivers which discharge into Lake Reza'iyyeh from the south: he was in his 49th year. He was laid to rest in the castle on the island of Shāhī where his treasures were stored, his grave being the traditional Royal Tomb of the Northern peoples: this is the last occasion on which human victims are recorded as having been buried with a Chingizid prince. His death was shortly followed (17 June 1265) by that of his chief wife, Doquz

Khatun, the niece of the Kereit ruler Ong-Khān, to whose influence is to be largely attributed his benevolent attitude towards the Christians.

The achievements of Hülegü as a conqueror and empire-builder have not perhaps been fully appreciated. In either capacity he will bear comparison with his cousin Batu or his brother Qubilai, the founders respectively of the Golden Horde and the Yüan dynasty. Having destroyed both the 'Abbāsid Caliphate and its Ismā'īlī opponents he extended the Mongol conquests to the shores of the Mediterranean and left to his successors dominion (subject, nominally, to the Great Khan) over a territory corresponding to the greater part of what we now call the Middle East. It is, however, not for nothing that we speak of the Il-Khāns of *Persia*, just as to William Adam Hülegü was *imperator Persidis*.¹ The Mongol was, in fact, *mutatis mutandis* as much Emperor of Iran as the Norman William was King of England. He and his successors created at least the pre-conditions for a national state; Iran ceased to be a mere geographical expression, and its rulers, for the first time since late antiquity, entered into direct diplomatic relations with the West. The dynasty founded by Hülegü may be said to have paved the way, however unwittingly, for the centralizing and nationalistic policies of the Šafavids.

ABAQA

Immediately upon Hülegü's death the roads were closed, in accordance with the Mongol custom, and a ban laid on all movement from place to place. Summoned from his winter-quarters in Māzandarān Abaqa, the Il-Khān's eldest son and heir-apparent and the most obvious candidate for the throne, did not in fact present himself until 9 March. Another candidate, his younger brother Yoshmut, had arrived on the Jaghatu only a week after his father's death but, realizing his lack of support, had returned almost at once to his post on the northern frontier at Darband. Abaqa, upon his arrival, was received with respect and deference and, the mourning ceremonies once completed, was, by the unanimous decision of the assembled princes and amīrs, invited to ascend the throne. In accepting, after the conventional show of hesitance, he stipulated that his election should first have the sanction of the Great Khan. The ceremony of enthronement took place on 19 June, a date selected as auspicious by Našīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, on the shores of the Chaghan Na'ur ("White Lake"), the modern Tualā, in the

¹ See Boyle "The Death of the Last 'Abbāsid Caliph", p. 149 n. 5.

Farāhān district to the north of Sulṭānābād (Arāk). Here the new Īl-Khān proceeded to appoint his commanders and officials: Shams al-Dīn Juvainī, chosen as vizier by his father, was retained in that office, while his brother, the historian, whom Hūlegū had made governor of Baghdad, now became lieutenant to the noyan Suqunchaq, the viceroy of 'Irāq-i 'Arab and Fārs. For his capital Abaqa chose Tabriz in preference to Marāgheh favoured by his father; his summer residences he fixed at Ala-Tagh and Siyāh-Kūh (the range which forms the watershed between the Jaghatu and the Qizil Uzūn) and his winter residences in Baghdad, Arrān and the warm valley of the Jaghatu.

Hostilities with the Golden Horde were resumed at the very commencement of Abaqa's reign. On 19 July 1265 Yoṣhmūt advanced northwards against Noqai, who had invaded the Īl-Khān's territory at the head of a large army. In a fierce battle fought on the Aq-Su, a river descending into Shīrvān from the southern slopes of the Caucasus, Noqai was wounded and put to flight. Abaqa now followed his brother over the Kur to collide with Berke at the head of 300,000 horse; he recrossed the river and for a fortnight the two armies faced each other across the water, exchanging volleys of arrows. In search of a crossing Berke proceeded upstream towards Tiflis; he died *en route*, his body was carried back to Sarai for burial and his leaderless troops dispersed to their homes. As a kind of Hadrian's Wall along his northern frontier Abaqa caused a great *sibē* or palisade to be erected along the left bank of the Kur, a day's journey in length according to Haithon,¹ a deep moat being dug between the *sibē* and the river. Leaving his brother Mengü-Temür with a mixed force of Mongols and Muslims to defend these fortifications the Īl-Khān set out for Khurāsān, passing the winter of 1266-7 in various encampments in Māzandarān and Gurgān.

It was during this winter, or perhaps a year or two later, that Abaqa was visited by Mas'ūd Beg, the son of the celebrated Muḥammad Yalavach and the governor of the whole agricultural zone of Central Asia from the Uighur country westwards. The object of this visit was ostensibly to collect revenues due to Baraq, the ruler (1266-71) of the Chaghatai Khanate, and to his eastern neighbour Qaidu, of whom Baraq was first a rival and then a satellite; but the real purpose of Mas'ūd Beg's journey was to spy out the land for Baraq, who had been encouraged by Qaidu in his plans for invading the territories of Abaqa.

¹ P. 336. He takes Cyba (Ciba), i.e. *sibē*, to be the name of a place in the vicinity of the wall.

A day after Mas'ūd's departure the news was received of the appearance of a hostile army on the Oxus. The Īl-Khān dispatched a party to apprehend him, but he eluded their pursuit and crossed the Oxus just as they reached the left bank. In the course of another embassy to Abaqa (apparently in the winter of 1267-8, when the Īl-Khān was again in Māzandarān and Gurgān) the emissaries of Baraq presented Prince Tegüder, a grandson of Chaghatai who had led a contingent westward under Hülegü, with a special kind of arrow known as *toghana*, discreetly indicating that there was a message hidden inside it. In the message Baraq apprised his kinsman of his intention and appealed for his co-operation. Returning to his fief in Georgia Tegüder, after consulting with his amīrs, decided to make his way into Baraq's territory by way of Darband. The Īl-Khān's suspicions had by now been aroused, and the noyan Shiremün, the son of Chormaghun, was sent in his pursuit; finding the passage through Darband barred, he returned to Georgia, still pursued by Shiremün, hid for a while in a great forest, was overtaken and defeated in battle and finally, in the autumn of 1269, surrendered to Abaqa. He was imprisoned for a year on an island in Lake Urmīyeh and then released after Baraq's defeat. Until his death, though not perhaps restored to favour, he enjoyed free access to the Īl-Khān's court. The story of his revolt is told with many curious details in the Georgian Chronicle¹ and in the *History of the Nation of the Archers* of the Armenian Grigor.² Tegüder's name has often been misread as Nigüder (Nigüdar) and has in consequence been connected with the Nigüdarīs, who, as we have seen, were in fact the troops of the Jochid princes Tutar and Quli.

Baraq's first hostile move was to demand that Tübshin, Abaqa's younger brother and commander in Khurāsān and Māzandarān, should evacuate the meadowlands of Bādghīs, which he claimed, along with the territories stretching southwards to the Indus, to be the hereditary property of his own ulus. It was only after an exchange of angry messages with Tübshin and Abaqa himself that he moved his forces towards the Oxus. Qaidu, to whom he had appealed for assistance, had sent, according to Vaṣṣāf,³ a whole host of princes to swell his army; but Rashīd al-Dīn mentions only two, Qīpchaq and Chabat, a grandson and great grandson respectively of the Great Khan Ögedei. The Chaghatai princes crossed the river in the spring of 1270 and advanced to Marū-

¹ Quoted by Howorth, vol. II, pp. 229-31.

² Transl. Blake and Frye, pp. (107)-(109).

³ Transl. Hammer-Purgstall, p. 134.

chaq, where Tübshin was awaiting them. Qaidu, who saw himself in the role of *tertius gaudens* in this conflict, had instructed his two kinsmen, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ to find some pretext for withdrawing their forces upon the first contact with Tübshin, and this they contrived to do, to Baraq's no small embarrassment. Tübshin, who was accompanied by the veteran Arghun Aqa, seems nevertheless to have been unequal to opposing the invader and retired into Māzandarān to await the approach of his brother at the head of the main army.

Abaqa set out from Miāneh in Āzarbāijān on 27 April 1270. The crops were beginning to come up and the Īl-Khān, so Rashīd al-Dīn² tells us, "out of his perfect justice" forbade his troops to harm even a single ear. In the great plain between Abhar and Zanjān, which the Mongols called Qongqur-Öleng ("Brown Meadow") and where Öljeitü afterwards built his capital Sultāniyeh, he was met by an ambassador from the Great Khan, a man called Tekechük, who had been detained by Baraq, had managed to escape and was able to inform Abaqa of the conditions prevailing in the enemy's camp. The Īl-Khān accelerated his pace and, passing through Ray, was welcomed by Tübshin and Arghun Aqa in Qūmis. They proceeded together to the meadows of Rādkān, where Abaqa distributed largesse to the troops and presents to the amīrs, and from thence by way of Bākhaz into Bādghīs. Abaqa, whose patrols had already made contact with Baraq's forces, now sent an emissary to offer terms of peace. Baraq was in the Ṭāliqān area, which he had made his headquarters. Despite the defection of Qipchaq and Chabat he had succeeded in conquering the greater part of Khurāsān. On 19 May 1270 his troops had attacked and pillaged the town of Nishāpūr, razed to the ground by their forebears nearly fifty years before, but had vacated it the next day. He had also meditated a similar attack on Herāt but had been persuaded of the unwisdom of such an action and had sought instead to win over the allegiance of the ruler of Herāt, the Malik Shams al-Dīn Kart. The latter was rescued from an embarrassing position by the news of the approach of Abaqa at the head of a great army; he withdrew into his castle to wait upon events.

The terms which Abaqa's emissary transmitted to Baraq were generous enough. In return for the cessation of hostilities the Īl-Khān offered to cede the territory stretching from Bādghīs southwards to the Indus. One at least of Baraq's amīrs was in favour of accepting these terms, but he was overruled by the bellicose majority and, despite the

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 74.

² *Op. cit.* p. 77.

warning of Baraq's astrologer, it was decided to launch an immediate attack. Doubt had been cast on the actual presence of Abaqa in Khurāsān, and it was suggested that this was a false report put about by Tübshin and Arghun Aqa for their own ends. Accordingly three scouts were sent on ahead to ascertain the facts. They were captured by Abaqa's men on the very spot that had been selected for the battlefield. This was a broad plain at the foot of the mountains with a river, which the Mongols called Qara Su, flowing in front of it. Brought before Abaqa the scouts were soon intimidated into declaring the nature of their mission; and the Īl-Khān conceived the idea of deceiving the enemy by means of their own spies. Leaving his tent for a moment he gave the necessary instructions to one of his men. He then returned to resume the drinking bout with his generals, the three scouts remaining, as heretofore, bound to the tent pole. An hour or two later the officer whom he had so instructed entered in the guise of a courier to declare, with simulated agitation, that Abaqa's territories had been invaded by a great army from the Golden Horde and that all was lost unless the Īl-Khān returned immediately. Affecting to believe this message Abaqa ordered his forces to abandon the camp and baggage and leave for Māzandarān that very night. At the moment of departure he detailed an officer to execute the three scouts but told him *sotto voce* to let one escape. As the army passed Herāt the governor was ordered to close the gates of the town to Baraq; they halted at the place chosen for the battlefield which Rashīd al-Dīn here calls Dasht-i Chīna, perhaps the Plain of the Wolf (Mongol *china* "wolf").

Meanwhile the sole surviving scout had made off post-haste to bear the imagined good tidings to Baraq. Elated with the news the Chaghatai army advanced westwards the next morning in pursuit, as they thought, of a fleeing army. The Herātis had closed their gates as ordered but Baraq, though angered by their action, was in no mood to turn aside from the chase. Crossing the Hārī Rūd the troops beheld the deserted encampment spread out before them and fell gleefully to pillaging it. Finally sated with plunder they halted to the south of Herāt and passed the remainder of the day in feasting and revelry. The next day they continued the advance westwards along the river and had ridden for about two hours when they suddenly emerged on to a broad plain covered from end to end with Abaqa's men. Baraq drew up his forces on the river bank, to meet, as best he could, the Īl-Khān's attack. Despite the advantage of surprise all did not at first go in Abaqa's

favour, and his left wing was driven back as far as Pūshang (on the site of the modern Ghurian); but their pursuers were thrown into disarray, and, with the third charge of Abaqa's army, the enemy broke before them. Baraq's horse was killed beneath him and he escaped across the Oxus on the mount of one of his guards; he was accompanied by only 5,000 of his men, whose losses would have been even greater but for rear-guard action on the part of Jalayirtai, the same general who had driven back Abaqa's left wing. The Battle of Herāt (as it may be called) was fought on 22 July 1270: henceforth, apart from the incursions of Esen-Buqa and Yasa'ur in the reign of Öljeitü, the eastern frontiers of Iran were to remain comparatively inviolate until the rise of Tīmūr.

Leaving Tübshin in command of Khurāsān and Māzandarān the Īl-Khān returned to Āzarbāijān, reaching Marāgheh on 18 October and the *ordus* of his wives in the Jaghatu valley on 6 November. Here he received the ambassadors of the Great Khan, the bearers of a *yarliḡh* conferring upon him the Khanate of Iran; and here, in accordance with that *yarliḡh*, the ceremony of enthronement was performed for a second time on 26 November. It is now that we hear for the last time of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. During a hunting expedition in the Jaghatu valley the Īl-Khān had been gored by a bison (*gāv-i kūbī*). The primitive first aid of an attendant had stopped the bleeding, but the wound suppurated and an abscess was formed which none of Abaqa's physicians dared to open. Naṣīr al-Dīn gave it as his opinion that the operation could be performed without danger; and the lancing was successfully carried out, under his supervision, by a Muslim surgeon. The great philosopher died four years later in Baghdad and Raṣhīd al-Dīn¹ records some curious details about the circumstances of his burial. His scientific work has been dealt with elsewhere in this volume. A true disciple of Avicenna, "he held fast"—in the words of Barhebraeus,² a Christian collaborator at Marāgheh—"to the opinions of the early philosophers, and he combated vigorously in his writing those who contradicted them".

In the following decade the Īl-Khān himself took little or no part in military operations. In 1271 there was an echo from the past when the Ismā'ili castle of Gird-Kūh finally surrendered. It had withstood a continuous siege of eighteen years, having been first invested by Ket-Buqa in May 1253. In Transoxiana, which remained without an effective ruler from the death of Baraq (9 August 1270) till the accession of his son Du'a (1282), Abaqa was able to avenge himself for the invasion of

¹ Transl. Verkhovsky. p. 200.

² P. 452.

Khurāsān. In the course of a campaign (1272-3) suggested and partially led by a renegade Chaghatai officer, Bukhārā was sacked and burnt and as a result of this and subsequent troubles remained depopulated for seven years. Only in Asia Minor was Abaqa called upon to intervene in person.

Of the two sultans of Rūm Kai-Kā'us II was now an exile in the Crimea and Qīlīch-Arslan IV had been put to death by his vizier Mu'in al-Dīn Sulaimān, better known as the Parvāna (*Ṣāhib Parvāna*, "Keeper of the Seals"). Though Qīlīch-Arslan's infant son was the titular ruler the administration of the country was and remained in the hands of the Parvāna. That he was in correspondence with the Mamlūks seems indisputable; whether he authorized the deputation of Rūmī notables (including, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, his own son) who in 1276 invited Baibars to attempt the conquest of Rūm is not so clear. The invitation was in any case accepted and, in the spring of 1277, the Mamlūk sultan invaded the territory of the Saljuqs, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongol army of occupation at Abulustān (the modern Albustan) on the Upper Jaiḥān (15 April), made a triumphal entry into Qaişariyya (Kayseri) a week later and then, with equal rapidity, withdrew into his own territory. News of this disaster was brought to Abaqa at Tabriz, and he set out forthwith for Asia Minor. At Abulustān he inspected the battlefield, and shed tears over the piles of Mongol dead; then angered with the lukewarmness of his Saljuq allies, he gave orders for the devastation of an area stretching from Qaişariyya to Erzerum, calling a halt to the rapine and slaughter only upon the intercession of his vizier the *ṣāhib-dīvān* Shams al-Dīn Juvainī. It was at first his intention to enter Syria in pursuit of Baibars but, convinced of the difficulties of military operation in the height of summer, he postponed till the following winter a campaign which in the event was not to be launched till the autumn of 1281. He spent the remainder of the summer in Ala-Tagh, whither the Parvāna, who had discreetly withdrawn to Ṭūqāt (Tokat) during the hostilities, was brought for trial. His guilt established, he was put to death on 2 August 1277. There is perhaps some truth in Haithon's¹ story that his body was cut up and eaten in some sort of cannibalistic ritual.

Some weeks after the execution of the Parvāna the *ṣāhib-dīvān* was sent to restore peace and order in the Saljuq territories. This task completed we find him in the Darband area pacifying the mountain tribes of what

¹ P. 309.

is now Daghestan, "peoples", says Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ "that have never been subdued by anyone in any period". It was at this time, about the year 1277, that the great minister was first exposed to the machinations of rivals seeking to encompass his downfall. Of these the most dangerous and persistent was a certain Majd al-Mulk, a former protégé of Shams al-Dīn. On the basis of some chance remarks by one Majd al-Dīn, a confidant of the šāhib-divān's brother 'Alā' al-Dīn, he accused both brothers of being in league with the Mamlūks. The accusation was made in a statement to Yesü-Buqa, a son-in-law of Hülegü, and in due course was brought to the notice of Abaqa, who ordered an inquiry. The unfortunate Majd al-Dīn was put to the question but refused to make any admission of guilt, so that Majd al-Mulk was not able to press the charge. However, three years later in the spring of 1279, he succeeded in gaining access to Prince Arghun, Abaqa's elder son and second successor (1284-91), and convincing him not only that the šāhib-divān was in treasonable correspondence with the Egyptians but also that he had embezzled huge sums from the Treasury. Arghun repeated these accusations to his father, who did not, however, take any action until he had himself been approached by Majd al-Mulk in the spring of the following year. It was only through the intercession of one of the royal ladies that Shams al-Dīn was saved from the Īl-Khān's wrath, though Abaqa's suspicions do not seem to have been entirely allayed and the šāhib-divān was not fully restored to favour. Against Shams al-Dīn's brother 'Alā' al-Dīn, the historian and governor of Baghdad, the intrigues of Majd al-Mulk were more successful: he was twice arrested and was actually being taken to Hamadān for trial at the time of Abaqa's death.

The Īl-Khān's plans for an attack on Syria, for which, as we shall see, he had long been seeking an alliance with the powers of the Christian West, were interrupted by a threat from an unexpected quarter. In the winter of 1278-9 a force of Nigūdaris or Qaraunas (as they called themselves and are called by Marco Polo) invaded Kirmān and Fārs from their base in southern Afghanistan. Rashīd al-Dīn's² and Vaṣṣāf's³ accounts of these operations are difficult to reconcile; the latter authority writes in much greater detail and speaks of a second campaign three years later in which the invaders penetrated to the shores of the Persian Gulf. The present incursion seems to have little more than a large-scale

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 92.

² *Ibid.* p. 94.

³ Bombay ed. pp. 199-202.

raid, from which they returned, with their prisoners and booty, to the region of Sīstān. Here in the town of the same name (the earlier Zarang) they were besieged by Prince Arghun in the summer (July–August) of 1279; they offered but slight resistance and, upon the surrender of the town, their leaders, including a grandson of the Chaghatai khan Mubārak-Shāh (1266) were taken to Herāt, where they paid homage to Abaqa (12 August 1279). The ruler or commander of these freebooters was until 698/1298–9 a great-grandson of Chaghatai called ‘Abdallāh, a convert (as his name indicates) to Islam. He was then recalled by the Chaghatai khan Du’a (1282–1306) and replaced by the latter’s son, Qutlugh-Khwāja, under whom in 1300 the Nīgūdarīs launched yet another attack upon Fārs, an action, says Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ on which they would not have ventured but for the preoccupation of Ghazan’s forces in Syria.

To Syria Abaqa was now at last able to give his full attention. He had been in correspondence with the pope since 1267 (and apparently earlier); in 1273 he had written both to the pope and to Edward I of England. In the following year his envoys had repeated the message at the Council of Lyons; in 1276 they were in Italy and in 1277 in England. To these appeals for an alliance against a common enemy Abaqa had received no positive reply, and he decided to act alone. In September 1281 an army of some 40,000 men under the command of the Īl-Khān’s brother Mengü-Temür entered Syria by way of ‘Ain Ṭāb. As in Hülegü’s invasion twenty years earlier, the King of Little Armenia, now Het’um’s son Leon III, had contributed his contingent of troops. The clash with the Egyptians occurred near Ḥimṣ on 30 October. The battle is described in the greatest detail by the Egyptian historians; Rashīd al-Dīn, writing for Ghazan and Öljeitü, is naturally disinclined to dwell upon a humiliating defeat of their grandfather’s forces. The Mongol right wing, composed of Oirats, Armenians and Georgians, drove back their opponents to the gates of Ḥimṣ, but in the centre, Mengü-Temür, a young and inexperienced commander, was wounded by an Egyptian officer and turning in flight was followed by the greater part of his army. He recrossed the Euphrates with such of his forces as had not drowned in the river or died of thirst in the desert and made for his mother’s apanage in Upper Mesopotamia.

News of this *débauche* was brought to Abaqa in the Mosul area. For some unaccountable reason, instead of taking personal charge of the

¹ *Loc. cit.*

campaign, he had chosen to remain to the east of the Euphrates, engaged apparently on a large-scale hunting expedition, first on the Khābūr and then on the Euphrates opposite Raḥbat al-Shām: fighting broke out with the inhabitants, though Rashīd al-Dīn¹ specifically mentions that the Īl-Khān did not cross the river. On 15 October he turned back towards Sinjār and on the 30th rejoined his ordus in the vicinity of Mosul. He was extremely angry with the news, declaring that those responsible would be called to account in a quriltai to be held the next summer and that he would then take the field in person to avenge his brother's defeat. He was to be denied this satisfaction. After passing the greater part of the winter in Baghdad (it was during this period that 'Alā' al-Dīn Juvainī was arrested, released and re-arrested) he set out for Hamadān, where he arrived on 18 March 1282 and where, after a bout of heavy drinking, he died in a state of *delirium tremens* on 1 April. He was laid to rest alongside his father on the island of Shāhī.

"Khulagu and Abaka", says Howorth,² "were two important figures in Asiatic history. They conquered and controlled a vast empire with vigour and prudence. Their successors, until we reach the reign of Ghazan, were for the most part weak and decrepit rulers, whose authority was gradually disintegrating. Had it not, in fact, been for the utter desolation and prostration caused by the campaigns of Jingis and Khulagu in Persia, they would undoubtedly have been driven out and displaced; and, as it was, a very little more aggressive vigour on the part of the Egyptian rulers who controlled the various forces of Islam would no doubt have led to the collapse of the empire of the Ilkhans." It is certainly true that not until the accession of Ghazan was the Īl-Khānid state ruled by a prince capable of reviving and continuing the policies of Hülegü and Abaqa.

TEGÜDER (AḤMAD)

After Abaqa's death the royal ladies, the princes of the blood and the great amīrs gathered together in Marāgheh to observe the usual ceremonies of mourning; they then proceeded to the Jaghatu valley to elect his successor. Of the two candidates for the throne Tegüder, Hülegü's seventh and eldest surviving son, was the more strongly supported, and the other candidate, Abaqa's eldest son Arghun, was persuaded to stand down in his favour. He was proclaimed on 6 May

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 98.

² Vol. III, p. 393.

1282, apparently still in the winter residence on the *Jaghatu*; but the actual enthronement took place in *Ala-Tagh* more than a month later, on 21 June. As a convert to Islam (it is not known of how long standing) he assumed the name of *Aḥmad* and the title of sultan.

It was at *Ala-Tagh* that 'Alā' al-Dīn Juvainī was cleared of Majd al-Mulk's charges and reinstated in the governorship of Baghdad, whilst his accuser, condemned in turn, was lynched by the mob before the death sentence could be carried out. His brother, the *ṣāhib-dīvān*, was likewise fully restored to favour, and it was at his advice that Tegüder now sought to establish friendly relations with the sultan of Egypt, a step diametrically opposed, as he admits himself in his letter to Qīla'un, to the wishes of his fellow princes, who at the *quriltai* just concluded had unanimously resolved upon the resumption of hostilities with the Mamlūks. The embassy which set out from *Ala-Tagh* on 25 August was coolly received. A mission in the following year fared even worse. The ambassador and his staff were cast into prison, where the former actually died. He could in any case have accomplished nothing for the delivery of his message had been anticipated by the news of Tegüder's dethronement and death.

Relations between the khan and his disappointed rival had rapidly deteriorated. Much of the latter's animus was directed against Tegüder's protégés, the Juvainī brothers, particularly *Shams al-Dīn*, whom he accused—and the charge seems to have been widely believed—of having poisoned his father. The winter of 1282–3 he spent in Baghdad, where he revived the old charge of embezzlement against 'Alā' al-Dīn, whose agents he arrested and put to the torture: he caused the body of one man, who had recently died, to be exhumed and flung upon the highway. News of these activities reached 'Alā' al-Dīn in Arrān and brought on a stroke: he died on 5 March 1283. In the spring Arghun returned from Baghdad to *Khurāsān*, of which his father had made him viceroy and where he now began to prepare for open rebellion against Tegüder. He had an ally and perhaps a rival in his uncle Prince Qongqurtai, the ninth son of *Hülegü* and viceroy of Rūm. In Arrān, where he was in attendance on Tegüder, Qongqurtai formed, or was said to have formed, a conspiracy to seize the khan's person during the celebration of the Mongol New Year falling in January 1284. He was arrested by Tegüder's son-in-law, the Georgian general *Alinaq*, on 17 January and executed on the following day; and with Qongqurtai out of the way the khan at once moved against his fellow conspirator Arghun. From

an army of 100,000 men now at his disposal he dispatched, on 29 January, an advanced force of 15,000 horse under the command of Alinaq; he himself, at the head of the main army, set out from Pīl-Suvār in Mūghān on 26 April. On the 31st he received news of the approach of Arghun's army and instructed Alinaq to offer battle if his forces were superior in number but otherwise to await his own arrival. There was a clash between the advance parties of either army at Khail-i Buzurg between Qazvīn and Ray, and a pitched battle was fought at Aq-Khwāja (Sumghān) to the south of Qazvīn on 4 May. Though the result seems on the whole to have been a victory for Arghun, he saw fit to withdraw eastwards, and the khan's forces continued to advance. At Aq-Khwāja Tegüder received a deputation bearing a conciliatory message from Arghun. Against the advice of his generals he rejected these overtures and pressed onwards. A second deputation headed by Prince Ghazan, the future Īl-Khān, reached him in the Simnān area on 31 May. His reply was that Arghun should demonstrate his sincerity either by presenting himself in person or by sending his brother Geikhatu. This message he caused to be delivered by a deputation of princes and amīrs, one of whom, Buqa, was secretly in sympathy with Arghun. Despite an undertaking made to Buqa that, as a conciliatory gesture, he would halt at Khurqān, Tegüder advanced to a place called Kālpūsh to the north of Jājarm, where it had been Arghun's intention to make a stand. At Kālpūsh, on 28 June, he was rejoined by his ambassadors bringing with them Prince Geikhatu and two of Arghun's amīrs, one of them the famous Nauruz. Buqa was annoyed to find that Tegüder had not kept his word; he ventured to argue with the khan, who expressed his displeasure by the use of threatening language and by deposing him from his office. As the result of this treatment Buqa became, in Rashīd al-Dīn's¹ words, "still more ardent a partisan of Arghun" with the direst consequences to Tegüder. Meanwhile, at Qūchān, which he reached on 7 July, the Īl-Khān learnt that Arghun, with only a small following, had taken refuge in the famous mountain stronghold of Kalāt (the later Kalāt-i Nādirī). Approached by Alinaq at the head of Tegüder's advanced forces he was persuaded to come down from the castle and surrender to his uncle (11 July 1284). Tegüder, after receiving him with apparent kindness, handed him over to Alinaq to be kept under guard until such time as he could be tried in the presence of the khan's mother, Princess Qutui. Then, conceiving a

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 109.

desire for the company of his most recently married wife, he set out for his *oghruq* or base camp at Kālpūsh, leaving Alinaq in charge of the prisoner and the princes in command of the army. Buqa availed himself of his opportunity. Arghun was released, and Alinaq killed; and, with the co-operation of the princes and commanders favourable to Arghun, all supporters of Tegüder had soon been eliminated. "At night", says Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ "Arghun was a prisoner, and in the morning he was monarch of the face of the earth."

News of this reversal of his fortunes reached Tegüder while still *en route* to Kālpūsh. He halted for a brief space and then, on 10 July, fled westwards along the great Khurāsān road. Within three days he was in Qongqur-Öleng, where he looted Buqa's ordu and was only restrained by the Amīr Suqunchaq from harming his wife and family. On 17 July he reached his own ordus, probably in Soghurluq (in Turkish "the place abounding in marmots"), the Mongols' summer residence at Shīz (Takht-i-Sulaimān), the site of the famous fire-temple.² It was his intention to make for Darband and escape into the territory of the Golden Horde; but messengers arriving from Arghun with news of his changed circumstances, he was placed under close arrest by the officers in charge of the ordus. It was at this juncture that a band of Qaraunas, whom Buqa had caused to be dispatched in his pursuit, burst into the camp, which they pillaged with an indiscriminate savagery graphically described by Vaṣṣāf:³ "nothing was left", says Rashīd al-Dīn,⁴ "save the ashes in the fire-places." They took Tegüder into their own custody handing him over to Arghun when, on 26 July, he arrived in the ordus. At a place called Āb-i-Shūr ("Salt Water") near Yüz Aghach (in Turkish "Hundred Trees"), an unidentified summer residence somewhere in the Ūjān region, Tegüder was brought to trial, the main charge being the execution of Qongqurtai. He expressed contrition for his past actions, and Arghun himself was in favour of clemency, but the protests of Qongqurtai's family and the possibility of a rising in Hamadān prevailed upon him to pass the death sentence. It was carried out on 10 August 1284: as in the case of his victim Qongqurtai his back was broken, a form of execution designed, like the use of the bowstring, to avoid the shedding of royal blood.

There is little or no evidence to support Howorth's⁵ contention that

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 111.

² See Minorsky, *Iranica* p. 101.

³ See d'Ohsson, vol. III, p. 605; Howorth, vol. III, p. 307.

⁴ Transl. Arends, p. 113.

⁵ Vol. III, p. 308.

his death "was mainly due to his patronage of Muhammedanism, which set against him the conservative feeling, both political and religious, of the Mongol chieftains". His overtures to the Mamlūks might well have offended national susceptibilities but can hardly have been widely known of during his lifetime. In patronizing the Juvainis he merely followed the example of his shamanist or Buddhist father and brother. Like them he was, according to Barhebraeus,¹ favourably disposed towards the Christian sects; and Rashīd al-Dīn² specifically mentions his employment of Georgian and Armenian troops in his campaign against Arghun. He does not, in short, despite the contrary testimony of Haithon,³ give the impression of a bigoted convert to Islam; and his downfall was probably due, not to an active or passive religious policy, but simply, as afterwards in the cases of his nephews Geikhātu and Baidu, to his ineffectiveness as a ruler.

ARGHUN

The enthronement of Arghun followed closely upon the execution of his uncle; it took place, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,⁴ on the next day, i.e. 11 August 1284. Only the royal ladies and the amīrs were present, the princes, Arghun's brothers, cousins and uncles, having not yet arrived. Rashīd al-Dīn,⁵ it is true, speaks of his uncle Hulachu as playing a leading part in the ceremony; but this is probably an anachronistic reference to the second ceremony, held on 7 April 1286, after Arghun's accession had been officially sanctioned by the Great Khan. At the time of the first ceremony Hulachu still saw himself as a rival candidate for the throne; it was only at the quriltai held in the spring or summer of 1285 that he was reconciled with his nephew and accepted, jointly with Arghun's brother Geikhātu, the viceroyalty of Rūm. At the same quriltai Arghun's son Ghazan received the provinces of Khurāsān, Māzandarān, Qūmis and Ray. Buqa's services had been recognized much earlier. Already in the autumn of 1284 Arghun had appointed him his vizier and, as a more spectacular demonstration of his gratitude, had caused gold to be poured over him until he was all but buried in the pile. Buqa's predecessor, Shams al-Dīn Juvaini, fared very differently. After his master's downfall he had made his way first to Iṣfahān and then to Qum, from whence he had been urged to escape to

¹ P. 467.² Transl. Arends, p. 106.³ P. 312.⁴ Transl. Arends p. 115.⁵ *Loc. cit.*

India by way of Hurmuz. However, reassured by the proclamation of a general amnesty, he decided to throw himself on the mercy of the new khan. Arghun was then at Qurban Shire (in Mongol "Three Thrones"), somewhere in the vicinity of Soghurluq. Here Shams al-Dīn arrived on 23 September 1284, and through the good offices of Buqa, with whom he had previously been on friendly terms, he was appointed the latter's deputy. This improvement in his fortunes was of very brief duration; the victim of intriguers, who had once been his *protégés*, he was put to death at the gates of Ahar on 16 October 1284.

Such was the end of the great minister, whose role under the Īl-Khāns may be compared, not unaptly, with that of Nizām al-Mulk under the Saljuqs. Barhebraeus,¹ an observer certainly not prejudiced in his favour, bears witness that "the whole kingdom of the House of Māghôgh [i.e. Magog, the Mongols] hung on his finger, for he was very sagacious with an understanding nature; and he was well instructed in the greater number of the sciences and the various kinds of learning". His successor's term of office lasted little more than four years. His arrogance soon raised him enemies; their numbers increased as the result of his activities in Fārs (still nominally ruled by Princess Abish), where he had been sent to restore order after a popular rising against the Mongols; and perceiving that he had lost the khan's favour he became involved in a conspiracy in which several of the princes seem to have been implicated. Betrayed by Arghun's cousin Jūshkeb, who had affected an interest in the plot in order to obtain the names of the conspirators, Buqa was put to death on 16 January 1289. He was succeeded as vizier by a Jewish physician, Sa'd al-Daula of Abhar, "the most influential Jew not only of Azerbaijan but of Persia as a whole, after Mordecai and Esther, and after Ezra and Nehemiah, ever to play a role in the political arena of Persia".² Sa'd al-Daula had first won the Īl-Khān's confidence as a financial administrator, when sent to Baghdad to restore the economy after the large-scale peculations of Buqa and his brother Aruq. A man of pleasing address conversant with both the Turkish and the Mongol languages, he so ingratiated himself with Arghun that the latter, in June 1289, bestowed upon him the vizierate of his Empire. The rule of a Jew over a predominantly Muslim community must of itself have caused widespread resentment, and such resentment was naturally aggravated by his practising the usual nepotism of his age and time and distributing the key posts in the

¹ P. 473.

² Fischel, "Azerbaijan in Jewish History", p. 8 n. 19

administration amongst his relations and co-religionists. Nevertheless even a hostile witness such as Vaṣṣāf is constrained to admit that Sa'd al-Daula "established the administration on the basis of law and justice; that his reforms led to the disappearance of oppression, robbery and thieving, to security and facilitation of the pilgrimage to Mecca; that the finances of the state were consolidated and that all the inhabitants benefited from his successful efforts".¹ The story, recounted by Vaṣṣāf,² that he contemplated founding a new religion with the khan as its prophet is probably pure invention. Despite his unpopularity he retained Arghun's favour to the very end, his adversaries venturing to attack him only when the Īl-Khān was on his death-bed.

Though he had won his throne by the sword Arghun appears only twice to have taken the field during the course of his reign: in the spring of 1288 and again in the spring of 1290, the forces under his command repelled an invasion launched by the ruler of the Golden Horde, Töle-Buqa (1287-91) and led by his successor Toqta (1291-1312). These seem however to have been little more than large-scale raids. Of far greater potential danger to the Īl-Khānid state was the insurrection of Nauruz, the son of Arghun Aqa, who, as military governor of Khurāsān, was the second-in-command to Prince Ghazan. The rebellion lasted for five years (1289-94), continuing into the reign of Geikhatu: at the time of Arghun's death Ghazan was in full retreat before his former lieutenant, who proceeded to rapine and slaughter upon such a scale as Rashīd al-Dīn³ terms "beyond description". The terror which Nauruz had inspired became proverbial, and the natives of Khurāsān, when their cattle refused to drink, would say it was because they had seen his reflection in the water. Such was the instrument whereby the Īl-Khāns were to be brought into the fold of Islam.

Like his father Arghun wished to resume the war against the Mamlūks, and he too sought a military alliance with the Christian West. Already in 1285 he had sent a letter to Pope Honorius IV, of which the Latin translation has been preserved in the Vatican archives. The correspondence seems to have had the sanction of the Great Khan himself, one of whose officials, a Nestorian Christian called 'Īsā Kelemechi, took part in the embassy.

And now let it be [says the Īl-Khān], because the land of the Saracens is not ours, between us, good father, us who are on this side and you who are on

¹ Fischel, *op. cit.* p. 8.

² See below, p. 541.

³ Transl. Arends, p. 152.

your side; the land of Scami [Shām, i.e. Syria] to wit the land of Egypt between us and you we will crush. We send you the said messengers and [ask] you to send an expedition and army to the land of Egypt, and it shall be now that we from this side and you from your side shall crush it between us with good men; and that you send us by a good man where you wish the aforesaid done. The Saracens from the midst of us we shall lift and the lord Pope and the Cam [i.e. the Great Khan Qubilai] will be lords.¹

In 1287 a second embassy, led by a Nestorian prelate from China called Rabban Sauma, set out for Europe, returning in the following year with letters from Pope Nicholas IV, Edward I of England and Philippe le Bel of France. The last-named at least seems to have given a favourable reply, for in a letter written in the summer of 1289 Arghun refers to his promise to send troops to his aid in a forthcoming campaign against the Mamlūks. He himself, he continues, would set out at the beginning of January 1291, so as to reach Damascus on 15 February. And he adds: "Now if, fulfilling thy sincere word, thou sendest thy troops at the time agreed upon, and if, blessed with good fortune by Heaven, we conquer these people, we shall give you Jerusalem."²

Arghun must soon have abandoned the idea of such an expedition, for we find him in September 1289 at Marāghēh *en route* for Arrān, where he passed the winter of 1289–90 and where, in the following spring, he became involved, as has already been mentioned, in a brief collision with the forces of the Golden Horde. He took a great interest in the sciences, true and false, and Rashīd al-Dīn³ records an interview with the famous scientist Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī in the Vān area, during the late summer of 1290, in which the latter showed him a map of the Mediterranean coast of what is now Turkey and answered the Īl-Khān's questions about it. Arghun had on a former occasion exchanged views with Quṭb al-Dīn on the alchemist's art, upon which and its practitioners he had lavished large sums of money; and at Marāghēh in the previous autumn he had been offered by an Indian yogi the elixir of life, in the form of an electuary compounded mainly of sulphur and mercury.⁴ This medicament he continued to take over a period of nearly eight months, at the end of which, having now returned to Tabriz, he retired into the castle to hold a forty-day fast in the company of Buddhist priests, apart from whom only Sa'd al-Daula and two other

¹ Moule, *Christians in China*, p. 106.

² Mostaert and Cleaves, *Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Arghun et Oljeitū à Philippe le Bel*, p. 18.

³ Transl. Arends, p. 128.

⁴ See also Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, vol. II, pp. 365 and 369 n. 5.

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favourites were admitted to his presence. In Arrān, where he passed the winter of 1290-1, he was taken dangerously ill, but in response to treatment by a Muslim or Jewish physician was showing some signs of recovery, when a Buddhist priest or doctor appeared at his bedside and gave him some kind of potion which had the effect of bringing on a relapse. His illness, which now became chronic, was put down by some to the evil eye, for the aversion of which they recommended the giving of alms; the *qams* or shamans, on the other hand, diagnosed witchcraft; and one of his ladies, who confessed under torture to having administered a love-philtre, was thrown into the river (presumably the Kur) along with a number of other women. The khan's life was now despaired of and on 16 February 1291 a group of amīrs hostile to Sa'd al-Daula and Arghun's other favourites formed a conspiracy to overthrow them. They were all of them seized and put to death, Sa'd al-Daula himself being formally tried and executed on 5 March. His death, as was to be expected, became the signal for savage pogroms in Tabriz and Baghdad. He was survived by his master for less than a week. Arghun died on 10 March 1291 in Bāghcha, one of his residences in Arrān; he was in his early thirties, having been born c. 1258. It is a curious thought that but for the measures he took to ensure longevity he might have lived to match the achievements of his father, Abaqa, and his son, Ghazan.

He was the last of the Īl-Khāns to be accorded the traditional secret burial, being laid to rest on a mountain side near Sujās. The place was concealed and the whole area made a *qorugh* or sanctuary, to which entry was prohibited, but the ban was lifted in after years when his daughter Öljei founded a *kḥānqāh* or convent for dervishes at the site of his tomb.

GEIKHATU AND BAIDU

A week after Arghun's death messengers were sent to summon the three candidates for the throne: his son Ghazan in Khurāsān, his brother Geikhatu in Rūm and his cousin Baidu at Baghdad. Ghazan, retreating before the rebel Nauruz, received the news, which was at first kept from him, at Simnān; it was followed by reports of the manoeuvres by the partisans of the other candidates and then of Geikhatu's election as Īl-Khān; and he halted where he was, in the Simnān-Firūzkūh area, to resume, in due course, the struggle against Nauruz and his Transoxianan allies. Certain of the amīrs, and particularly

those involved in the death of Sa'd al-Daula, had favoured Baidu, in whom they saw a more lenient and easy-going ruler; but the supporters of Geikhatu, amongst whom we now hear for the first time of the Amīr Choban, had won the day, and he was proclaimed khan at a quriltai held near Akhlāt on 23 July 1291, though the actual enthronement ceremony did not take place until a year later.

Immediately after the celebrations an inquiry, over which the Īl-Khān presided in person, was held into the execution of Sa'd al-Daula's Mongol colleagues. On this, as on later occasions, Geikhatu showed remarkable clemency. One alone of the conspirators was put to death, the remainder receiving only light punishment when they were not pardoned outright. The new khan's unwillingness to spill blood was apparently due to the advice of the qams, who attributed the shortness of his predecessor's reign to the quantity of blood he had shed. He was soon to demonstrate this same leniency towards offenders against his own interests. After the trial was concluded he returned to Rūm to put down a rising and, availing themselves of his absence the Amīr Taghachar, the ringleader of the conspirators so recently pardoned, and Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, a former associate of Juvainī's enemy Majd al-Mulk, plotted together to set up one of his uncles in his stead. Their plot uncovered, Taghachar was sent under escort to the quriltai held at Ala-Tagh in the summer of 1292, at which the ceremony of enthronement was to take place, and Ṣadr al-Dīn was cast into prison at Tabriz. Not only was their act of treason forgiven them, but we find Ṣadr al-Dīn invested, before the year was out, with the combined office of vizier and ṣāhib-dīvān, a post for which he had had the effrontery to canvass when just released from prison, while Taghachar was actually chosen as one of the commanders dispatched from Ala-Tagh to the relief of Qa'lat al-Rūm.

This fortress, on the right bank of the Euphrates, had been invested by the Mamlūk Sultān Ashraf Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl (1290-3), fresh from his victories over the Franks of Acre and Tyre. In June 1292 a force of which Taghachar was apparently second-in-command, was sent to raise the siege, and reinforcements followed a week or so later; but the fortress had fallen to the Egyptians already before the first troops arrived. Ashraf did not follow up this success, contenting himself, in an exchange of letters with Geikhatu, with a threat to invade the latter's territory and re-establish Baghdad as the metropolis of Islam. Meanwhile there was a *détente* in relations with the Golden Horde. Toqta

(1291-1312), who before his accession had led two campaigns across the Caucasus, dispatched, in the spring of 1294, a peace mission which was honourably received by Geikhatu at Dalan Na'ur (in Mongol "Seventy Lakes"), a settlement at the western end of the Great Wall along the Kur. The period of peace thus inaugurated was to last, more or less uninterrupted, until the reign of Abū Sa'id.

On the profligacy of Geikhatu's morals the authorities are with one exception unanimous. He was concerned, says the continuator of Barhebraeus,¹

with nothing except riotous living, and amusement and debauchery. He had no thought for anything except the things that were necessary for Kings, and which they were bound to have, and how he could get possession of the sons and daughters of the nobles, and have carnal intercourse with them... And very many chaste women among the wives of the nobles fled from him, and others removed their sons and daughters and sent them away to remote districts. But they were unable to save themselves from his hands, or to escape from the shameful acts which he committed with them.

Rashid al-Din's total silence on this subject is due no doubt to a desire not to embarrass his patrons, the nephews of Geikhatu; but even he is constrained to refer to the Īl-Khān's wild extravagance, one of the reasons given for the curious experiment for which his reign is chiefly remembered, the attempt to substitute for metallic currency the paper money of China known as *ch'ao*.

In describing the situation which led up to this experiment Vaṣṣāf² alludes not only to the depletion of the treasury by the gross prodigality of the khan and his vizier Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī but also to a disease called by the Turkish name of *yut* which had caused great havoc in the Mongols' herds in the days following on the death of Arghun. This was not in fact an epidemic but simply the consequences of a cold spell following abruptly upon a period of mild weather.³ It was probably this natural disaster rather than the exhaustion of the exchequer which led to the situation in which, according to the continuator of Barhebraeus,⁴ not a single sheep could be killed for the Īl-Khān's food. The possibilities of *ch'ao* as a means of overcoming their difficulties had

¹ P. 494.

² Bombay ed. p. 271.

³ The Kazakh *dzbut* (*yut*). Cf. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Central Asia*, p. 34: "The whole of Kazakh life was regulated by the search for summer grazing grounds with adequate water, and winter pastures sheltered from the wind and cold and particularly from the dreaded *dzbut*—the freezing over of previously thawed snow which made it impossible for cattle to reach fodder."

⁴ P. 496.

been discussed by Šadr al-Dīn and his colleagues on several occasions. At Pil-Suvār in the spring of 1294, they broached the subject to Geikhatu, who turned to Bolad Ching-Sang, the representative of the Great Khan at his court, for further information on the nature and working of this type of currency. It was decided, despite some opposition, to proceed with the experiment, which seems to have been put fully into practice only in Tabrīz. Here on 13 August a proclamation was issued imposing the death penalty on all who refused to accept the new currency. Considerable quantities of ch'ao were then prepared and, on 12 September, put into circulation. For a week after their first issue these notes were taken from motives of fear, but soon all trade had come to a standstill and the bazaars were completely deserted. In face of public uproar Šadr al-Dīn was forced first to allow the use of gold for the purchase of food and then to suppress the paper currency altogether. The experiment lasted little more than two months and is perhaps most noteworthy as being the first recorded instance of block printing outside of China. It is remarkable that Marco Polo, who with his father and uncle had spent nine months in Tabrīz at about this time, should make no mention of this episode, the more so as he describes at length the use of paper currency in China. One can only assume that the Polos left on their homeward journey before the scheme had been set in motion.

Unbridled licentiousness and reckless extravagance would no doubt of themselves have brought about the Īl-Khān's downfall, which was, however, precipitated by his ill-considered behaviour towards Baidu. Rashīd al-Dīn¹, as one would expect, is extremely reticent about this incident, which took place in Ala-Tagh in the summer of 1294. He says simply that Baidu joined Geikhatu in his summer residence on 12 June, that the latter rebuked him for some unspecified reason and that he was allowed to leave on 11 July having apparently been under some kind of detention. The continuator of Barhebraeus,² on the other hand, gives a detailed account of the episode, with which Vaṣṣāf's³ briefer version is in basic agreement. Insulted by Baidu during a drinking bout Geikhatu caused his cousin to be beaten up by his attendants and then, repenting of his action, sought to make amends. Concealing his resentment Baidu returned to his residence at Daqūqā, where, in the winter of 1294-5, he rose in rebellion. From Tabrīz Geikhatu dispatched the perfidious Taghachar against his advancing enemy; Taghachar deserted to Baidu,

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 136.

² Pp. 494-5.

³ Bombay ed. p. 275.

and Geikhatu fled, first to Ahar and then to Pil-Suvār. Here he was overtaken by pursuers whom he thought to be in prison in Tabriz. These were the amīrs who, under the leadership of Taghachar, had been responsible for the deaths of Sa'd al-Daula and his Mongol colleagues. Warned of their complicity in Baidu's rebellion Geikhatu had been persuaded by Taghachar to imprison rather than to execute them; and they had then, on Taghachar's orders, been released. They showed no mercy to the man who had twice spared their lives. Geikhatu was strangled with the bowstring on 26 March 1295, apparently on the amīrs' own authority without Baidu's sanction or knowledge; he was 24 years of age. Vaṣṣāf concludes his account of the catastrophe with a phrase of which d'Ohsson¹ renders the sense but not the concision and the elegance: "A la fin l'empire montra à Gaïkhatou ce qu'il aimait, c'est-à-dire, *le derrière*."

The brief reign of Baidu is ignored by Rashīd al-Dīn, who mentions this prince only in connexion with Ghazan's campaign against him. His enthronement took place, according to Vaṣṣāf,² in the neighbourhood of Hamadān in April 1295. On the other hand, the continuator of Barhebraeus³ speaks of a ceremony at Ūjān, whither he had caused to be transported from Tabriz the "great throne" on which his predecessors, from Abaqa onwards, had been inaugurated. Taghachar now received, as reward for his perfidy, the post of commander-in-chief, Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī was replaced as vizier by Jamāl al-Dīn Dastajirdānī and the executioners of Geikhatu were each appointed to the governorship of a province.

Ghazan first heard of Baidu's revolt at Qara-Teppe near Sarakhs when returning from a victory gained over the Transoxianan Mongols. He took no notice and proceeded on his way to Rādkān, where, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,⁴ he received a message from Baidu himself formally inviting him to ascend the throne. Having consulted his amīrs and sent for Nauruz, with whom he was now reconciled, he returned to his headquarters at Sulṭān Duvīn in the plain between the Atrak and the Gurgān river, from whence, after a few days, he set out for Āzar-bāijān by way of Māzandarān and 'Irāq-i 'Ajam. At Simnān he was met by emissaries dispatched, before his death, by Geikhatu with a consignment of ch'ao for use in the provinces under Ghazan's jurisdiction.

¹ Vol. IV, p. 113 n. 1. In the original (Bombay ed. p. 279): ... *tā saltanat u pādshāhī nīz mahbūb-i ū ya'nī pusht bi-numūd*.

² Bombay ed. p. 283.

³ P. 500.

⁴ Transl. Arends, pp. 285-6.

He caused it all to be burnt, remarking that even iron would not stand up to the damp climate of Māzandarān, to say nothing of paper. At Khail-i Buzurg he learnt, as Rashīd al-Dīn¹ puts it, that Baidu had changed his mind and now wanted the Khanate for himself; he probably learnt, in actual fact, that Baidu's enthronement was now a *fait accompli*. He decided to continue his advance despite the smallness of his forces: his unpreparedness for battle is illustrated by Rashīd al-Dīn² by the fact that he had left behind his sacred banner (*tug*) and royal war drum. He dispatched ambassadors to Baidu to announce his coming and to ask for a safe conduct. Baidu's reply, delivered at Aq-Khwāja, though conciliatory in tone, was to the effect that Ghazan should turn back. Disregarding this warning he still pressed on: at Qongqur-Öleng he gathered, from a close questioning of Baidu's envoys, that his reception might well be hostile, and from thence onward the troops proceeded in battle order. On 16 May they crossed the Safid Rūd, and three days later the two armies came face to face at Qurban Shire.

After a charge by Ghazan's left wing a truce was called for, apparently on Baidu's initiative, and the two princes, each accompanied by a small group of followers, conferred together on rising ground between the armies. Their negotiations that day did not extend beyond general expressions of good intent, which they affirmed, according to the Mongol custom, with the drinking of wine mixed with gold, a ceremony for which the converts to Islam such as Nauruz substituted an oath and handshake. At nightfall each returned to his own quarters. The next day the two armies proceeded side by side to Qurban Shire, where they encamped so close together as to drink from the same spring; but there was mutual distrust and the troops remained under arms throughout the whole of the night. The following day, 23 May, the representatives of the two princes met to continue their discussions, and it was agreed that the ordus of his father Arghun should go to Ghazan and that he should have control of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, Khurāsān, Qūmis, Māzandarān and one half of Fārs. As the negotiations proceeded Baidu's troops had been strongly reinforced, and Ghazan, fearing treachery, decided to withdraw, leaving Nauruz behind to complete the negotiations. He decamped in the night of 24-5 May, crossed the Safid Rūd at dawn and by nightfall had reached Zanjān; the next day he continued on his journey to Damāvand, where he was to spend the summer. Baidu's troops set out at once in his pursuit and advanced as

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 287.

² *Loc. cit.*

far as Qongqur-Öleng before giving up the chase. As for Nauruz, he and his colleagues were arrested and detained, and one at least of Baidu's amīrs demanded his execution. He was, however, not without friends in the Īl-Khān's entourage, and prompted, it is said, by Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, he undertook upon oath to deliver either Ghazan's head or his person bound hand and foot. Released on the strength of this undertaking he fulfilled the letter of his oath, upon reaching Ghazan at Fīrūzkūh, by sending Baidu a cauldron (in Turkish *qazan* or *ghazan*) tied up in a sack.

In Ghazan's councils Nauruz, himself a Muslim of long standing, now impressed upon his master (as he had done during the parleys at Qurban Shire) the desirability of following his example and adopting Islam. Ghazan, who had been brought up as a Buddhist and had himself erected Buddhist temples in Khurāsān, responded to the suggestion with alacrity, partly no doubt out of genuine conviction, as Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ himself a convert from Judaism, is careful to insist, but partly also for reasons similar to those that weighed with Henry of Navarre. His declaration of faith, an important moment in the history of Persia and of Islam, took place on 19 June 1295 in the mountain pastures of the Lār valley, high up in the Alburz.² After performing the ritual ablution he entered a pavilion frequented in former times by his father Arghun and, instructed by Shaikh Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ḥamawī, repeated several times the *Kalima* or Muslim Creed. His amīrs followed his example in a body, and the month of Ramaḍān coming round shortly afterwards (15 July to 13 August in that year) they observed for the first time the precepts of their new religion in the company of *shaiḳhs* and *imāms*. The fasting over Ghazan set out, as the Muslim commander of a Muslim army, to overthrow the last non-Muslim ruler of Persia.

His advance westwards was in the nature more of a triumphal procession than of a military campaign. Already before his departure he had learnt from Baidu's own envoy of the support he enjoyed in the latter's camp; and at every stage of the journey he met with fresh evidence of that support. At Fīrūzkūh he received Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, the promoter of the ch'ao experiment, now the first of Baidu's officials to defect to his rival. Near Ustūnāvand, a castle in that same area, he welcomed the Amīr Choban and Qurumshī, the son of Alinaq, whom, at their own request, he sent on ahead to join Nauruz in the advanced

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 297.

² See also below, pp. 541-3.

party. At Aq-Khwāja he learnt that Taghachar had abandoned Baidu, as he had abandoned Geikhātu before him and was now allied with Nauruz in pursuit of his master. To the west of Sujās Ghazan was met by his brother Khar-Banda, the future Īl-Khān Öljeitü; and on the banks of the Safīd Rūd, a group of powerful amīrs came to place their services at his disposal. He halted at Yüz Aghach to await the latest news of Baidu, who had fled before Nauruz's troops towards the Araxes and Nakhchivān. Hearing nothing he went on to Ūjān, where he learnt that the Īl-Khān had been captured and brought back to Tabrīz and that he had requested an interview with Ghazan. Suspecting the motives of this request Ghazan gave orders not to bring the prisoner to his presence but to execute him on the spot. He was put to death in a garden outside Tabrīz on 4 October 1295.

Haithon¹ speaks of Baidu as a "good Christian" and indeed ascribes his downfall to his patronage of the Christians. His pro-Christian attitude was due, according to the continuator of Barhebraeus, to the influence of Abaqa's wife Despoina, the natural daughter of Michael Palaeologus.² The same authority goes on to say that he became a Muslim but "was never able to learn the ablutions and the fasts". The probability is that he was one of the minority that still clung to the old shamanistic deism which showed equal respect to all faiths and religions.

GHAZAN

Ghazan arrived at the gates of Tabrīz on 4 October, the very day of his predecessor's execution. Already the first decree of the new Islamic régime was being enforced within the town, viz. that all churches, synagogues and Buddhist temples were to be destroyed here, at Baghdad and throughout the Īl-Khān's domains.

And in those days [says the continuator of Barhebraeus],³ the foreign peoples stretched out their hands to Tābrīz, and they destroyed all the churches which were there, and there was great sorrow among the Christians in all the world. The persecutions, and disgrace, and mockings, and ignominy which the Christians suffered at this time, especially in Baghdād, words cannot describe. Behold, according to what people say, "No Christian dared to appear in the streets (or, market), but the women went out and came in and bought and sold, because they could not be distinguished from the Arab women, and could not be identified as Christians, though those who were recognized as Christians were disgraced, and slapped, and beaten and mocked...

¹ P. 315.² P. 505.³ P. 507.

But it was on the Buddhists that the decree and its consequences weighed heaviest. "And this after the honour to which they had been promoted by the Mongol kings, and which was so great that one half of the money which was gathered together in the treasury of the kingdom had been given to them, and it had been expended (?) on the work of images of gold and silver. And a very large number of the pagan priests, because of the way in which they were persecuted became Muslims."¹ Measures such as these were, it seems, due to the fanaticism of men like Nauruz who had brought Ghazan to power and whose policies, for a time at least, he was obliged to follow. Once established on the throne he reverted, as far as was consistent with his Muḥammadanism, to the religious tolerance of his predecessors, and we are told by Rashīd al-Dīn² that when two years later, on 21 July 1298 (significantly a Sunday), the Tabrīz mob proceeded to wreck such churches as were still left standing the Īl-Khān was angry and saw to it that the ring-leaders were punished.

On 17 October Ghazan left Tabrīz to spend the winter in Arrān. He halted in the early stages of the journey to go through the Muslim marriage ceremony with a lady who had been the wife of his father Arghun and then (apparently against her will) of his uncle Geikhātu. The custom of a son's marrying his father's widows other than his own mother can be traced back, as Togan³ has shown, through the whole history of the Altaic peoples: it had been observed by Ghazan's father, grandfather and great grandfather, the Christian wife of Hülegü, the celebrated Doquz Khātun, having been previously married to Tolui. That a Muslim divine should have been willing to solemnize such a marriage seems almost incredible; that an apparently sincere convert to Islam should have formed a union expressly condemned in the Qur'ān⁴ shows how strong the old traditions still remained. After the wedding celebrations Ghazan proceeded by way of Ahar into Mūghān, where he halted for a while near Bakrābād and where he was joined by Nauruz. The latter, now appointed the Īl-Khān's lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief, had been left behind in Tabrīz to deal with various administrative matters including the raising of a loan from wealthy Tabrīzīs, the treasury being, as was to be expected, completely exhausted. From Bakrābād they crossed the Araxes into the Qarabāgh Steppe,

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² Transl. Arends, p. 327.

³ *Ibn Faḍlān's Reisebericht*, pp. 129-31.

⁴ Sūra iv, verse 26: "And marry not women whom your fathers have married: for this is a shame, and hateful, and an evil way—though what is past may be allowed."

where, at a ceremony held on 3 November 1295, Ghazan was enthroned as khan, assuming as a Muslim ruler the name of Maḥmūd and the title of sultan.

Ghazan had many problems to cope with in the first winter of his reign. Prince Süge, an uncle of the İl-Khān, sent eastwards to repel a Chaghatai invasion, halted on the Karaj to plot rebellion; Nauruz, in command of the advance forces, turned back to engage him in battle; he was defeated, captured and executed. A fellow conspirator, Prince Arslan, a descendant of Chingiz-Khān's brother Jochi-Qasar, continued the rebellion in the Pil-Suvār area. Engaged by Qutluḡ-Shāh, one of the most capable of Ghazan's generals, at Bailaqān he was finally put to flight after a hotly contested battle. With his execution on 29 March 1296 the rebellion came to an end: it had cost the lives of three princes of the blood. Whilst this civil war was still in progress, a horde of Oirat, who had their grazing lands in the Diyārbakr area, migrated *en masse* into Syria and placed themselves under the protection of the Mamlūk sultan, then Ket-Buḡha (1294–6). At about the same time Prince Ilder, a grandson of Hülegü, fled for some unspecified reason into Asia Minor, was defeated in battle, hid for a while in the neighbourhood of Erzerum and was finally captured and killed. Taghachar too now met his end. In November 1295 Ghazan had sent him to Rūm on the grounds that he was a man of fickle character (*sarī' al-inqilāb*)¹ and that it was safer to keep him at a distance. Shortly afterwards he caused him to be discreetly put to death. The İl-Khān had some compunction about this treatment of a man to whom he owed a debt of gratitude and who was only of potential danger; and in justification of his action he recounted to his intimates an analogous episode in the history of China. The removal of Taghachar was not without its consequences. Baltu, the military commander in Asia Minor, who had been involved in his death, now rose in revolt, egged on by Prince Ildei, another of Ghazan's great uncles. The revolt was suppressed by an expedition led by Qutluḡ-Shāh in the winter of 1296–7. Ildei, who was tried and executed in the previous autumn, was no less than the fifth prince of the blood to come to a violent end within the first twelve months of Ghazan's reign.

In June 1296 Ghazan held a quriltai in pasture lands with the Mongol name of Sayin ("Good") between Ardabil and Sarāb. It was here that he received Nauruz, towards whom, for reasons that shall appear, his

¹ Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Alizade, p. 302.

feelings had begun to cool. Upon Nauruz's approach the Chaghatai army had quickly withdrawn. A brief reconnaissance raid satisfied him as to the fact of their withdrawal and he at once returned to Āzarbāijān to visit his sick wife. His departure and the rumours to which it gave rise led to large-scale desertions so that the defences of Khurāsān were greatly depleted. Hearing of his return Ghazan was angry and ordered him back to his post; and his reply, to the effect that he must first see his wife (a daughter of Abaqa), only increased the Īl-Khān's anger. At Sayin he was accorded every honour, but the amīrs perceived the change in the Īl-Khān's attitude and impressed upon him the inadvisability of sending this arrogant and unscrupulous man back to Khurāsān. Ghazan was inclined to agree with them but his sense of gratitude prevailed over his judgment, and on 3 July Nauruz took his leave for the last time. His downfall and death little more than a year later were due, in the event, not to disloyal ambition but to the machinations of his enemies.

On his journey to Baghdad in the following autumn Ghazan halted for a while in the Hamadān region, where he received the *malīks* of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, as also Afrāsiyāb I, the atabeg of Greater Luristān (1288-96), who had risen in rebellion at the time of Arghun's death. Afrāsiyāb, despite his record, was treated with favour and had started on the homeward journey, when he was arrested by the general Horqudaq just returning from Fārs and, on the strength of the latter's accusations, put to death. It was at Hamadān, too, that Jamāl al-Dīn Dastajirdānī was appointed sāhib-divān in place of Sharaf al-Dīn Simnānī, who in turn had displaced Šadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, disgraced after only a brief tenure of office. Jamāl al-Dīn's appointment lasted little more than a month. Brought to trial on charges instigated by Šadr al-Dīn he was executed on 27 October 1296 and was succeeded in the office of vizier or sāhib-divān (the two posts seem at times to merge into one) by his antagonist.

It was during the trial of Jamāl al-Dīn Dastajirdānī that the full facts of Nauruz's correspondence with the Mamlūk sultan were first brought to light. He had, in the last months of Baidu's reign, appealed to the ruler of Egypt for help in the overthrow of the infidel Īl-Khān. The sultan's reply arrived after Ghazan's triumph, when the situation was altogether changed; and Nauruz judged it prudent to show his master, not the real text, but a substitute version prepared, at his orders, by Jamāl al-Dīn Dastajirdānī. Nauruz's emissary had been a certain 'Alam

al-Dīn Qaiṣar, the clerk of a Baghdadi merchant, who in the course of his duties made frequent visits to Egypt. He was arrested at Baghdad on 13 March 1297 and Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, seizing this opportunity of avenging himself on Nauruz, caused a number of forged letters to be secreted in the prisoner's effects. Qaiṣar was taken before Ghazan at Shahr-Abān to the north-east of Baghdad on the Khurāsān road. Questioned by the Īl-Khān in person he recounted the true facts of the correspondence. His belongings were then searched and the letters, apparently addressed by Nauruz to Egyptian amīrs, discovered. Ṣadr al-Dīn and his associates attested that the writing was that of Nauruz's secretary, and Ghazan, enraged by this seemingly damning evidence, had Qaiṣar executed on the spot and gave orders for the extirpation of the whole of Nauruz's family, three of his brothers (two of them implicated in the spurious correspondence) and a son being seized and put to death within the space of little more than a month.

At Asadābād, as he returned northwards, the Īl-Khān was joined by Qutlugh-Shāh from Mūghān and by the amīrs Choban and Bolad-Qaya from Ray. Bolad-Qaya was at once dispatched to join advance parties under the amīrs Horqudaq and Sönitei in pursuit of Nauruz; and was followed shortly afterwards by Qutlugh-Shāh at the head of the main army. At Dāmghān Qutlugh-Shāh learnt that Nauruz's *shaḥnas* here and in all towns from Ray eastwards had been put to death by Horqudaq's forces. East of Isfarā'in he was joined by a deserter from Nauruz's army, an officer called Dāniṣhmand Bahadur, whom he sent on ahead with the vanguard. Dāniṣhmand overtook Nauruz somewhere to the east of Nīshāpūr and, despite the smallness of his own force, inflicted a heavy defeat upon him. Nauruz abandoned his baggage and fled in the direction of Herāt, pursued now by Horqudaq and the whole of the advance forces. At Jām, under cover of darkness, he sprang an ambush on his pursuers and then continued his flight. Arrived before Herāt he was offered asylum by the Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Kart. His amīrs urged him not to trust himself to the malik; he replied that for three days past he had been unable to perform the *namāz* and that he could neglect his religious duties no longer. He entered the town accompanied only by 400 horse, and was accommodated by Fakhr al-Dīn in the citadel. Meanwhile Qutlugh-Shāh, also a good Muslim, arriving at Maṣḥhad, had visited the shrine of the Imām Riḍā and prayed that his enemy might be delivered into his hands. His prayer was to be granted. Summer was at its height when Qutlugh-Shāh invested Herāt, and

because of the great heat and the strength of the fortifications he was advised to abandon the siege and withdraw. He indignantly rejected this advice and soon found means of achieving his purpose. The *shaiikh al-Islām* of Jām was made to write a letter to Fakhr al-Dīn urging him to surrender Nauruz if he wished to save the town from destruction. The letter was smuggled into the town and produced its effect. Despite the great debt of gratitude which Fakhr al-Dīn owed to Nauruz (who during his father's lifetime had secured his release from imprisonment by a personal guarantee of his good behaviour) he decided in the end to betray his guest rather than risk Ghazan's wrath. A device was found to separate Nauruz from his followers and he was overpowered and bound. The severed head of his secretary, the same man whose handwriting Šadr al-Dīn had affected to recognize in the forged letters, was sent to Qutluğh-Shāh as proof of his master's detention, and in return for a written assurance confirmed by oath, that no harm should come to the town, Nauruz himself was handed over to his pursuers. The jubilant Qutluğh-Shāh attempted to interrogate him. It was for Ghazan, Nauruz said, and not for the likes of him, to question him, and he refused to answer, "knowing that he had committed no crime".¹ Qutluğh-Shāh ordered him to be cut in two, and his head was sent to Baghdad, where for some years it was exposed on one of the city gates. So ended the career of this powerful and turbulent man, probably destined, had his life been spared, to have played the same role of king-maker and mayor of the palace in Persia as had his elder contemporary Prince Noqai in the Golden Horde. The death of the "second Abū Muslim", as Vaṣṣāf² aptly calls him, occurred on 13 August 1297.

In Tabriz, on 2 November, there took place a ceremony that would have gladdened Nauruz's heart. The Īl-Khān and his amirs in a body formally exchanged their broad-brimmed Mongol hats for the Muslim turban. In our own days we have witnessed, in the very regions over which Ghazan ruled, the reversal of this process by laws which substituted for the fez and the *kulāb* a form of headgear as ill-suited as the Mongol for the performance of the *namāz*.³ Soon after the ceremony Ghazan left for Arrān, where he spent the winter of 1297-8 and where, in the following spring, the execution of a prince of the blood was

¹ Rashīd al-Dīn, transl. Arends, p. 181.

² Bombay ed. p. 313.

³ In Turkey a law was passed in 1925 requiring all men to wear hats and making the wearing of the fez a criminal offence. In Iran the change was made in two stages. In 1928 a peaked cap replaced the *kulāb*, for which in 1935 the normal European headgear was substituted.

shortly followed by that of his vizier, the infamous Şadr al-Dīn Zanjānī.

The prince of the blood was Taichu, a son of Mengü-Temür and therefore Ghazan's great uncle. His crime seems to have been little more than lending a credulous ear to a prophecy made by a Muslim divine that within forty days he would succeed to the throne. He was arrested on 13 April 1298 on the banks of the Qara-Küderi (in Mongol "Black Musk Deer"), apparently a canal cut from the Kur, and was put to death on the 15th near Dalan Na'ur. His fate was shared by the prophet and by all who had been present when he made his prophecy. Whether or not Taichu's guilt was such as to justify the death penalty, it is impossible, on the evidence available, to reach an opinion; the punishment of Şadr al-Dīn, the *Şadr-i Jahān* as his title went, was certainly richly deserved. On 28 March 1298 he was accused before Ghazan of having embezzled state funds. A couple of days later, no doubt with these accusations in mind, Şadr al-Dīn taxed Rashīd al-Dīn (who now appears on the scene for the first time, apparently as a subordinate to Şadr al-Dīn) with having traduced him behind his back. He was silenced by Ghazan, who took Rashīd al-Dīn's part but seemed otherwise disposed to let matters rest. At this juncture Qutluğ-Shāh, returning from a campaign in Georgia, upbraided Şadr al-Dīn for the economic conditions in that country. To avert the blame from himself the vizier told Ghazan that it was in fact Qutluğ-Shāh's officers who had ruined Georgia. Puzzled at the khan's attitude of disapproval Qutluğ-Shāh asked Şadr al-Dīn who it was that had spoken ill of him. He said that it was Rashīd al-Dīn. It so happened that Qutluğ-Shāh was on familiar terms with Rashīd al-Dīn and he took the first occasion to reproach him for this unfriendly act; he refused, however, to disclose the name of his informant. Rashīd al-Dīn then approached the Īl-Khān in person, and when Ghazan sent for Qutluğ-Shāh he had no option but to name the vizier. Ghazan's patience was now at an end. Şadr al-Dīn was arrested and put on trial; he answered his interrogators with the utmost aplomb and might, given time, have extricated himself even from this situation. However, he was handed over to Qutluğ-Shāh and, on 4 May, met the same end at the hands of the same executioner as his great antagonist the Amīr Nauruz. Soon after these executions Ghazan left Dalan Na'ur for Tabrīz, where on 3 June, the brother and nephew of Şadr al-Dīn were likewise put to death.

From Tabrīz, on 11 September, the Īl-Khān set out for his winter-

quarters in the Baghdad area, at about the same time appointing Sa'd al-Dīn Sāvajī as Ṣadr al-Dīn's successor with, apparently, Rashīd al-Dīn as his associate or deputy. Travelling by way of Hamadān and Burūjird he arrived on 29 November in the region of Wāsiṭ, where he remained until February 1299 and where he received the news of Sülemish's revolt in Asia Minor. Sülemish had been sent by Qutluḡ-Shāh in pursuit of Baltu after the latter's defeat in the winter of 1296-7, and it was presumably he who had brought Baltu to Tabriz, where he had been executed on 14 September 1297. It was then that Ghazan had appointed Sülemish commander-in-chief in Rūm. He had at the same time deposed the Saljuq ruler Mas'ūd II, the son of Kai-Khusrau II, suspected of complicity in Baltu's rising, and had replaced him by his nephew 'Alā' al-Dīn Kai Qubād II (1297-1300). Mas'ūd, it may be anticipated here, was restored to the throne in 1300 and reigned for four years: he was the last of the Saljuqs of Rūm. In the winter of 1298-9 there were heavy snowfalls in Asia Minor cutting off all communications with the East, and Sülemish took advantage of this situation to spread the rumour that Ghazan had been dethroned. He then rose in revolt, killing the generals whom Ghazan had associated with him in the command, gathering together a force of some 50,000 men and obtaining the promise of support from Syria. To suppress the rebellion an army under the command of Qutluḡ-Shāh set out from Wāsiṭ on 15 February 1299. On 27 April a battle was fought near Aq-Shahr between Sīvās and Arzinjān on the high road to Persia. Sülemish was defeated and put to flight; he escaped into Syria and proceeded to Cairo, where he was favourably received by the sultan; but deciding to return to Rūm in search of his family, he was captured by the Armenians upon entering Cilicia and handed over to Ghazan.

Ghazan, meanwhile, whilst journeying from Najaf to Baghdad, had received in audience a group of dissident Mamlūk amīrs led by Saif al-Dīn Qīpchaq, the governor of Damascus. Their quarrel had been with Sulṭān Lachīn (1296-8) and learning at Ra's al-'Ain of his death, they had regretted their decision to defect to the Īl-Khān. It was, however, too late to turn back and, admitted to Ghazan's presence, they assured him, with such conviction as they could muster, of their support in the invasion of Syria and Egypt. Ghazan remained in Baghdad for less than a fortnight (8-20 March 1299) before setting out on the journey back to Āzarbāijān. In Ūjān, where he arrived on 28 May, he held a quriltai shortly followed by the execution of several

of Sülemish's officers. Sülemish himself was put to death in Tabriz on 27 September. Of the form of execution Rashīd al-Dīn says¹ only that it was "horrible" (*shani'*): his body was burnt and the ashes flung to the wind. Ghazan, at about this time, was affected with ophthalmia; and wild rue was burnt and prayers offered up in order to avert the evil eye.

At Tabriz Ghazan learnt of a Syrian incursion into Upper Mesopotamia. The invaders had captured Mārdīn and attacked Ra's al-'Ain; they had desecrated the mosques by their scandalous behaviour in them, and this during Ramaḍān (falling that year in June); and they had carried off great numbers of prisoners when they withdrew. Ghazan had no difficulty in obtaining a *fatwā* for a war of retaliation, and on 16 October he set out for Syria. Proceeding by way of Mosul and Nasibīn he crossed the Euphrates on 7 December at Qal'at Ja'bar. On the western bank of the river in the Plain of Şiffin, the scene of the famous battle between 'Alī and Mu'āwiya, he was heartened with news of dissension amongst the enemy, presumably reports of the attempt by the Oirat refugees to overthrow Sulṭān Nāṣir. The Mongol forces arrived before Aleppo on 12 December but did not attempt to invest the town; instead they turned southwards, passing to the east of Ḥamā on the 20th and encamping near Salamiyya on the edge of the Syrian Desert. The enemy, as Ghazan now learnt, had concentrated their forces near Ḥimṣ in the same strategically favourable position from which, eighteen years before, they had inflicted a crushing defeat on Mengü-Temür. He decided not to make a frontal attack but, by turning eastwards into the desert, to outflank the Mamlūks and take them from the rear. On the banks of a stream some ten miles north of Ḥimṣ the troops, in accordance with this change of plan, were ordered to draw three days' supply of water. This was on 22 December. The enemy had intended to attack the next day, but mistaking the purpose of the Mongols' movements and thinking they were about to retreat they decided to give battle at once. As the enemy approached Ghazan drew up such of his forces as were at hand, Qutluḡ-Shāh commanding on the right and he himself in the centre. Qutluḡ-Shāh caused the great war-drums to be beaten and the Egyptians, imagining this to indicate the presence of the khan, charged in great strength upon the right wing, which broke before them; but the centre, where Ghazan himself, contrary to Mongol usage, took part in the fighting and where he was

¹ Ed. Alizade, p. 332, transl. Arends, p. 185.

joined by Qutluḡh-Shāh from the routed right, stood firm until the left wing was able to take up its position. The battle, which lasted from eleven o'clock until nightfall, ended in the total defeat of the Mamlūks. Advancing slowly in the tracks of the retreating enemy Ghazan encamped some three miles from Hims. Town and citadel surrendered without a blow, and Ghazan found himself in possession of the Sultan's treasure abandoned by the Mamlūks in their precipitate flight. He distributed the contents amongst his amīrs, keeping for himself, according to Haithon, only a sword and a leather bag containing the title deeds of the kingdom of Egypt and the muster roll of its army. As for his prowess in the battle, says Haithon, himself present in the suite of Het'um II, "it will be talked of amongst the Tartars for all time".¹ A *fath-nāma* or bulletin proclaiming the victory, penned by none other than Vaṣṣāf, was dispatched to Tabriz and all the chief cities of Ghazan's empire; and the next day, 28 December, the Mongols advanced on Damascus deserted, like Hims, by its defenders. On 31 December a deputation of Damascene notables came to sue for quarter, and three days later Ghazan was encamped in the famous meadows of Marj Rāhiṭ to the east of the town, where he received the homage of the populace. On the following Friday, 8 January 1300, the *khutba* was read in Damascus in Ghazan's name; on the 23rd he learnt from the officer sent in their pursuit that the Egyptians had been driven out of Syria.

The Mongols evacuated the country as quickly as they had occupied it. Ghazan left Damascus as early as 5 February, possibly because of reports of the Qarauna inroads in Southern Persia; whatever the reason for his departure, it cannot have been, as Rashīd al-Dīn² appears to suggest, the approach of the hot season. He crossed the Euphrates, again as before at Qal'at Ja'bar, on a bridge of his own invention consisting of inflated skins lashed together with bark rope. In the Mosul area, which he reached on 8 March, he was joined in early April by Qutluḡh-Shāh, whom he had left in command at Damascus. After Ghazan's departure Qutluḡh-Shāh had laid siege to the citadel, which had continued to offer resistance after the capitulation of the town, but discouraged by his lack of success had abandoned these operations after a matter of days and followed in his master's wake. According to Rashīd al-Dīn,³ he brought news of rebellious activities on the part of Qīpchaq, whom the Īl-Khān had reinstated as military governor of

¹ P. 318.² Transl. Arends, p. 188.³ *Op. cit.* p. 190.

Damascus; but this is probably only an anticipation of subsequent events. On leaving Damascus Qutluḡ-Shāh had handed over the command to Mulai, the same officer who had pursued the Egyptians to the frontier. Alarmed by rumours put about by Qīpchaq, now in correspondence with Sulṭān Nāṣir, he too withdrew from Syria, catching up with Ghazan on 8 May at or near Darband-i Zangī between Hulwān and Shahrāzūr. By this time the Egyptians had already reoccupied Damascus; by the end of May they had restored Mamlūk rule throughout the whole of Syria.

Ghazan, however, had no intention of renouncing his conquests; and in the autumn he returned to the attack. The summer he had spent in Āzarbāijān: first in Marāḡheh, where he had inspected the observatory and explained to the scientists his plans for another and more elaborate one in Tabrīz; then in Ūjān, where, on 13 July, he had summoned a quriltai; and finally in Tabrīz, where he had remained till the end of September, watching the progress in the building of the Gunbad-i ‘Ālī, his future mausoleum. On 30 September he left for Syria; Qutluḡ-Shāh at the head of large forces, had been sent on in advance on the 16th. Ghazan followed the same route as on the previous expedition, crossing the Euphrates on 30 December, again at Qal‘at Ja‘bar. From Jabbūl, which they reached on 3 January 1301, the Mongols approached the outskirts of Aleppo (which, as in the previous campaign, they made no attempt to invest) and then turned southwards, encamping on the 18th in the vicinity of Qinnisrīn. They advanced no further and the forces under Qutluḡ-Shāh were ordered to halt at Sarmīn. Ghazan, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ had received no reports of enemy movements and wished to spare a Muslim country from devastation. In point of fact military operations by either side had been rendered impossible by torrential and continuous rains, and the consequent floods and the cold had caused havoc amongst the horses and camels: Rashīd al-Dīn² himself speaks of the plight of two Mongol amīrs entrapped with their men and beasts in a sea of mud. Ghazan turned back on 2 February, crossing the Euphrates at Raqqa, where he visited the tombs of the martyrs of Šiffin, and reaching the ordus of his ladies at Chahār Tāq near Sinjār on the 25th. On 19 May he crossed the Tigris into the Kurdish country and directed a punitive expedition against the inhabitants. It was from here that he sent an embassy to the Mamlūk sultan. On 2 June he was back in Ūjān.

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 191.

² *Loc. cit.*

Ghazan passed the whole of the summer in Ūjān, during which time a conspiracy against his minister Saʿd al-Dīn was uncovered and suppressed, three officials of the Dīvān being put to death. The ʿĪl-Khān, remarks Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ *à propos* of these executions, was so tender-hearted that if a fly fell in his food he would lift it out and set it gently down so that its wings might not be broken. "It is more difficult for me," he would say, "to kill an innocent gnat than a guilty human being; for to allow a mischievous man to live only leads to disorders, especially in affairs of state." After a brief stay in Ala-Tagh Ghazan left, on 23 November, for his winter-quarters in Arrān. It was here, in the Qarabāgh country on 19 December, that he received his ambassadors on their return from Egypt with the Sultan's reply to his message. Versions of both documents have been preserved by the Egyptian historians.² Nāṣir's letter, though mainly concerned with a rebuttal of Ghazan's charges, ended on a conciliatory note with an offer of peace and an alliance. From Qarabāgh Ghazan now went on a hunting expedition into the mountains of Shīrvān and Lakzistān, i.e. the south-eastern spur of the Caucasian range; from thence he proceeded to the plain called Gāvbarī in the Mūghān Steppe, where he passed some time hunting and fishing before moving into the area to which he had given the Turkish name of Qush-Qapugh ("Bird Gate"). This was the narrow coastal strip stretching northwards from the Gulf of Kirov (as it is now known) to the present-day Divichi (formerly Barmakī). Rashīd al-Dīn speaks of cranes and waterfowl flying overhead on their way back from their winter to their summer range; and in fact the shores of the gulf are to this day a resting place for migrating birds, which in 1929 was established as a nature reserve. It was from Qush-Qapugh, on 12 April 1302, that Ghazan wrote a letter to the pope (then Boniface VIII), of which the Mongol original was discovered in the Vatican archives in 1921. After referring to a message from the pope delivered by the Genoese Buscarel the ʿĪl-Khān speaks of a yarlīgh transmitted in reply by a mission composed of the same Buscarel and two Mongols. This yarlīgh was apparently, as suggested by Mostaert and Cleaves,³ a detailed plan of campaign for the invasion of Syria proposed by Ghazan to Boniface and the Christian princes. "As for now," he goes on, "we are making our preparations exactly in the manner [laid down in our yarlīgh]. You too should prepare your troops, send word to the

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 192.

² See d'Ohsson, vol. iv, pp. 288-93 and 295-309.

³ "Trois documents mongols des Archives secrètes vaticanes", p. 469.

rulers of the various nations and not fail to keep the rendezvous. Heaven willing we [i.e. Ghazan] shall make the great work [i.e. the war against the Mamlūks] our sole aim."¹

On the preparations to which Ghazan referred in this letter there is no precise information in the Muslim sources; but the dispatch of Qutlugh-Shāh to Diyārbakr at the end of September 1301, and his recall a month later had presumably some connexion with the proposed campaign. Ghazan himself seems not to have returned to Tabriz until the early summer of 1302. From the coastal strip he had gone back into the mountains to receive the submission of the Lakz, the modern Lezghians, the same tribesmen subdued twenty-five years earlier by Shams al-Dīn Juvainī. Then, returning southwards, he had entered the jungles of Tālīsh, where he had held a great *battue*, constructing for this purpose a kind of vast stockade, consisting of two wooden fences a day's journey apart at the one end and converging to a width of less than fifty yards. Rashīd al-Dīn enumerates the various species of animals entrapped in this enclosure but, curiously enough, does not mention the tiger, still in modern times a native of that region. From Tālīsh Ghazan made his way, by easy stages, to Tabriz and from thence, at the end of July, to Ūjān, where he was lodged in a huge tent of gold cloth, which it had taken three years to construct and a whole month to erect. Three days of religious devotion and reading from the Qur'ān were followed by feasting and revelry, and the festivities concluded with a *quriltai* at which dispositions were made for the contemplated campaign in Syria. Ghazan's brother Khar-Banda, the future Öljeitü, was placed, as heretofore, in command of the eastern frontiers; Qutlugh-Shāh was sent into Georgia to recruit a Georgian contingent to join the Mongol forces in Diyārbakr; and Ghazan himself set out on 26 August 1302, by a circuitous route which took him southwards to Hilla by way of Kirmānshāh and then north-westwards along the right bank of the Euphrates to Raḥbat al-Shām.

From Hamadān he even made an easterly *détour* to the pasture lands on the Chaghan-Na'ur in Farāhān before turning back and striking the Khurāsān trunk road near Bisitūn. As he passed by Kirmānshāh he recalled how in that region, five years previously, he had slept with his followers under a great rock with a solitary tree casting its shade over them. It was during the supposed revolt of Nauruz and his party; Nauruz's brother Lakzi had not yet been captured; Nauruz himself was

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 471.

still all-powerful in distant Khurāsān; and Ghazan had passed an uneasy night, filled with anxiety for the future. He revisited the spot with all his amīrs and ladies and was moved to tears at the contrast between his circumstances then and now. After he had offered up prayers of thanksgiving his amīrs, reverting to a custom of their pagan forefathers, attached streamers to the branches of the tree and danced around it to the strains of music. Bolad Ching-Sang, the representative of the Great Khan, who was present in Ghazan's suite, related how Qutula, a great uncle of Chingiz-Khān, had performed a similar ceremony to celebrate a victory over the Merkit; and how he and his warriors continued to dance until the pressure of their feet had formed a circular trench around the tree. Ghazan was pleased with the tale and, good Muslim though he was, himself for a while joined in the dancing.

He was apparently still in the mountains of Kurdistān when messengers arrived from Qutlugh-Shāh escorting a party of Syrian amīrs who had come to offer their allegiance: these were apparently distinct from a deputation of three who had joined him at Bisitūn. At about the same time he received an embassy from the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus II (1282-1328), who offered the hand of a daughter in marriage and sought the Īl-Khān's protection against his Turkish neighbours. Ghazan now descended into the plains of Iraq somewhere to the north of Bandīnjān¹ on the Khūzistān border, where he stayed for three days at the beginning of December before embarking upon a hunting expedition in the Wāsiṭ region. By the end of the month he was in Hilla, where he received two embassies: from the Mamlūk sultan and from Toqta, the ruler of the Golden Horde. Of the sultan's message Rashīd al-Dīn² says only that it was not to Ghazan's liking: it was, according to Mirkhwānd,³ a rejection of a demand by the Īl-Khān for annual tribute and the insertion of his name in the khutba and on the sultan's coinage. As for Toqta's embassy Rashīd al-Dīn gives no indication whatsoever of its purpose, which was, again according to Mirkhwānd,⁴ to revive the old claim of the House of Jochi upon Arrān and Āzarbāijān. The ambassadors had an escort of 300 horse—too few, as Ghazan sarcastically remarked, to conquer the country and too many for the delivery of a message. The Mongol New Year occurring at this time the members of both embassies were included in the celebrations,

¹ The modern Mandalī.

³ Vol. v, p. 412.

² Transl. Arends, p. 197.

⁴ *Op. cit.* pp. 413-14.

the sultan's envoys being afterwards sent to Tabriz as prisoners on parole.

On 29 January, Ghazan crossed the Euphrates at Hilla on the famous bridge of boats and on 5 February visited the shrine of Husain at Karbalā. He then turned northwards along the western bank of the river. At Hāditha the greater part of the womenfolk were sent across to the eastern bank to await the Īl-Khān's return at Sinjār; his favourite wife accompanied him as far as 'Āna ("there is", says Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ "no more delightful place in the whole world"), which he reached on 2 March. His pace along this stretch of the route had been leisurely in the extreme, averaging less than ten miles a day; and the whole of one week had been spent in pursuit of game still apparently as plentiful as in the days of Xenophon,² the Arabian ostrich. It was at 'Āna that Vaṣṣāf presented the Īl-Khān with the first three books of his history and was encouraged to continue with his work. The Mongols remained here for a week before advancing on Raḥbat al-Shām, which they reached on 18 March. The inhabitants at first made some show of resistance but after some days of negotiations, in which Rashīd al-Dīn played a leading part, were induced to surrender. On the 26th, as Ghazan continued northwards, he was heartened with news of the defeat and death of Qaidu in a battle with the Great Khan's forces; he learnt at the same time that Qutluḡ-Shāh and the Amīr Choban had crossed the Euphrates at Raqqa and approached Aleppo. He halted for three days on the river bank, dispatched his amīrs and troops to join Qutluḡ-Shāh, and then recrossed the Euphrates *en route* for Sinjār and Mosul. Why he chose to withdraw from personal participation in the campaign is by no means clear. Rashīd al-Dīn³ ascribes his retirement, unconvincingly, to the approach of the hot weather and the seasonal floods, while Haithon⁴ speaks of an invasion of his eastern frontiers by Qaidu, who in point of fact had been dead for more than a year and a half. Of his itinerary Rashīd al-Dīn,⁵ who evidently accompanied him, gives a detailed account. The passage of the Euphrates took place on 2 April; he crossed the Khābūr at Mākisīn and advanced at a very leisurely pace across the desert, then covered with spring flowers, hunting the game animals as he went; on the 14th he joined his womenfolk at Chahār Ṭāq near Sinjār, on the 19th he was at Tall A'far, where he conferred the Sultanate of Northern Mesopotamia upon Najm al-

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 198.

² *Anabasis* I, v.

³ Transl. Arends, p. 199.

⁴ P. 319.

⁵ Transl. Arends, pp. 199-200.

Dīn II (1294-1312), the Artuqid ruler of Mārdīn; crossing the Tigris at Mosul he encamped on the plain of Kuṣḥāf, apparently to be identified with the town of Ḥadīṭha above the confluence of the Great Zāb: here he awaited the outcome of the campaign.

Qutluḡ-Shāh's army advanced through Syria without meeting serious resistance; they reached the Damascus area on 19 April and on the following day passed on through Kiswa to encounter the sultan's army drawn up on a famous battle-field of early Islam, the meadows of Marj al-Ṣuffar. A charge by the Mongol left wing on the Mamlūk right inflicted heavy casualties on the Egyptians and drove them back in headlong rout. Meanwhile Qutluḡ-Shāh, who had gone to their assistance from the centre, was attacked by the Mamlūk centre and left and forced back on to a neighbouring hill, where he was joined by the troops returning from their pursuit of the enemy's right wing. Here the Mongols were compelled to pass the night, the hill completely encircled by Mamlūk troops. In the morning, suffering by now from thirst, they were unable to break through the cordon until the Egyptians deliberately opened their ranks to let them through, the more easily to destroy them in their flight. The Mongols made their way down to the river, apparently the modern Wādī 'Arrām, losing a great number of their horses in the muddy terrain, and the Egyptians then launched their attack, pursuing the fleeing enemy until nightfall: the pursuit was taken up in the morning by a Mamlūk amīr who continued to follow them as far as Qariyatain.

Travelling with what appears to have been indecent haste Qutluḡ-Shāh reached Ḡhazan at Kuṣḥāf on 7 May, and was presumably the first to inform him of the Mongols' disastrous defeat. Of the Īl-Khān's reaction to the news and his reception of the messenger Rashīd al-Dīn says not a word. According to Maqrīzī¹ the effect of the report was so violent as to bring on a nasal haemorrhage: his attitude towards Qutluḡ-Shāh may be deduced from the Egyptian's account of his subsequent behaviour at the court of inquiry held in June-July at Ūjān. Ḡhazan left the next day for Irbīl, celebrating the 'īd al-fiṭr (falling that year on 18 May) at Darband-i Zangī in the foothills of Kurdistān and proceeding from thence to Marāḡheh. On 4 June, at some point along this route, he was joined by Choban, who, in contrast to his colleague, had remained with the defeated army, attending to the wants of the horseless and the wounded, and leading them slowly back by way of

¹ Transl. Quatremère, vol. II, p. 204.

Baghdad. From Marāḡheh Ghazan sent his womenfolk ahead to Ūjān and spent a few days hunting on the slopes of Mount Sahand; he reached Ūjān himself on 26 June and two days later inaugurated the *yarghu* or court of inquiry, which lasted till 18 July. Of the results of this investigation Rashīd al-Dīn¹ mentions only the execution of two obscure officers; it is natural perhaps that he should not refer to the humiliation of Qutluḡ-Shāh, with whom he was on terms of friendship. According to Maqrīzī's² account, the Īl-Khān was with difficulty restrained from putting his commander to death; and the onlookers are said to have rushed at the prisoner and spat in his face. Maqrīzī adds that Qutluḡ-Shāh was banished to Gilān; in fact, like the other commanders, he seems to have been sentenced to be beaten with the rod; even Choban, whose conduct had earned and received the Īl-Khān's praises, was not excepted from this punishment.

On 8 September 1303 Ghazan arrived in Tabriz and had begun warlike preparations, presumably for a fourth invasion of Syria, when he was attacked for the second time with some form of ophthalmia. After treatment by his own doctors had failed to cure the disease he finally, on 19 October, had recourse to Chinese physicians (probably in the suite of Bolad Ching-Sang), who cauterized his body in two places, apparently in the abdominal region. He left on 1 November for his winter-quarters in Baghdad; unable to sit a horse on account of the cauterization he was obliged to travel in a litter, averaging little more than three or four miles a day. By 25 November he was on or near the Safīd Rūd and finding the route southwards to Hamadān to be blocked with heavy snowfalls he abandoned his intention of wintering in Baghdad and made instead for a residence at some unidentified spot on the banks of the river to which he had given the Mongol name of Ōljeitū-Nuntuq³ ("Auspicious Encampment"). Here he imposed upon himself the discipline of a *chilla*, i.e. a forty-day period of retirement, fasting and meditation such as was practised by dervishes and seekers after occult powers. His motives may well have been medical rather than spiritual, for it is clear that the Īl-Khān's infirmity—whatever its nature—was no longer a mere inflammation of the eyes.

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 201.

² Transl. Quatremère, vol. II, pp. 204-5.

³ The Oeuldjaïtou-yamouc of d'Ohsson (vol. IV, p. 349) and Oldzheitu-Buinuk of Arends (p. 206), the second element of the name being corruptly spelt in the MSS of Rashīd al-Dīn. Howorth, vol. III, p. 484, takes the first element for the name of the Īl-Khān and speaks of "a yurt or camp of the Mongols, which Uljaitu named Boinuk or Yamuk"!

It was during this period of seclusion that the "Mazdakite" conspiracy (to which reference will be made elsewhere in this volume)¹ was uncovered and suppressed. Ala-Fireng, the eldest son of Geikhātu, whom the conspirators sought to place on the throne, is depicted by Rashīd al-Dīn as playing a purely passive role in their machinations; it is significant, however, that one of the first acts of Ghazan's successor was to order his execution. On 10 January 1304 the Īl-Khān emerged from his retreat to take part in the New Year celebrations and to resume the administration of affairs. A few days later Keremün, the youngest of his wives, died suddenly of a stroke; her death produced a deep impression on Ghazan, perhaps already conscious of his own approaching end. At the beginning of April, he set out eastwards travelling light and accompanied only by his immediate entourage: the womenfolk had been left, along with the heavy baggage, at a place called Qal'achuq ("Little Castle") on or near the Safīd Rūd. No reason is given for this journey: it is possible that the Īl-Khān had conceived a desire to revisit his old viceroyalty of Khurāsān. His health was apparently fully restored and he was even able to indulge his passion for hunting whilst passing through the Sultān Bulāgh hills *en route* for Sāveh. From Sāveh, where a feast had been prepared by the vizier Sa'd al-Dīn, a native of the town, he continued, after a three days' halt, in the direction of Ray. It was at this stage that he suffered a relapse; he forced himself to ride on in spite of his infirmity, but by the time he had reached the district of Khail-i Buzurg between Ray and Qazvīn he was critically ill. He sent for his chief and favourite wife Princess Bulughan, whom he had married in defiance of the *sharī'a* in 1294,² and returning slowly westwards was reunited with her in the district of Pushkil Darra to the east of Qazvīn at the beginning of May. Assembling his ministers he exhorted each of them individually and confirmed his previous designation of his brother Khar-Banda as his heir. This duty accomplished he passed the greater part of his time in retirement, retaining full possession of his faculties until the end. He died on Sunday, 11 May 1304 in the thirty-third year of his life, and his body, transported amid universal mourning to Tabriz, was laid to rest in the Gunbad-i-'Ālī, the mausoleum he had himself designed and erected.

Ghazan was without question the greatest of the Īl-Khāns, a remarkably gifted man by the standards of any age of history. What strikes one above all is the catholicity of his interests. He was conversant not only

¹ See below, p. 548.

² See above, p. 380.

with arts or sciences such as natural history, medicine, astronomy and chemistry (or more strictly alchemy) but also with several handicrafts. He could, so Rashīd al-Dīn¹ assures us, perform the tasks of a goldsmith, a blacksmith, a carpenter, a painter, a founder or a turner more expertly than the masters of these trades. "No one surpassed him", says Pachymeres,² "in making saddles, bridles, spurs, greaves and helmets: he could hammer, stitch and polish, and in such occupations employed the hours of his leisure from war." In addition to his native Mongol he was said to have had some knowledge of the Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Kashmīrī, Tibetan, Chinese and Frankish (i.e. French or perhaps Latin) languages. Despite his conversion to Islam he took a great interest in the history and traditions of his forefathers, on which he was an authority second only to Bolad Ching-Sang, the representative of the Great Khan. It was, in fact, at his suggestion and with his encouragement that Rashīd al-Dīn embarked upon the first part of the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, "a vast historical encyclopaedia such as no single people, either in Asia or in Europe, possessed in the Middle Ages".³ His measures to reform the fiscal system will be examined elsewhere in this volume.⁴ In his person he was short and of unprepossessing appearance, in complete contrast to his father Arghun, a tall and handsome man. After describing his gallantry in the Battle of Hims the Armenian Haithon, in a passage already referred to above,⁵ continues as follows: "And the most remarkable thing of all was that within a frame so small, and ugly almost to monstrosity, there should be assembled nearly all those high qualities which nature is wont to associate with a form of symmetry and beauty. In fact amongst all his host of 200,000 Tartars you should scarcely find one of smaller stature or of uglier and meaner aspect than this Prince."⁶

ÖLJEITÜ

Through his agents in Ghazan's court Khar-Banda had received early intelligence of his brother's death and had at once taken steps to remove a possible rival. This was his cousin Ala-Fireng, recently involved in the "Mazdakite" conspiracy.⁷ The unsuspecting prince was struck down

¹ Transl. Arends, p. 213.

² Quoted by Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, vol. II, p. 478.

³ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 46.

⁴ See below, pp. 494-500.

⁵ P. 388.

⁶ Quoted by Yule, *loc. cit.*

⁷ See above, p. 396.

in the course of a private interview by one of Khar-Banda's emissaries (30 May 1304), himself killed shortly afterwards in a collision with the forces of the Amīr Horqudaq. The latter, also apparently regarded as an obstacle in Khar-Banda's path, was captured and summarily executed. Against the deaths of these two men should be set the fact that during the first year of Ghazan's reign no less than ten princes of the blood had met a violent end: it is possible that the new Īl-Khān's prompt if ruthless action may have prevented the recurrence of bloodshed on a similar scale. The way now clear, he set out on the journey from Khurāsān to Āzarbāijān. Progress was slow because of the heavy rain-falls: he reached Ūjān on 9 July, and ten days later the ceremony of enthronement took place still, apparently, with all the traditional rites as observed and described by John de Plano Carpini nearly sixty years before. He assumed the throne name of Öljeitü (in Mongol "Fortunate" or "Auspicious") in addition to that of Khar-Banda (in Persian "Ass-Herd") given him either at birth, in accordance with the Mongol custom of naming a child after the first person or object that caught the mother's eye after the confinement, or at a later stage, in accordance with the custom of altering a child's name to protect him against the evil eye. Partly, at least, for euphemistic reasons the name was afterwards changed to Khudā-Banda ("Slave of God", the Arabic 'Abdallāh), the Īl-Khān's full title being Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad Khudā-Banda Öljeitü Sultān.

After three days of feasting Öljeitü turned his attention to affairs of state, confirming Sa'd al-Dīn and Rashīd al-Dīn in their offices and appointing Qutlugh-Shāh his commander-in-chief. On 6 August he left Ūjān for Tabriz where, on the following day, he visited his brother's tomb. It was somewhere near Marāgheh, in the Jaghātu valley according to Vaṣṣāf,¹ that he received the ambassadors of the Great Khan Temür, the grandson and successor (1294-1307) of Qubilai, accompanied by those of Chabar, the son of Qaidu, and Du'a, the son of Baraq: the object of this composite mission was to apprise the Īl-Khān of a pact that had put an end to the longstanding quarrels between these branches of the House of Chingiz-Khān. From Marāgheh, where he installed Aṣīl al-Dīn, the son of Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsi, in the observatory founded by his father, Öljeitü made his way to winter-quarters in Mūghān, halting *en route* at Tabriz to pay a second visit to the Gunbad-i 'Āli. In Mūghān, on 9 December, he received the ambassadors of

¹ Bombay ed. p. 475.

Toqta, the ruler of the Golden Horde, who presumably made some allusion to the reconciliation of the princes of Central and Eastern Asia, of which Toqta also had been informed. To this development, apparently betokening the restoration of the Mongol world empire as it had existed under Möngke, Öljeitü refers in a letter addressed to Philippe le Bel, which has been preserved in the French national archives. He begins this letter, written at Alivān (Barzand) in Mūghān on 5 April 1305, by affirming this desire to maintain the traditional ties of friendship between the Il-Khāns and the "sultans of the Frankish people". He then proceeds: "...we, Temür Qa'an, Toqta, Chabar, Du'a and others, the descendants of Chingiz-Khān, after recriminating one another for forty-five years down to these recent times, have now, protected by Heaven, all of us, elder and younger brothers, reached a mutual agreement, and from the land of the Chinese, where the sun rises, to the sea of Talu [the Caspian, or perhaps the Mediterranean], our states joining with one another [i.e. re-establishing communications], we have caused our post stations to be linked together." The letter concludes with a veiled hint at possible concerted action against the Mamlūks: "Now, as for those who shall not agree, either with us, or with you, let Heaven decide on the manner in which, by the strength of Heaven, leaguely against them all of us together, we shall take our stand."¹ The Il-Khān's meaning, as appears from the contemporary Italian version of the letter, was intended to be amplified by word of mouth.

Öljeitü, in fact, as the Persian authorities explicitly state, had every intention of continuing the anti-Mamlūk policy of his predecessors. In December 1305, the Egyptian ambassadors detained by Ghazan were allowed to depart; they were accompanied by Öljeitü's own ambassadors bearing a message to the sultan. That this was not a conciliatory move is clear from the tone of the message as reproduced by Vaṣṣāf:² the Il-Khān wished no doubt to gain time whilst making his own preparations and awaiting the response to his appeal to the princes of Christendom. In the meantime he set his hand to the task for which he is chiefly remembered: the building or rather the completion (for the work had been begun by his father Arghun) of a new town on the plain of Qongqur-Öleng to which he (or perhaps already Arghun) had given the name of Sultāniyeh and which, though "neither geographically nor

¹ Mostaert and Cleaves, *Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Arghun et Öljeitü à Philippe le Bel*, pp. 56-7.

² Bombay ed. p. 472.

historically suited for such a high destiny",¹ he now made his capital. Here was erected his mausoleum, still to this day "one of the most celebrated buildings in the whole of Persia".²

It was from Sulṭāniyeh that he set out, in May 1307, upon a campaign against, not the Egyptians, but an enemy much nearer home, the people of the Caspian province of Gilān. That this territory, contiguous to the Mongols' summer and winter quarters in Arrān and Āzarbāijān, should still have remained unsubjugated after fifty years of ʾĪl-Khānid rule is readily accounted for by the inaccessibility of the country with its dense forests and impenetrable jungles and, above all, humid, unhealthy climate. Stung, it is said, by the jeers of the Chaghatai Mongols Öljeitü resolved upon an elaborate military operation against Gilān. Four armies entered the country at four different points: Choban advancing from Ardabil, Qutlugh-Shāh from Khalkhāl and Toghan and Mu'min from Qazvin, whilst Öljeitü himself, passing through Tārum halted for three days on the slopes of Mount Dulfak, before pushing forward in the direction of Lāhijān. He was joined *en route* by Choban, to whom the rulers of Āstārā and Gaskar had surrendered without a fight. Toghan and Mu'min were equally successful in Southern Gilān, and Öljeitü, who had occupied Lāhijān and received the submission of its ruler, was in the region of Kūhdum on the return journey when he learnt the news of Qutlugh-Shāh's defeat and death in battle. Advised at Khalkhāl to proceed with caution in this difficult terrain the commander-in-chief, ignoring counsel so little in keeping with his character, sent on ahead Bolad-Qaya in command of a force which defeated the Gilakīs in three bloody battles. The latter then sued for peace, and Qutlugh-Shāh was in favour of accepting their submission but was dissuaded by his son Siba'uchi, who seems to have inherited all of his father's impetuosity. Displacing Bolad-Qaya at the head of the advanced forces Siba'uchi carried fire and sword through the land until confronted by a great host of Gilakīs on a battle-field of their own choosing between Rasht and Tūlim. The Mongols were defeated with great slaughter, their horses sinking in the mud as they turned in flight. Qutlugh-Shāh's own troops withdrew in panic when they heard the news, and he was left with only a handful of men to meet the oncoming enemy: he was killed by an arrow shot, and the triumphant Gilakīs possessed themselves of the whole of the immense booty which the Mongols had captured in their territory. Such was the end of this

¹ Minorsky, *Iranica*, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*

powerful and headstrong man, the Cotolossa of Haithon: he was a descendant of Jedei Noyan of the Manqut tribe, a general of Chingiz-Khān. His death carried incalculable consequences for the future of the Īl-Khānate; had he survived, the Amīr Choban, who now succeeded him as commander-in-chief, might well not have achieved the all-powerful position which he occupied in the following reign. A detachment sent to avenge this disaster almost met with the same fate; the dispatch of reinforcements caused the Gīlakīs to disperse into their forests, and, on 29 June Öljeitü struck camp to leave Gīlān, having gained what seems to have been at most a Pyrrhic victory over its inhabitants.

In the previous year the Īl-Khān had dispatched an army against Fakhr al-Dīn Kart, the malik of Herāt, with whom he had clashed during his viceroyalty of Khurāsān because of his support for the Nigūdarīs. Fakhr al-Dīn closed the gates of the town upon the approach of the Mongol commander, Dānīshmand Bahadur, but after a few days' siege entered into negotiations, as the result of which he surrendered the town to Dānīshmand, leaving one of his officers, Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Sām, in command of the citadel; he himself withdrew to the neighbouring castle of Amān-Kūh. Whilst visiting the citadel with a small following Dānīshmand was attacked and killed; the Mongols inside the town were slaughtered and the army outside the walls then withdrew. Reinforcements were sent under the command of Dānīshmand's son Bujai to avenge his father's death; they invested the town on 5 February 1307. The siege, which lasted till 24 June, is described in considerable detail by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū¹ and Mīrkhwānd,² as one would expect of historians writing of their Timūrid patrons' capital. Here it is sufficient to say that Fakhr al-Dīn Kart, who was certainly in collusion with Sām, died in the early days of siege; that a plot to kill Sām and so save the town was betrayed and the conspirators executed; and that Bujai finally negotiated terms of surrender with his father's murderer in order to deny another general the credit of capturing the town.

Öljeitü, baptized in infancy with the Christian name of Nicholas, had become in turn a Buddhist and a Sunnī (Ḥanafī) Muslim. Reference will be made elsewhere³ to a curious disputation which took place in his presence, apparently in Arrān in the winter of 1307-8, between representatives of the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'i schools, "who, in the heat of controversy, brought against each other such abominable accusations that Üljāytü was greatly annoyed with both, and even the Mongol

¹ Pp. 18-39.

² Pp. 443-68.

³ See below, p. 544.

nobles who were by no means squeamish, professed disgust, and began to ask whether it was for this that they had abandoned the faith of their ancestors, to which they now called on Ūljáytú to return".¹ Shortly afterwards, during a violent thunderstorm, several of the Īl-Khān's companions were killed by lightning. It was put to him by some of his amīrs that he should purify himself according to the ancient Mongol (and indeed Altaic) custom, by passing between two fires;² and *bakhshis*, who must have been, not Buddhist priests but qams or shamans, were produced to supervise the ceremony. They attributed the disaster to Ōljeitü's conversion to Islam, which they called upon him to abjure. A return to shamanism was of course altogether out of the question, but his anti-Sunni feelings persisted and he was gradually persuaded to become a Shī'ite, making the final decision after a visit to Najaf in the winter of 1309-10.

The vizier Sa'd al-Dīn Sāvajī, who had always enjoyed Ghazan's confidence and favour, fell from grace under his successor. The basic cause of his downfall seems to have been an arrogance bred from long years of power; he made enemies, one of whom was his colleague Rashīd al-Dīn; and it was the latter's report to Ōljeitü on the peculations of his subordinates that led to his arrest and execution (19 February 1312). He was succeeded in his office by Tāj al-Dīn 'Alī-Shāh, a dealer in jewels and precious stuffs who had insinuated himself into the Īl-Khān's good graces; with no previous knowledge of public finance (*'ilm-i daftar u siyāqat*)³ and in no way more honest than his predecessor, he achieved, in the following reign, the distinction of being the first Īl-Khānid vizier to die in his bed.

Ōljeitü must by now have long abandoned the hope of a European alliance against the Mamlūks. There is no record of Philippe le Bel's having answered (or even received) the Īl-Khān's letter; but a similar letter addressed to Edward I of England was acknowledged in a letter from his son Edward II dated at Northampton, 16 October 1307, and in a second letter⁴ dated 30 November and written at Langley the English king replies to what must have been an oral message conveyed by the Īl-Khān's ambassadors. He wishes Ōljeitü well in his enterprise, which he takes quite naturally, and without necessarily being misled by the envoys, to be the extirpation of the "abominable sect of Mahomet",

¹ E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. III, p. 50.

² See Rockhill, *The Journey of William of Rubruck*, pp. 240-1 n. 2.

³ Hāfiz-i Abrū, p. 46.

⁴ Quoted by Howorth, vol. III, p. 576.

but regrets that the distance and other difficulties prevent his co-operating in this "laudable design". Pope Clement V, in a letter¹ dated at Poitiers, 1 March 1308, disclosed some of the details of the proposed alliance: "We have noticed with pleasure, from these letters and communications, that appealing to our solicitude on behalf of the Holy Land, you have offered us 200,000 horses and 200,000 loads of corn, which will be in Armenia when the army of the Christians arrives there, and in addition to march in person with 100,000 horsemen to support the efforts of the Christians to expel the Saracens from that Holy Land." He expresses his appreciation of the offer, which, he says, "has strengthened us like spiritual food", but makes only a vague reference to future collaboration. He and his brethren, he assures the *İl-Khān*, "will execute as far as we can what God had inspired us to do, and when a favourable season for crossing the sea shall come we will advise you by letters and messengers so that you may accomplish what your magnificence has promised".

It was encouragement from another quarter that prompted Öljeitü's one and only invasion of Mamlūk territory. At Sulṭāniyeh, in August 1312, he welcomed the arrival of a group of dissident Syrian amīrs headed by Qara-Sonqur, the governor of Damascus, and Aq-Qush al-Afram, the governor of Tripoli. On Qara-Sonqur, whose Turkish name ("Black Gerfalcon") he changed, on account of his years, to Aq-Sonqur ("White Gerfalcon"), he bestowed the governorship of Marāḡheh and on al-Afram that of Hamadān; both men accompanied him on a campaign for which they must have convinced him the time was now propitious. Setting out from his capital at the beginning of October he proceeded by way of Mosul, crossed the Euphrates at Qirqīsiyā and, on 23 December, sat down before Raḡbat al-Shām. He had been encouraged by Qara-Sonqur and al-Afram to think that the governor, a protégé of the former amīr, could be induced to surrender the town. In this he was disappointed: the townsfolk offered fierce resistance, and because of their heavy casualties and lack of provisions the Mongols, on 26 January 1313, raised the siege and withdrew across the Euphrates, never to return.

So ended, after a lapse of fifty years, the Mongol-Mamlūk struggle for the possession of Syria. That the outcome would have been different had the princes of Europe accepted the proffered alliance cannot seriously be doubted. Nor need we question the sincerity of the Mongols'

¹ Quoted by Howorth, vol. III, pp. 576-7.

promises with respect to Palestine; the restoration of the Kingdom of Jerusalem would have been as much in their interest as was the preservation of Little Armenia. The views of the Armenian Haithon, dictated in Avignon in 1307 when the question of such collaboration was still under earnest consideration, deserve more attention than has perhaps been accorded them.¹ Having captured the district of Tripoli the Christian expeditionary force should, according to the strategy laid out in his work, rebuild the city, make it their base of operations "and thus be ready when the Tartars had completed their conquest of the Holy Land to take over from them the towns there, which he was confident they would make over to the Christians for custody, because they could not endure the heat of the summer in those parts; nor did they fight with the Sultan to conquer more lands, for they were masters of all Asia, but because the Sultan was very unfriendly to them and always doing them some injury, especially when they were at war with the neighbouring Tartars (i.e. those of Kipchak and Jagatai)".² There were, of course, disadvantages to an alliance with the Mongols.

If Karbanda, or some one sent by him, should invade Egypt with a very large army, it would be well to avoid him, for the Lord of the Tartars would deem it derogatory to follow the counsel of the Christians, and would insist on their following his commands. Besides which, the Tartars were all mounted and marched rapidly, and a Christian army, much of which marched on foot, could not keep up with them. The Tartars, again, when in small numbers and humble were obsequious, but when in large numbers were overbearing and arrogant, insulting to their allies who were weaker than themselves, and would be found unbearable by the Christians.³

In the event of a large-scale campaign of this sort Haithon recommends that while the Mongols follow their normal route to Damascus the Christian army should advance along a parallel route to Jerusalem. "And in this way, because of the distance between them, peace and friendship would be preserved between the Christians and the Tartars..."⁴ Some kind of collaboration must in fact have been possible, and it is interesting to speculate what might have happened if, for example, the Crusade of Edward I and Abaqa's invasion of Syria in 1281 had, by accident or design, exactly coincided, instead of occurring nearly ten years apart.

In the last years of his reign the Īl-Khān's attention was directed

¹ The *Flos Historiarum Terrae Orientis* is dismissed by Spuler, p. 231, as "nur ein Tendentzwerk".

² Quoted by Howorth, vol. III, p. 578.

³ *Ibid.* p. 579.

⁴ P. 361.

eastwards. His annexation, in 1313, of the Nīgūdārī territories in Southern Afghanistan provoked an invasion of Khurāsān by a Chaghatai army led by Kebek, the brother of the khan (Esen-Buqa), Dā'ūd Khawāja, the ousted Nīgūdārī ruler, and Prince Yasa'ur, a grandson of Baidar, Chaghatai's sixth son. Crossing the Oxus in the middle of January 1314, they inflicted a heavy defeat on the army of Khurāsān near the banks of the Murghāb, pursuing their fugitive opponents to the gates of Herāt. Upon receiving news of this disaster Öljeitü at once set out from Sulṭānīyeh (18 February 1314), and the enemy withdrew as he approached, recalled, apparently, by Esen-Buqa, who was being hard pressed by the troops of the Great Khan. It was about this time that Öljeitü appointed his son Abū Sa'id to the viceroyalty of Khurāsān, a post traditionally held by the heir-apparent, the actual duties being carried out by Abū Sa'id's atabeg, the Amīr Sevinch, for the prince was only an eight-year old child. The situation in the East was somewhat eased by the defection of Prince Yasa'ur, accused by Kebek of collusion with the Persian Mongols during the invasion of Khurāsān. Öljeitü's troops crossed the Oxus to intervene in a battle between Yasa'ur and the Chaghatai forces and to swing the balance in the former's favour: he accompanied them back into Khurāsān, where Öljeitü allowed him to occupy the pasture lands of Bādghīs and where, as we shall see, he rose in rebellion against Öljeitü's successor.

It was the expenses of the army of Khurāsān that occasioned the first rift between Rashīd al-Dīn and 'Alī-Shāh. Abū Sa'id's requests for funds were passed on by Öljeitü to the two viziers. Rashīd al-Dīn disclaimed all responsibility, saying that he had never had the management of the finances nor affixed his seal to assignments made upon the revenue.

"I only possess the robe that covers me, and have not a single coin, and, inasmuch as we govern the empire together," replied Ali-Shah, "why should we separate from one another when it is a question of paying?" "Because you have undertaken that responsibility yourself", said Rashid. "You are the guardian of the Great Seal, and are charged with the carrying out of the Sultan's orders." "Why then not affix your seal after mine?" was the reply. "I do not want to join myself with you who profess poverty when asked for money, while each of your employes has made a hundred tumans and become a Carun..."¹

After listening to this dispute Öljeitü ordered the division of his empire into two administrative spheres, Rashīd al-Dīn becoming responsible

¹ Howorth, vol. iv, pp. 570-1. His ultimate source is Kāshānī: the passage is quoted by Bayānī in his edition of Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, pp. 65 ff., n. 1.

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for Central and Southern Persia to the confines of Khurāsān whilst 'Ali-Shāh was placed in charge of North-western Persia, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. But even this segregation of their fields of operation failed to restore harmony, and 'Alī-Shāh, having survived an investigation into his accounts, continued a vendetta which resulted, in the following reign, in his colleague's disgrace and execution.

Öljeitü died in Sulṭāniyeh on 17 December 1316; he was in his thirty-sixth year. The cause of his death seems to have been some kind of digestive disorder brought on by the intemperate habits common to all the Mongol princes (with the exception, if we may believe Rashīd al-Dīn,¹ of Ghazan) and aggravated by the excessive administration of astringent medicines. Without his brother's energy and strength of character Öljeitü was an even greater patron of the arts. It was at his suggestion that Rashīd al-Dīn, having completed the first volume of his work, the *Ta'rikh-i Ghāzānī*, dealing with the history of the Mongols from the beginnings down to the death of Ghazan, embarked in a second volume upon "the first attempt to record the history of all the great nations of the continent of Eurasia",² an enterprise which "has not as yet been accorded the recognition it deserves as a unique achievement. . .".³ We think of Öljeitü, however, first and foremost as a builder. In addition to Sulṭāniyeh he constructed, at the foot of Mount Bisitūn, a second capital called Sulṭānābād Chamchimāl or simply Chamchimāl (Mongol *chabchimal* "hewn"), of which the ruins still exist and which has given its name to the Chamchamāl plain. Mustaufī⁴ speaks of his interest in the surveying of his dominions: roads were measured and milestones set up and in 1311, presumably when the foundations of Chamchimāl were being laid, Mustaufī himself, on the instructions of the Īl-Khān and with the assistance of engineers, made a calculation to ascertain the height of Bisitūn.

ABŪ SA'ĪD

The heir-apparent, still only in his twelfth year, was in Māzandarān at the time of his father's last illness. It was not until the spring of the following year that he arrived in Sulṭāniyeh, the enthronement ceremony following in the middle of April or, according to the *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*,⁵ not until 4 July. The delay in his arrival appears to have been

¹ Transl. Arends, pp. 215-16.

² Jahn, *Rashīd al-Dīn's History of India*, pp. ix-x.

³ *Op. cit.* p. x.

⁴ Pp. 160-1 and 183.

⁵ Vol. II, p. 26.

due to the ambition of his atabeg the Amīr Sevinch, who for a while had aspired to the post of amīr of the ulus or commander-in-chief before conceding the superior claims of the Amīr Choban, who had occupied this office ever since the death of Qutlugh-Shāh and to whose charge Öljeitü, upon his deathbed, had specifically committed his son.

The new Il-Khān retained the services not only of Choban but also of Rashīd al-Dīn and 'Alī-Shāh. The two viziers were still at loggerheads, and 'Alī-Shāh, jealous of the credit his colleague enjoyed with the now all-powerful amīr of the ulus, renewed his former intrigues to such purpose that, at the beginning of October 1317, Rashīd al-Dīn was dismissed from office. The Amīr Sevinch wished to secure his reinstatement, but died near Baghdad, where Abū Sa'īd was passing the winter of 1317-18, before he could achieve his object. In the spring, when the Court moved northwards, the Amīr Choban summoned Rashīd al-Dīn from Tabriz, where he was living in retirement and persuaded him, against his better judgment, to re-enter the Il-Khān's service: he was, Choban said, as necessary to the state as salt to food. 'Alī-Shāh and his henchmen now redoubled their efforts to discredit him; they accused him of having poisoned the Il-Khān's father; the accusation was believed and Choban, far from defending his protégé, seems actually to have assumed the role of prosecutor. Rashīd al-Dīn was put to death on 17 July 1318, having first been made to witness the execution of his son, a lad of sixteen, who, as the cupbearer, was alleged to have actually administered the poison. His death was the signal for the looting of Rub'-i Rashīdī, the suburb of Tabriz which he had founded and given his name, and all his lands and property were confiscated by the Dīvān, even his pious foundations (*vaqfs*) being robbed of their endowments. His severed head, according to Nuwairi,¹ was taken to Tabriz and carried about the town for several days with cries of: "This is the head of the Jew who abused the name of God; may God's curse be upon him!" Such was the ignominious end of the celebrated statesman and historian, "the greatest vizier of the Il-Khan dynasty, and one of the greatest men the East has produced";² he was a little over seventy years of age. His Jewish origin, denied by some scholars and queried by others, has been fully established by the researches of Fischel³ and Spuler.⁴

¹ Quoted by d'Ohsson, vol. iv, p. 611.

² Howorth, vol. iii, p. 589.

³ See "Azarbaijan in Jewish History", pp. 15-18.

⁴ See *Die Mongolen in Iran*, pp. 247-9.

Yasa'ur, the Chaghatai prince established in Bādgīs, had at first professed towards the young Īl-Khān a loyalty with which his activities in Khurāsān were difficult to reconcile, but early in 1319 he rose in open revolt, and news of his invasion of Māzandarān was received simultaneously with a report that Öz-Beg, the ruler (1313-41) of the Golden Horde, was approaching Darband at the head of a great army. It was decided that the Amīr Ḥusain—the father of Ḥasan-i Buzurg or Ḥasan the Great, the founder (1336-56) of the Jalayir dynasty—should be sent against Yasa'ur, whilst the Īl-Khān marched in person against Öz-Beg. Choban, reviewing his troops near Bailaqān,¹ learnt that Abū Sa'īd was facing the enemy across the Kur with a force of no more than a thousand men at arms and the like number of grooms, muleteers and camel-men, his advanced forces having retired in disorder upon the mere report of Öz-Beg's approach. It had been Choban's intention to proceed to Khurāsān, being alarmed by exaggerated accounts of Yasa'ur's strength; he now hurried to his sovereign's assistance, crossed the Kur at the head of 20,000 men and inflicted heavy losses upon an enemy already in full retreat. The fighting over, disciplinary action was taken against the officers who had deserted their posts: the most culpable were beaten with the rod, a display of severity which was not without its consequences. In 1325 Choban repulsed a second invasion by Öz-Beg and even carried the war into the enemy's own territory. Thirty years later Öz-Beg's son and successor Janī-Beg (1340-57) succeeded where his father had failed and for a brief space of time Āzarbāijān was incorporated in the territories of the Golden Horde.

Yasa'ur's revolt was soon suppressed. He withdrew from Māzandarān as Ḥusain's forces advanced against him; from Tūs he sent an army to invest Herāt, where the Malik Ghiyāth al-Dīn had rallied to Choban and the Īl-Khān; in April he sat down in person before the town but raised the siege upon the approach of the Īl-Khān's army and withdrew into Southern Afghanistan. In the following year he was defeated and killed, not by the Persian Mongols, but by the troops of his Chaghatai kinsman Kebek, who had now succeeded to the Khanate. A rebellion nearer home was of far greater danger. The officers subjected to corporal punishment after the battle with Öz-Beg sought to take their vengeance on Choban; they waylaid him near Lake Sevan in Armenia; he escaped, made his way to Tabriz, and thence to Sulṭāniyeh. The malcontents, meanwhile, had been joined by the Amīr Irenjin, whom Choban had

¹ Near Shusha in the present-day Soviet Āzarbāijān.

dismissed from the governorship of Diyārbakr; they collected an army at Nakhchivān and advanced on the capital. A fierce battle was fought near Miāneh (June 1319); the Īl-Khān's men were on the point of giving way, when they were rallied by Abū Sa'īd's personal intervention and, returning to the charge, completely routed the enemy. Many of the rebel amīrs were killed in the fighting; Irenjin, captured in the village of Kāghadh-Kunān, was taken with two of the other ring-leaders to Sulṭāniyeh, where they were suspended from hooks and fires kindled beneath them. Because of the bravery he had displayed in this battle the young Īl-Khān received the title of Bahādur¹ ("Hero") and in subsequent firmans and the like his name appeared as al-Sulṭān al-'Ādil ("the just Sultan") Abū Sa'īd Bahādur Khān. The fath-nāma announcing this victory was issued from Qarabāgh, whither Abū Sa'īd had betaken himself to pass the winter of 1319-20. For the part he had played in the battle Choban was rewarded with the hand of the Īl-Khān's sister, the Princess Sati Beg.

The mayor of the palace—for such Choban had by now to all intents and purposes become—had soon to cope with the rebellion of his own son. In 1322 Temūr-Tash, appointed viceroy of Rūm at the beginning of the reign, proclaimed himself the independent ruler of that province, causing coin to be struck and the *khutba* to be recited in his name; he gave himself out to be the Mahdī or Messiah whom the Muslims expect at the end of the world and sought the alliance of the Egyptians in the conquest of Persia. With the Īl-Khān's permission Choban intervened in person. Though suffering from gout he advanced through the snows of an Anatolian winter to secure his son's surrender; and Temūr-Tash was for his father's sake not only pardoned but actually reinstated in his post, in which, attacking now the Turks and now the Greeks, he extended the Mongol conquests to the very shores of the Mediterranean.

Early in 1324 occurred the death of the vizier 'Alī-Shāh, the first and only holder of his office under the Īl-Khāns to die of natural causes. He was succeeded in due course by Rukn al-Dīn Ṣā'in (Mongol *sayin* "good"), a protégé of Choban, who, however, soon began to intrigue against his benefactor. The latter's power was now at its zenith, and Abū Sa'īd was "only king in name",² the whole of his dominions being parcelled out amongst Choban and his sons, one of whom, Dimashq

¹ On this ancient Altaic title see Doerfer, vol. II, pp. 366-77 (no. 817).

² *The History of Shaikh Uwais*, transl. van Loon, p. 54.

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Khwāja ("Master Damascus"),¹ the viceroy of Āzarbāijān and the two ʾIrāqs, also exercised the authority nominally vested in Rukn al-Dīn. A natural impatience with such tutelage was aggravated by the whisperings of the new vizier, the arrogant and dissolute behaviour of Dimashq Khwāja and, above all, a violent passion which the ʾĪl-Khān, now in his 21st year, had conceived for Baghdād Khatun, the latter's sister and the wife of Shaikh Ḥasan. In accordance with the Yasa² of Chingiz-Khān the sovereign could exercise a kind of *droit de seigneur* with respect to any married woman who took his fancy. In Üjān in the late summer of 1325 Abū Saʿīd approached the Amīr Choban through an intermediary with a view to claiming this right. Without making a direct reply Choban extricated himself from an embarrassing situation by persuading the ʾĪl-Khān to pass the following winter in Baghdad and then, after the departure of the Court, dispatching his son-in-law and daughter to Qarabāgh. Absence did not, however, have the effect that Choban had expected and Abū Saʿīd's feelings for Baghdād Khatun remained unchanged. Early in 1326 the fear of an invasion of Khurāsān caused Choban to lead an army to the eastern frontiers, where in the autumn of that year the Chaghatai khan Tarmashirin (1326-34) crossed the Oxus to be defeated by Choban's son the Amīr Ḥasan in a battle near Ghazna. The vizier Rukn al-Dīn Šāʾin had accompanied Choban on this campaign, leaving Dimashq Khwāja in complete and untrammelled control of the administration. Disgusted with his excesses and ashamed of his own complete destitution of authority, the ʾĪl-Khān was seeking some opportunity for ridding himself of Dimashq when the pretext was provided by the discovery of an intrigue with a former concubine of Öljeitü; and Dimashq, trapped in the citadel of Sultāniyeh, was killed whilst trying to escape on 25 August 1327.

The ʾĪl-Khān was now resolved to extirpate the whole race of Choban. The amirs in Khurāsān, notified of his intention, at first affected to take the part of their commander-in-chief, who set out westwards to avenge his son. At Simnān he persuaded Shaikh ʾAlāʾ al-Daula, the local religious leader, to intercede with Abū Saʿīd, then encamped near Qazvin. The shaikh's arguments producing no effect Choban continued his march, his troops pillaging and burning as though in enemy

¹ Cf. the name of his sister Baghdād Khatun ("Lady Baghdad"). Dimashq might well have been born in Damascus during the Syrian campaign of 1299-1300.

² Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 117, seems to be our only authority for the existence of such a law, which Togan, p. 220, believes to have obtained amongst the ancient Turks.

territory, until he reached the village of Qūha to the south-east of Ray, only a day's journey distant from the Īl-Khān's camp. Here, under cover of darkness, the greater part of his amīrs with a force of 30,000 men went over to Abū Sa'īd, and in the morning he found himself with no alternative but a rapid withdrawal. He made off in the direction of Sāveh, from whence he sent his royal wife, Princess Sati Beg, back to her brother, and then struck eastwards across the desert to Ṭabas. It had at first been his intention to seek refuge in Transoxiana, but upon reaching the Murghāb he changed his mind and made for Herāt, where history was to repeat itself almost exactly. Like Nauruz before him, he trusted his life to the Kart ruler and like Nauruz he too was betrayed. Ordered by Abū Sa'īd to execute the refugee, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, though bound by ties of friendship to Choban (as his brother Fakhr al-Dīn had been to Nauruz), had no choice but to obey. At his own request Choban was not beheaded but suffered an honourable death by strangulation, a finger of his hand being sent to the Īl-Khān as proof of his execution. His last wish that his body should be buried in Medina was carried out under the supervision of his daughter Baghdād Khatun, whom Abū Sa'īd had now at last married, having compelled her husband Shaiikh Ḥasan to divorce her. Choban, according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, was laid to rest, not in the mausoleum he had caused to be built for himself near the Mosque of the Prophet, but in the famous cemetery of Baqī'. "It was al-Jubān", Ibn Baṭṭūṭa¹ adds, "who had the water brought to Mecca", referring to his restoration of the conduit of Zubaida "with the result that good water became abundant and cheap in Mecca during the Pilgrimage, and plentiful enough to grow vegetables in the city".² The pious Muslim did not forget his Mongol origins: his son by Princess Sati Beg was called Sorghan Shira after his ancestor the Süldüs tribesman who had helped the youthful Chingiz-Khān to escape from captivity amongst the Taichi'ut.³

Temür-Tash learnt of his father's death at Qaisariyya; he fled by way of Lāranda (now Karaman) into the territories of the Mamlūk sultan, who had offered him asylum. At Cairo he was received at first with every honour but was afterwards imprisoned and put to death (22 August 1328). Nāṣir, desirous of keeping on good terms with Abū Sa'īd, found it expedient to execute his guest rather than accede to the Īl-Khān's request for his extradition. Had Temür-Tash survived he might, after

¹ Transl. Gibb, pp. 339-40.

² *Ibid.* p. 340, n. 227.

³ See Waley, *The Secret History of the Mongols*, pp. 230-1.

the collapse of the ʾĪl-Khānid dynasty, have founded a successor state in Anatolia and so hampered and perhaps prevented the rise of the Ottoman empire. "His death", says Grousset,¹ "followed seven years later by that of Abū Saʿīd, left Anatolia without a master and liberated the local Turkish amīrs, the Qaraman in the South-East and the Ottoman in the North-West. Thus the rise of the Ottoman Empire was an indirect consequence of events at the ʾĪl-Khānid court in the crucial years 1327-1335."

The duties of vizier were confided, after the death of Dimashq Khwāja, to Ghiyāth al-Dīn, the son of Rashīd al-Dīn, a minister, according to the contemporary historian Mustaufī,² of such "angelic temperament" that "instead of punishing those who had wrought towards his noble family ill deeds whereof the recapitulation would disgust the hearts of my hearers, he drew the pen of forgiveness through the record of their crimes, recompensed their evil actions with good, and made each one of them an exemplar of the prosperity of this empire, raising them to the highest ranks, and entrusting to them the most important functions..." Such indeed was the vizier's complaisance or simplicity that we find him interceding with the ʾĪl-Khān on behalf of the rebellious viceroy of Khurāsān, Narin-Taghai, who was plotting his downfall. The execution of Narin-Taghai and his fellow conspirator the Amīr Tash-Temūr in September 1329 ended the last serious threat to Abū Saʿīd's authority. Three years later Shaikh Hasan-i Buzurg, accused of conspiring with his former wife, Baghdād Khatun, to assassinate her husband, was banished to the castle of Kamākh (the modern Kemah) on the Western Euphrates. He was cleared of the accusation and in 1333 returned to Rūm as viceroy, a post which he still occupied when called to intervene in the struggles that followed Abū Saʿīd's death. In the summer of 1335 there were rumours that Öz-Beg was again preparing an invasion of the ʾĪl-Khān's dominions. The armies of Baghdad and Diyārbakr were dispatched to Arrān and stationed along the Aq-Su. Abū Saʿīd followed in person; he died in the Qarabāgh area on 30 November 1335, his death being apparently due to poisoning though he had previously been attacked by some epidemic disease. The poison according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,³ was administered by Baghdād Khatun, jealous of a younger rival, Dil-Shād Khatun, the daughter of her brother Dimashq Khwāja and afterwards the wife

¹ *L'Empire des steppes*, p. 464.

² Quoted by Browne, vol. III, pp. 56-7.

³ Transl. Gibb, p. 340.

of Shaikh Hasan-i Buzurg and the mother of his son and successor (1356-74) Shaikh Uvais.

The last of his line, Abū Sa'īd was in no way degenerate or effete. He is described by Ibn Taghribirdī¹ as "a brave and brilliant prince of majestic appearance, generous and witty". He wrote an excellent hand in both the Mongol and the Arabic scripts, was a good musician and composed poetry in Persian, of which two specimens are preserved in the *Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uvais*.² Ibn Taghribirdī also praises him for demolishing churches, though in fact in matters of religion he seems to have continued the tolerant policy of his predecessors. It was during his reign that Pope John XII, by a bull dated 1 May 1318, had founded the archbishopric of Sulṭāniyeh, of which the first incumbent was Francis of Perugia, succeeded in 1323 by William Adam. And if he ignored the pope's exhortation to embrace Christianity he at least paid some attention to his appeal to protect the Christian Armenians against their Muslim neighbours.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE ĪL-KHĀNID STATE

With the death of Abū Sa'īd the House of Hülegü had become virtually extinct. A prince of another line, Arpa Ke'un,³ a great grandson of Tolui's youngest son Arīgh Böke, was raised to the throne as his successor. A Mongol of the old school he showed himself during his brief reign a strong and energetic ruler in complete contrast to the puppets that were to follow him. One of his first acts was to order the execution of Baghdād Khatun, accused of correspondence with the Golden Horde and at least suspected of having poisoned her husband. In the depths of winter he confronted Öz-Beg across the Kur and, by an outflanking movement, put his forces to flight. Returning from this victory he consolidated his position by marrying Princess Sati Beg, the sister of Abū Sa'īd and the widow of Choban; at the same time he put to death several Chingizid princes whom he saw as possible rivals. He had reckoned, however, without 'Alī Pādshāh, the Oirat governor of Bagdad, who proclaimed a new khan, Mūsā, a grandson of Baidu, and took up arms against Arpa. A battle was fought on the Jaghatu on 29 April 1336; Arpa fled, defeated, was captured in Sulṭāniyeh and

¹ Quoted by d'Ohsson, vol. iv, p. 717.

² Persian text, pp. 155-6.

³ I.e. *Prince* Arpa, the Mongol *ke'in* "son", like its Turkish equivalent *oghul*, being used as the title of princes of the blood.

brought to Ūjān, where, on 15 May, he met his end at the hands of the son of one of his own victims. His vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn, the son of Raṣhīd al-Dīn, was already dead, having been executed by the amīrs against 'Alī Pādshāh's wishes.

It was now that Shaiikh Ḥasan-i Buzurg intervened in the struggle for power, setting up as his own claimant a great grandson of Mengü-Temür, a young child called Muḥammad. A battle between the rival khans in the Ala-Tagh area (24 July) resulted, through an act of treachery on the part of Shaiikh Ḥasan, in the defeat of Mūsā and the death of 'Alī Pādshāh. After pursuing Mūsā in the direction of Baghdad and inflicting heavy losses on his followers Ḥasan accompanied Muḥammad to Tabrīz, where he fixed his residence and where he married Princess Dil-Shād, the favourite wife of Abū Sa'īd, who had recently borne him a posthumous child—a daughter. Meanwhile the amīrs in Khurāsān, hostile to Shaiikh Ḥasan, had elected their own khan, Togha-Temür, a descendant in the sixth generation of Chingiz-Khān's brother Jochi-Qasar. Under his leadership they undertook the conquest of Āzarbāijān and 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, arriving in March 1337, before Sulṭāniyeh. Shaiikh Ḥasan judged it prudent to withdraw from Tabrīz into Arrān, and the Khurāsānīs proceeded to overrun the greater part of 'Irāq, clashing with Mūsā's men and finally making common cause with them against Shaiikh Ḥasan. The two princes encountered their opponent in the Marāgheh area, at Soghurluq, according to the *Ta'rikh-i Shaiikh Uvais*,¹ on 15 June. For some unexplained reason Togha-Temür at once retired from the battlefield and did not draw rein until he had reached Bisṭām. Mūsā for his part stood firm and gave a good account of himself, but was none the less defeated, captured in flight and taken to Shaiikh Ḥasan, by whom, on 10 July, he was put to death. Despite his apparently pusillanimous conduct Togha-Temür maintained control over Khurāsān and Māzandarān, while Shaiikh Ḥasan's authority in Āzarbāijān and 'Irāq was challenged from an altogether unexpected quarter.

His new antagonist was another Shaiikh Ḥasan, the son of Temür-Tash and the grandson of Choban, called Shaiikh Ḥasan-i Kūchak or Shaiikh Ḥasan the Little to distinguish him from his namesake. To advance his cause Ḥasan-i Kūchak conceived the idea of passing off a Turkish slave as his father Temür-Tash who, he claimed, had escaped from prison in Egypt and had wandered for several years in distant

¹ Transl. van Loon, p. 64.

lands. By this pretence he attracted to his party both the supporters of the Choban family and also the Oirat tribesman who had fought under Mūsā. Advancing under the banners of his spurious father he engaged Ḥasan-i Buzurg at a place called Naushahr ("New Town") in the Ala-Tagh area on 16 July 1338. The latter, deceived by a ruse of Ḥasan-i Kūchak, withdrew on Tabriz leaving in the lurch his protégé, the young khan Muḥammad, who was captured and killed.

The pseudo-Temūr-Tash now thought to exploit this victory to his own advantage. He attempted to assassinate Ḥasan-i Kūchak, who, however, escaped and made his way to Georgia; he then advanced on Tabriz, hoping to occupy the town before his secret became known. He was defeated by Ḥasan-i Buzurg and, joining the Oirat whom the latter had expelled from Sulṭānīyeh, accompanied them to their encampment in the Baghdad region. Meanwhile Ḥasan-i Kūchak, who had joined Princess Sati Beg in Arrān, proclaimed that lady, the sister of Abū Sa'īd and the widow of his grandfather, as khan and advanced against his rival. The latter fell back on Qazvīn, and Ḥasan-i Kūchak's forces occupied Āzarbāijān; Ḥasan-i Buzurg then launched a counter attack, but before they actually came to blows an uneasy peace had been patched up between them. The advantage now being with his opponent Shaikh Ḥasan-i Buzurg tried another tack: he offered the throne of Abū Sa'īd to Togha-Temūr, who arrived in 'Irāq-i 'Ajam with his following in January or February 1339. By a Machiavellian ruse Ḥasan-i Kūchak succeeded in so discrediting this prince that he withdrew into Khurāsān in the early summer. Ḥasan-i Buzurg then set up yet another khan, Jahān-Temūr, the son of Ala-Fireng and grandson of Geikhātu. Ḥasan-i Kūchak, not to be outdone, deposed Princess Sati Beg and replaced her by Sulaimān, a great grandson of Hülegü's third son Yōshmut, whom he forced her to marry. The two Ḥasans with their rival khans met in battle on the Jaghatu at the end of June 1340: Ḥasan-i Buzurg was defeated and fled to Baghdad, where he deposed Jahān-Temūr and himself assumed sovereignty as the founder of the Jalayir dynasty.¹

The deposition of Jahān-Temūr may be regarded as the final dissolution of the Īl-Khānid state. His rival, it is true, retained his nominal power a year or two longer, surviving the death² of his protector, but

¹ Called also the Īlkāni dynasty after Ḥasan's great grandfather, Ilge (Īlkā) Noyan, one of Hülegü's generals. See van Loon, p. 6.

² He was murdered by his wife in a manner described by Salmān of Sāveh in verses which, as Browne, who reproduces them (*A Literary History of Persia*, vol. III, p. 60), says, "hardly bear translation".

then he too was deposed by Ḥasan-i Kūchak's brother and, like Jahān-Temūr, vanishes into obscurity. So insignificant had these figureheads become that we are not even informed as to the time and manner of their death. The same applies to another puppet, Anushīrvān, of Persian, Turkish or Īl-Khānid origins, who replaced Sulaimān in 1344 and in whose name his Chobanid masters continued to strike coin until 1353. In the latter year Togha-Temūr, the last of the Persian Chingizids, was killed by the first of the Sarbadārs of Sabzavār, who, along with the Jalayirs in Baghdad and Tabriz, the Muẓaffarids in Fārs and the Karts in Herāt, were to fill the vacuum left by the Īl-Khāns until the advent, towards the end of the century, of another Mongol or semi-Mongol conqueror, Tīmūr,¹ born, by a curious coincidence, in the same year in which Abū Saʿīd died.

The Īl-Khāns, and before them the viceroys of the Great Khan, had dominated Western Asia for a period of more than 100 years. The economic decline of that region, induced by the havoc of the invasion, aggravated by the taxation policy of the earlier rulers and only partially arrested by the reforms of Ghazan will be examined elsewhere² in this volume. Here is perhaps the place to consider the more positive consequences of Mongol rule. Unlike the Saljuqs, who entered the Iranian world already converted to Islam and with their backs turned upon their Oghuz past, the Mongols, whilst gradually abandoning their shamanist, Christian or Buddhist beliefs, never forgot their historical origins or severed their ties with their kinsmen in Eastern, Central and Northern Asia. The persistence of national feeling amongst their conquerors may well have strengthened the Persians' own sense of nationalism, reinforcing the effect of what Minorsky has called the "Iranian intermezzo", i.e. the period between the withdrawal of the Arabs and the arrival of the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs, an "interval of Iranian domination" but for which "the national tradition would have become blunted and the Ṣafavids would have found it infinitely more difficult to restore the particular moral and cultural character which distinguishes Persia from her Muslim neighbours".³ Certainly this process of differentiation must have been greatly facilitated by the existence, for almost a century, of a centralized state occupying approximately the same area as the Sassanian

¹ Strictly speaking *Temūr* (in Turkish "Iron"), the Taimūr/Teimūr usual in Middle Eastern countries and even the conventional European Tamerlane representing the original pronunciation more closely than the Orientalist's *Tīmūr*.

² See below, chapter 6.

³ *Studies in Caucasian History*, p. 110 n. 1.

empire and entering, for the first time since the Sassanians, into direct relations with the Christian West. The fact that Persian, under Īl-Khānid patronage, now finally displaced Arabic as the vehicle of historical writing must also have encouraged nationalistic tendencies. But perhaps the greatest, if the least tangible, benefit of Mongol rule was the widening of Persia's horizons. Situated on the communication routes between East and West, Īl-Khānid Iran was exposed to the influence of both China and Europe. The first Chinese to reach Persia seem to have been artillery men—mangonel experts—in the armies of Chingiz-Khān and Hülegü. Among the "numerous company of wise men from various countries"¹ that were gathered around Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in his Marāghēh observatory was one Fu Meng-chi who explained to him the principles of Chinese astronomy. There were, as we have seen, Chinese physicians at the Court of Ghazan. Chinese artists, operating for the most part, we must presume, in the Buddhist temples, were to leave an indelible impression upon Persian miniature painting. European contacts were mainly in the fields of commerce and diplomacy. Since the reign of Hülegü Italian merchants had been established in Tabriz, where they remained and prospered until after the death of Abū Sa'īd; it was from their numbers that the Īl-Khāns recruited their ambassadors and interpreters for the various missions to Europe; the most famous of them, the Polos, escorted from China to Persia a Mongol princess destined to be the bride of Ghazan. There is some evidence of the employment of European artisans: in the correspondence of Rashīd al-Dīn² there is a letter addressed to his son, then governor on the Byzantine frontier, asking for the dispatch of twenty weavers, apparently to be purchased as slaves from a Cypriot slave-dealer. Of intellectual relations the only concrete evidence is Rashīd al-Dīn's *History of the Franks*, which is based on a Latin work translated for him by some unknown scholar, perhaps a monk or friar resident in Tabriz. The collapse of the Īl-Khānid state followed by the rise of the Ming in Eastern and the Ottomans in Western Asia brought an end to all such intercourse. Had Ghazan lived longer or had he shed less royal blood at the commencement of his reign, relations with Europe would have been continued and perhaps intensified with incalculable consequences for the future. What is certain is that the Middle East would today bear an altogether different aspect if the House of Hülegü had retained its full vigour for a decade or two longer.

¹ Barhebraeus, p. 51.² Quoted by Minorsky, "La Perse au Moyen Age", p. 421.




Table 1. The Great Khans and the Yüan Dynasty of China.




Table 2. The Il-Khāns of Persia.




Table 3. The Khans of the Golden Horde, 1237-1357.




Table 4. The Chaghatai Khanate, 1227-1338.

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CHAPTER 4

ABBREVIATIONS

- B.S.O.A.S. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*.
- C.A.J. *Central Asiatic Journal*.
- H.J.A.S. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*.
- J. A. *Journal Asiatique*.
- J.R.A.S. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*.
- J.S.S. *Journal of Semitic Studies*.
- Abū Bakr al-Quṭbī al-Ahrī. *Ta'rīkh-i Shaiikh Uwais*. Ed. and tr. J. B. van Loon. The Hague, 1954.
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